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Health Care Reform and Connecticut’s 
Non-Profi t Hospitals
Jeffrey P. Cohen, William Gerrish, and J. Robert Galvin
The recent federal Health Care Reform Act signed into law by President Obama is expected to lead 
to greater patient volumes at non-profi t hospitals in Connecticut (and throughout the country). The 
fi nancial implications for these hospitals depend on how the costs per patient are expected to change 
in response to the anticipated higher patient volumes. Using a regression analysis of costs with annual 
data on 30 Connecticut hospitals over the period 2006 to 2008, we fi nd that there are considerable dif-
ferences between outpatient and inpatient unit cost structures at these hospitals. Based on the results of 
our analysis, and assuming health care reform leads to an overall increase in the number of outpatients, 
we would expect Connecticut hospitals to experience lower costs per outpatient treated (economies 
of scale). On the other hand, an infl ux of additional inpatients would be expected to raise unit costs 
(diseconomies of scale). After controlling for other cost determinants, we fi nd that the marginal cost of 
an inpatient is about $8,000 while the marginal cost of an outpatient is about $44. This disparity may 
provide an explanation for our fi nding that the effect of additional patient volumes overall (combining 
inpatient and outpatient) is an increase in hospitals’ unit costs. Key words: health care reform, unit costs, 
hospital cost structure, economies of scale, cost elasticities.
The recent historic health care bill passed by the US Congress and signed by President Barack Obama 
is expected to have broad-reaching impli-
cations for many aspects of health care in 
the United States. We examine one specifi c 
aspect in one geographic location—the 
potential implications of higher patient 
volumes that are expected to accompany 
federal health care reform on the fi nancial 
performance of Connecticut’s not-for-profi t 
hospitals. 
Virtually all hospitals in Connecticut are 
non-profi ts. These hospitals operate via 
revenues from several sources including 
Medicare, Medicaid, uncompensated care, 
and non-governmental payers (e.g., private 
insurance). These revenue streams result in 
a complex payer mix, allowing hospitals to 
“cost shift” from the typically lower paying 
public payers (which often pay below cost), 
to the higher paying private payers. That is, 
hospitals utilize the occupancy of private 
pay patients to offset operating losses due to 
below cost public pay reimbursements and 
to maximize overall margins. 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama 
signed into law the comprehensive health 
reform legislation, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. The law makes broad 
changes to the way health insurance will be 
provided and paid for in the United States. 
Starting in 2014, the law will require most 
US citizens to have health insurance, and 
calls for the establishment of state-based 
“exchanges” through which individuals can 
purchase health insurance if they do not have 
access to affordable employer coverage.1 In 
J Health Care Finance 2010;37(2):1–7
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Connecticut, about 10 percent of the total 
population (approximately 335,000 individ-
uals) are uninsured. Under the new law, by 
2014, most of Connecticut’s uninsured will 
become eligible for health benefi ts.2 
Increased access to health care may 
result in positive implications for hospitals. 
Moody’s Investor Service recently projected 
a positive impact for both not-for-profi t and 
for-profi t hospitals as a result of health care 
reform, due to increased volumes of insured 
patients and reductions in unreimbursed 
care.3 Other benefi ts may result from fewer 
emergency department visits and a reduction 
in recurring hospitalizations due to better 
(and possibly less costly) outpatient follow-
up care.
On the other hand, reform may create eco-
nomic pressures for some hospitals. Increased 
patient volume may result in a “slow surge” 
of patients that strains the bed capacity of 
hospitals that are already stretched, due to 
physical, operating, and/or staff limitations. 
While comprised of more insured patients, 
this surge may result in negative operating 
margins if reimbursements are insuffi cient to 
cover overall costs.
Since it is apparent that health care reform 
will lead to increased volumes of hospital 
patients (both inpatient and outpatient) in 
Connecticut (as well as in other states), the 
hypothesis we test is: Hospitals face decreas-
ing unit costs when they treat more patients. 
To empirically test this hypothesis for 
hospitals in Connecticut, and to determine 
how hospitals in the state might be impacted 
by reform, we conduct a statistical analy-
sis to estimate cost function models, using 
 hospital-level data covering the years 2006 
to 2008. We test the above hypothesis sepa-
rately for inpatient days, outpatient visits, and 
for both, across all 30 hospitals in the state.
One objective of this study is to examine 
the current cost structure of Connecticut 
hospitals, with the goal of generating infor-
mation that can be useful in anticipating 
the cost impacts on hospitals of health care 
reform. 
Given the results of our statistical analy-
sis, we can explain how recent variation in 
the numbers of outpatients and inpatients 
in Connecticut hospitals affect unit costs, 
and thus how treatment unit costs may be 
expected to be impacted immediately fol-
lowing health care reform if patient vol-
umes rise as expected. One possible result is 
that additional inpatients and/or outpatients 
would lead to lower unit costs, possibly due 
to current under-utilization of expensive 
equipment or fl uctuations in general capac-
ity utilization. Such a scenario is referred to 
by economists as “economies of scale.” 
Another potential outcome is that greater 
patient volumes might increase unit costs 
(“diseconomies of scale”), perhaps because 
of the lack of fl exibility to expand capac-
ity in the short-run, or because of additional 
costs associated with recruiting qualifi ed 
staff. 
The third possibility is that hospitals may 
already be operating close to their effi cient 
scale, so that a change in patient volumes 
might have no statistically signifi cant effect 
on unit costs of treatment. Also, it is possible 
that some hospitals in the state may be fac-
ing economies of scale, while others may be 
operating with diseconomies of scale or at 
the effi cient scale.
Since some hospitals may see more (or 
less) of a rise in outpatient visits than inpa-
tient days, and outpatient/inpatient cost 
structures may be different, we include sepa-
rate control variables for inpatient days and 
outpatient visits at each hospital. 
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Review of Literature 
Our study differs from previous research 
on hospitals’ economies of scale since we use 
sophisticated regression techniques that are 
well grounded in economic theory, and recent 
hospital-level data across the state of Con-
necticut. The use of data from hospitals across 
the state is important because of variation in 
hospital characteristics across the state (such 
as Medicare and Medicaid patient volumes). 
Other studies have estimated scale econo-
mies for general hospital costs. Early studies 
in the general literature on hospital cost esti-
mation ran regressions of costs on a group 
of variables.4 These early studies did not 
recognize the theoretical conditions the cost 
function needs to satisfy. Some later studies 
began to accommodate regularity conditions 
for output(s) but not for input prices.5 This 
omission precludes appropriate scale econo-
mies measurement.
More recent studies have used more gen-
eral cost functions that allow for interactions 
between output(s) and input(s).6 These stud-
ies show the importance of fl exible func-
tional forms, such as a generalized Leontief 
form, for evaluating cost effi ciency and scale 
economies. However, Cohen and Morrison 
Paul7 and Li and Rosenman8 focus on hos-
pitals in Washington State, and both fi nd 
signifi cant economies of scale for outpatient 
and inpatient treatment. Their analyses also 
cover much older data—for instance, the 
most recent time period covered by either of 
these studies was 2002 by the former—and 
now an updated analysis for another state in a 
different part of the country may be expected 
to yield different insights in light of the pas-
sage of so much time. 
In other words, valid inferences about the 
impact of increased volumes of patients in 
Connecticut in 2010 cannot be made based 
on the magnitude and direction of hospitals’ 
economies of scale estimates in one other 
particular state (WA) found for the year 2002. 
Thus, our research is a contribution because 
it addresses these issues in a current, com-
prehensive and rigorous manner in order to 
explain how health care reform might affect 
hospital costs in Connecticut.
Data
We acquired fi nancial data from the State 
of Connecticut Department of Public Health’s 
Offi ce of Health Care Access (OHCA) on 
30 hospitals over the period 2006 to 2008. 
These data include information on:
Value of property, plant, and equipment 
(which we use for capital stocks); 
Total salaries and benefi ts and full-
time equivalents (we divide salaries by 
full-time equivalents to obtain a “labor 
price”); 
“Other” spending (excluding employ-
ees and capital); 
Inpatient days and outpatient visits 
(each of which we use as separate “out-
put” control variables); 
Medicare and Medicaid visits and dis-
charges (separate shift variable); and 
Whether the hospital is in an urban or 
rural area (a shift variable). 
We also obtained data on the Case-Mix 
index for each hospital (which is a shift vari-
able) from OHCA. 
Approach
The research methodology to estimate 
economies of scale is based on the statisti-
cal techniques of regression analysis. We 
•
•
•
•
•
•
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estimate a regression on a cost function for 
Connecticut hospitals. Microeconomic foun-
dations support the use of such a cost func-
tion as a representation of the underlying 
hospital “production technology,” as long 
as the data satisfy standard regularity condi-
tions.9 These conditions ensure that the cost 
function is consistent with “real world” con-
ditions such as higher costs for greater out-
put or input levels (assuming costs are being 
minimized). Such a specifi cation allows for 
a detailed representation of hospital costs. 
Such a cost function is dependent on the 
outputs, consisting of the quantities of out-
patient visits and inpatient days; the aver-
age prices of the “variable” inputs (e.g., 
average salaries and benefi ts of the “full 
time equivalent” staff and “other” expendi-
tures); the quantities of “fi xed” inputs (e.g., 
owned capital stocks for physical facili-
ties and equipment); and other factors that 
may “shift” the cost function as described 
above. The short-run cost function model for 
each hospital, i, at any point in time, t, can 
be written as: TC
it
  VC
it
(P
it
,Y
it
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it
, K
it
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P
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it
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P
kit
; P
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it
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includes the stock of capital as a fi xed factor 
and omits capital price; and R consists of the 
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We use the generalized Leontief (GL) var-
iable cost function, as opposed to the trans-
log that has been used by some researchers. 
Hospitals treating only either inpatients or 
outpatients will have a “0” for the other out-
put type. This is problematic for the translog 
since log(0) is undefi ned. The GL avoids this 
issue. The GL functional form is: 
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, where 
VC is hospital i’s total variable costs; 
Y represents the “outputs” (inpatient 
days and outpatient visits); K is private 
capital stock; the P
nit
 are the variable 
input prices (employee wages/benefi ts; 
and total “other” spending); R repre-
sents “shift” factors (an indicator vari-
able for “urban”; a hospital case-mix 
index; and Medicare/Medicaid inpa-
tient days and outpatient visits); and 
u
it
 is a random error term assumed to 
have a normal distribution with mean 
zero and constant variance. The α and 
δ (with subscripts as above) are regres-
sion parameters.
After we estimate the cost function model, 
we can obtain estimates for elasticities of 
scale for hospitals in each state, as averages 
of the elasticity for all hospitals. The elas-
ticity of variable costs with respect to each 
output type, which is often referred to as an 
“elasticity of scale,” can be written as the 
ratio of marginal costs to average costs. 
If the combined output elasticity is statis-
tically signifi cantly less than one, this pro-
vides evidence of economies of scale; that is, 
average costs would be greater than marginal 
costs, so average costs are decreasing with 
additional output. This trend implies that if 
hospitals treat more patients, the unit cost of 
treating these patients is lower. The opposite 
is true if this elasticity is statistically sig-
nifi cantly greater than one. When marginal 
costs are equal to average costs, or their ratio 
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is insignifi cantly different from one, this sce-
nario is described as the effi cient scale. 
One potential explanation for economies 
of scale is indivisible inputs. For instance, 
when a hospital builds physical space but 
is not using it to full capacity, the unit costs 
of treatment would be higher than when the 
facility is fi lled to capacity. 
Economies of scale when there are multiple 
outputs (which here is for hospitals treating 
both inpatients and outpatients) are typically 
measured as the sum of the cost elasticities 
with respect to the outputs:10  ε
TC,Y
  ε
VC,Y
  
Σ
m 
VC/Y
m
•(Y
m
/VC)   Σ
m 
log VC/log 
Y
m
, where m represents individual outputs 
(inpatient days, outpatient visits) and “log” 
is the natural (base e) logarithm. 
When there is only one output or when it 
is desirable to examine economies of scale 
together for inpatient and outpatient treat-
ments, scale economies are given by ε
TC,Y
  
ε
VC,Y
  VC/Y•(Y/ VC)  log VC/log 
Y  (% change VC)/(% change Y). If costs 
increase less (or more) than proportionally 
with a one percent increase in output levels, 
i.e., if ε
VC,Y
<1 (or ε
VC,Y
>1), economies (or 
diseconomies) of scale prevail. If a one per-
cent increase in output levels leads to exactly 
a one percent increase in costs (i.e., ε
VC,Y
1), 
then hospitals are at their effi cient scale, and 
changes in patient volume would not have 
any signifi cant impact on unit costs. 
Results
Descriptive statistics of the data for the 30 
hospitals in our sample over the years 2006 
to 2008 are presented in Figure 1. The aver-
age hospital in the sample faced total costs of 
about $250 million, employed about 1,640 
workers (full-time equivalents), and paid 
those workers an average salary of about 
$81,000. The range of average salary across 
hospitals was between $59,000 and about 
$101,000. The smallest hospital employed 
283 full time equivalents, while the larg-
est hospital employed over 6,000 full time 
equivalents. An average of 69,200 inpatient 
Figure 1. Descriptive Statistics Number of Observations: 
90 (Annual Data on 30 hospitals, Covering the Years 2006–2008)
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
TCOST 2.47610D+08 1.99370D+08 4.72522D+07 1.05791D+09
KSTOCK 9.73537D+07 7.30748D+07 1.84713D+07 2.93794D+08
TOTFTE 1640.48 1282.32 283 6343.8999
WAGE_RATE 81282.56502 7797.94 59314.69531 101886.0234
IPDAYS 69200.5 58843.99694 11268 272757
OUTPAT_TOTAL 216712.3667 142666.7386 37047 659127
MCARE_DAY 33596.4 25469.64896 58 99749
MCAID_DAY 10449.91111 12253.04931 303 62488
NONWAGE_EXP 1.13670D+08 9.74098D+07 2.08518D+07 5.32018D+08
CMI 1.340 0.232 0.888 2.223
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days and 216,000 outpatients were treated at 
each hospital. 
After estimating the statistical model 
described above using least squares regres-
sion techniques, we obtain parameter esti-
mates for all of the α and δ parameters. 
These parameters are used to obtain the elas-
ticity estimates that we present in Figure 2. 
While we do not present the results for the 
individual regression parameter estimates 
here, they are available from the authors 
upon request. 
First, it is noteworthy to mention that after 
controlling for all other cost determinants, 
the marginal cost of an outpatient is about 
$44, while the marginal cost of an inpatient 
is about $8,000. These marginal costs are 
tied to the elasticities of costs with respect 
to outpatients and inpatients (note that the 
respective t-statistics are the same). This is 
because the elasticity of scale for each type 
of patient treatment is the marginal cost 
divided by the average cost. The elasticity 
of costs with respect to outpatients is 0.038, 
which is statistically signifi cantly greater 
than zero at the one-tailed, 5 percent level 
(P-value0.058). It is also statistically 
signifi cantly less than one, implying that 
additional outpatients would be expected to 
lead to lower unit costs of outpatients.
The picture is somewhat different for inpa-
tients. The elasticity of costs with respect to 
inpatients is 2.28, which is statistically sig-
nifi cantly greater than zero at all levels of 
signifi cance (P-value0.000). Moreover, 
this elasticity is statistically signifi cantly 
greater than one, which implies that addi-
tional inpatients would be expected to result 
in higher unit costs of inpatients. This may 
be because many Connecticut hospitals are 
stretched in terms of available beds, so addi-
tional patients at the margin would make it 
more costly to treat each existing patient.
When we assess the elasticity of scale with 
respect to both inpatients and outpatients 
together, we fi nd strong evidence of disec-
onomies of scale. In other words, increas-
ing total patients (due to increases in either 
inpatients and/or outpatients) leads to higher 
overall unit costs.
It is also noteworthy to mention that hos-
pital costs have been increasing over time, 
after controlling for all other determinants 
of hospital costs. The elasticity of costs with 
respect to time is 0.04 and statistically signif-
icant (P-value  0.013), implying that costs 
Figure 2. Elasticity Estimates
Elasticity Estimate Std. Error t-statistic P-value
eTC, outpat 0.038458 0.020326 1.89204 [.058]
eTC, inpat 2.23235 0.17758 12.571 [.000]
eTC, both 2.27081 0.174912 12.9826 [.000]
MCinpat 7987.69 635.408 12.571 [.000]
MCoutpat 43.9412 23.2243 1.89204 [.058]
eTC,t 0.044141 0.017749 2.48691 [.013]
eTC,K -0.04023 0.037082 -1.08478 [.278]
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increased by about 4 percent annually over 
the period of the sample (2006 to 2008).
Conclusions 
Federal health care reform is expected to 
lead to additional people seeking health care 
treatment. Some of these additional patient 
volumes will be absorbed by hospitals. In 
Connecticut, our analysis shows that addi-
tional outpatients should lower unit costs of 
treatment, while additional inpatients should 
lead to signifi cantly higher unit treatment 
costs. Also, when assessing the situation 
overall without distinguishing between inpa-
tients and outpatients, greater patient vol-
umes in Connecticut hospitals should lead to 
signifi cantly higher unit costs. 
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 Understanding the Health Care 
 Business Model:  The Financial 
 Analysts’ Point of View 
 Per Nikolaj Bukh and Christian Nielsen 
 This study focuses on how fi nancial analysts understand the strategy of a health care company and 
which elements, from such a strategy perspective, they perceive as constituting the cornerstone of a 
health care company’s business model. The empirical part of this study is based on semi-structured 
interviews with analysts following a large health care company listed on the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange. The authors analyse how the fi nancial analysts view strategy and value creation within the 
framework of a business model. Further, the authors analyze whether the characteristics emerging from a 
comprehensive literature review are refl ected in the fi nancial analysts’ perceptions of which information 
is decision-relevant and important to communicate to the fi nancial markets. Among the conclusions of 
the study is the importance of distinguishing between the health care companies’ business model and 
the model by which the payment of revenues are allocated between end users and reimbursing organi-
zations. Key Words:  Strategy, business models, disclosure, fi nancial analysts, revenue streams. 
 F or the health care sector in general, the customer base is growing stead-ily. In developed countries the demo-
graphic changes will in the coming decades 
increase the percentage of elderly consider-
ably, because of the post-World War II baby 
boom as well as the fact that our lifespan 
also is increasing. In the developing coun-
tries,  e.g ., the so-called BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China), higher 
living standards will give rise to the crea-
tion of large health care sectors. However, 
this does not imply that health care compa-
nies will be greeting times of  unwarranted 
prosperity. As globalization creates greater 
demands for health care services, globali-
zation too will create greater competi-
tion for health care companies. Therefore, 
explaining and communicating uniqueness, 
profi tability, and strategy,  i.e ., the business 
model, will play a vital role in attracting 
capital. This article thus studies the con-
stituents of a health care company’s busi-
ness model through the eyes of the analysts 
follow ing it.  
 The capital market plays an important role 
in our present day society as it facilitates 
the distribution of capital between inves-
tors and companies. Within the realm of the 
capital market, information plays a central 
role because of, for example, agency costs 1 
and the fact that there is information asym-
metry 2 between company management and 
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 investors. Recent research in relation to 
IPOs in the health care industry 3 suggests 
that new companies entering the market rep-
resent great peril to the investment commu-
nity because a mere fi nancial analysis of the 
company is insuffi cient to understand future 
profi tability in this sector.  
 By means of the annual report, Web pages, 
investor meetings, conference calls, as well 
as private meetings, publicly listed health 
care companies provide information to the 
capital market,  i.e ., investors and fi nancial 
analysts, in order to minimize such informa-
tion asymmetry. In principle, the disclosure 
of additional relevant non-fi nancial informa-
tion, for example, relating to the pipeline and 
relevant partnerships across the pharmaceu-
tical industry, is expected to lower the cost 
of equity capital 4 because increased disclo-
sure reduces information asymmetry and 
lowers investor uncertainty about the future 
prospects of the company, thus facilitating a 
more precise valuation of the company, as 
discussed by Botosan. 5 It is, however, not 
suffi cient that credible, reliable, and neu-
tral information is conveyed to the capital 
market. The information should also be rel-
evant in relation to assessing aspects of the 
company’s current and future performance, 
and, more importantly, the investors and 
analysts should be able to comprehend this 
information.  
 Most literature concerning supplementary 
reporting models 6 and voluntary disclosure 
in general 7 suggests that information on the 
strategy of the company, in the form of key 
value drivers, should form the basis for dis-
closure of information and therefore also for 
the dialogue with fi nancial analysts. From a 
strategy perspective, such a reporting model 
or framework for disclosure is offered by the 
concept of a  business model and Lev 8 has 
previously argued that the existing problem 
of lacking transparency in corporate report-
ing can be overcome by basing disclosure 
on the company’s business model. Business 
models have earlier been intimately con-
nected with e-business; 9 however, the con-
cept as such has a much broader meaning in 
recent management literature.  
 The aim of this study is to identify which 
elements a health care business model could 
consist of in order to form the basis for the 
communication between management and 
fi nancial analysts. Previous literature on 
business models has mostly been based on 
theoretically anchored models of, for exam-
ple, value creation—relationships between 
resources or growth drivers where one or 
sometimes a few companies have been used 
as cases or illustrations of the models. This 
article, however, does not attempt to verify 
the usefulness of a specifi c perspective on 
business models. Rather, we take fi nancial 
analysts’ understandings of strategy and 
strategy related elements as a starting point, 
and then analyse the business model of a 
health care company, in turn identifying the 
elements that fi nancial analysts mobilise 
when they understand, analyse, describe, 
and rationalise strategy.  
 Thus, the main contribution of this study 
is the identifi cation of the elements that con-
stitute fi nancial analysts’ concrete under-
standing of the health care business model 
since a more general formulation of a busi-
ness model should comprehend building 
blocks that can facilitate the communication 
of these elements. 
 The empirical part of this article is based 
on interviews with 12 fi nancial analysts from 
European investment banks about the busi-
ness model of a large health care company 
listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. 
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Our focus when conducting the interviews 
was on identifying the general elements that 
constitute a business model from the ana-
lysts’ point of view. In this article the inter-
views are analyzed using a coding approach 
where codes determined from a compre-
hensive survey of the literature on business 
models are taken as a starting point.  
 The remainder of this article is structured 
as follows: After an introduction to the infor-
mation needs of analysts, we introduce the 
concept of a business model. Then we review 
the literature on business models focusing on 
the identifi cation of specifi c characteristics, 
followed by an introduction of the research 
methodology and the interview data, and the 
empirical analysis of the health care case-
company structured around the business 
model characteristics, respectively. Finally, 
we offer conclusions on the study and fur-
ther avenues of research. 
 Analysts’ Information Needs 
 Both from the perspective of the fi nan-
cial markets and accounting organizations, a 
growing frustration with traditional fi nancial 
reporting has been evident in the last two dec-
ades. Such frustrations have been expressed 
in the ‘Jenkins Report,’ 10 the work of the 
former commissioner of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Steven Wall-
man 11 and, more recently by the Accounting 
Standard Board 12 and The Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants. 13 
 Various studies of investors’ and analysts’ 
information demands 14 indicate a substantial 
difference between the types of information 
found in companies’ annual reports and the 
types of information demanded by the capi-
tal market. 15 This information gap is partly 
due to an increased demand for non- fi nancial 
information,  i.e ., concerning the company’s 
strategy and competencies, and its ability to 
motivate the staff, increase customer satis-
faction, etc. However, this information gap 
may also be due to a lack of understanding 
of business models and of proper communi-
cation between company management and 
the capital market. 16 In this respect, Nils-
son  et al. 17 suggest that the main objective 
of applying a business model approach is 
to bridge the communication gap between 
management and external stakeholders, as 
shared models become a platform for creat-
ing common understanding. 
 From the fi nancial analysts’ point of view, 
information disclosed in the annual report or 
in a supplementary report only constitutes 
one part, maybe even an inferior part, of the 
information set needed to make recommen-
dations to clients. This is because fi nancial 
analysts are in a privileged position to “get 
more information—and sooner—than all 
[other information users] except the very 
largest investors.” 18 Thus it might be the 
case that information provided in the annual 
report has value relevance, but the analysts 
have already a much more detailed under-
standing about, for example, the research 
and development activities than what could 
be gained from reading about the aggregated 
research and development expenses.  
 The Business Model as Basis 
for Corporate Communication 
 Changes in the nature of value creation 
have inevitably called for new reporting 
metrics and frameworks. Blair and Wall-
man 19 argue for instance that a model for 
business reporting refl ects the dynamics of 
wealth creation. Business reporting should 
essentially constitute a representation of the 
company’s business model “by describing 
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the  relationships among the various input 
measures and outcome measures, and to link 
the primary inputs to intermediate inputs 
and, ultimately, to fi nancial performance and 
other measures of total value creation.” 20 
 Competition now increasingly stands 
between competing business concepts as 
Hamel 21 argues and not only between con-
stellations of companies linked together in 
linear value chains, as was the underlying 
notion in the original strategy framework 
by Porter. 22 If companies within the same 
industry operate on the basis of different 
business models, different competencies 
and knowledge resources are utilized in 
the value creation processes, and the mere 
benchmarking of fi nancial or non-fi nancial 
indicators will not provide insight in the 
profi t or growth potential of the company. 
Comparisons of the specifi c company with 
its peer group require interpretation within 
an understanding of differences in business 
models. 
 The business model concept has intimate 
connections to corporate disclosure and the 
ongoing debate about transparency. Since 
forward-looking information can be diffi cult 
to comprehend if it is not mobilized within 
the relevant context, supplementary disclo-
sures must be linked to value creation. 23 
 There exists a substantial amount of lit-
erature on business models. However, there 
is no generally accepted defi nition of what a 
business model is and the theoretical ground-
ing of most business model defi nitions is 
rather fragile. Nielsen 24 offers a defi nition 
along the lines of: “A company’s business 
model describes its collaborative portfolio 
of strategy choices put in place for the han-
dling of the processes and relationships that 
drive value creation on operational, tactical 
and executive levels.” Furthermore, business 
model defi nitions vary signifi cantly as they 
are derived from a number of different per-
spectives. In this study we are interested in 
how business models can form the basis for 
communication between management and 
fi nancial analysts.  
 Thus, we perceive the business model as 
a management technology that helps man-
agement communicate and share its under-
standing of the business logic to external 
stakeholders, 25 in our case primarily analysts 
and investors. The notion here is that man-
agement must explain the company’s unique 
value proposition to external parties, as 
Sandberg 26 states: “Spell out how your busi-
ness is different from all the others.” Finally, 
the mere process of modelling the business 
helps management in identifying and under-
standing the relevant elements of its busi-
ness, 27 such as, for example, value drivers 
and other causal relationships.  
 Characteristics of the Business Model 
 It is not possible to cover all literature 
on business models within the scope of this 
article, but in this section we review those 
parts of the literature that we have found 
representative or most relevant in developing 
a business model framework useful in cor-
porate communication. We have as shown 
in Figure 1 chosen to structure our review 
around nine topics that are typically dis-
cussed in the literature on business models. 
These areas, which are termed ‘character-
istics of business models’ are in this article 
grouped in three overall categories covering 
the areas that are most often included as part 
of a business model: 
 The overall criteria that determine long-
term performance; 
•
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 The point(s) of departure for creating 
products and services; and  
 The key interconnections that drive the 
value generation of the company. 
 Criteria for Long-Term Performance 
 While the ultimate goal from an extreme 
shareholder perspective could be said to 
increase the stock price by creating profi t, 
business models sometimes address broader 
criteria such as  sustainable development , 
which implies that focus is shifted from mere 
profi t orientation towards sustainable enter-
prises and an economic reality that connects 
industry, society, and the environment. 28 This 
need for linking sustainable development to 
business strategy is for instance acknowl-
edged by Funk, 29 who characterizes the sus-
tainable organization as “one whose charac-
teristics and actions are designed to lead to a 
‘desirable future state’ for  all stakeholders,” 
and by Afuah and Tucci 30 who argue that the 
business model concerns sustainable devel-
opment through the company’s unique value 
confi guration. 
 In using the notion of a business model 
as our key concept in this study we have 
•
•
 implicitly assumed that it comprehends 
something more than  strategy or at least 
is a concept different from strategy. In this 
sense Magretta 31 is clear when she states that 
“business models describe, as a system, how 
the pieces of a business fi t together. But they 
don’t factor in one critical dimension: com-
petition,” which implies that she fi nds com-
panies’ competitive basis to be completely 
outside the business model. 
 Another perspective is offered by Czuchry 
and Yasin 32 who argue that a business model 
is not necessarily successful by itself because 
companies must integrate and align strategic 
and operational efforts, activities, resources, 
and decisions into a systematic organiza-
tional strategy, thus indicating that strategy 
is an integrated component of a business 
model. Departing from this discussion, 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom 33 argue that 
while business models are more oriented 
towards value creation and sustainable devel-
opment from a bounded rationality perspec-
tive, strategy theory is more apt to consider 
value creation from a shareholder perspec-
tive, and suppose full analytical rationality 
of decision-makers.  
 Figure 1. Overview of Business Model Characteristics
1. Criteria for Long-Term Performance • Sustainable development
• Strategy
• Improving the business and innovation
2. Points of Departure for Creating 
Products and Services
• Resource base
• Value chain
• Value proposition
3. Interconnections That Drive Value • Value drivers
• Value creation
• Causal relationships
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 Finally, business models have also been 
associated with company’s efforts to  improve 
the business and innovate . Much early lit-
erature 34 departed in how new technology, 
most notably the Internet, revolutionized 
certain industries and changed the feasibil-
ity of existing business models. This was 
for instance illustrated by Gallaugher 35 who 
showed how e-commerce enabled the emer-
gence of new business models.  
 Also from an innovation perspective Kart-
seva et al. 36 suggest the business model as a 
basis for strategic analysis since it offers the 
possibility for mapping new business ideas 
graphically in a clear and communicable 
fashion. In this way business models facili-
tate change because of their building-block-
like approach to formulating the business 
logic of a company. 
 Points of Departure for Creating 
Products and Services 
 In this section we take a closer look at how 
business models describe elements of the 
organization that are a part of the company’s 
performance. Performance-related elements 
are elements that relate to the actual struc-
ture of the company. We distinguish between 
three characteristics: 
1.  Resource base; 
2.  Value chain; and 
3.  Value proposition.  
 The company’s resource base is impor-
tant, as there has been a lot of focus on which 
resources actually drive company value crea-
tion. For example, in the knowledge society 
it is stated that primarily knowledge drives 
value creation. Along these lines, Miller 
et al. 37 argue that capabilities are the back-
bone of a company’s competitive advantage 
because resources are a more stable element 
on which to base sustainable development 
than competitive strategy in a highly vola-
tile business environment. Klaila 38 explains 
how the business model helps to identify the 
critical behaviours, competencies, and mar-
ket conditions and account for the compa-
ny’s resources of intellectual capital. From 
the resource-based perspective we must per-
ceive resources in the sense of being assets 39 
and inputs to the value creation process of 
the company. As it is diffi cult for organiza-
tions to understand the role of knowledge 
resources in their value creation, 40 the busi-
ness model approach becomes advantageous 
by visualizing the company’s capability con-
fi gurations, which are the cohesive combina-
tion of resources and capabilities embedded 
within its infrastructure, and which generate 
value. 41  
 Porter defi nes the value chain as a basic 
tool for analyzing the sources of competi-
tive advantage of the company, by enabling 
systematic examination of all the activities 
a company performs and how these activi-
ties interact. 42 Every company is essentially 
a collection of interdependent activities that 
are performed to create value. The value 
chain can also be perceived as, according to 
Shank and Govindarajan, 43 a generic concept 
for organizing our thinking about strategic 
positioning. They defi ne the value chain as 
“the linked set of value-creating activities all 
the way from basic raw materials to the ulti-
mate end-use product delivered into the fi nal 
consumers’ hands.” 44 Within the notions of 
business models, the value chain comprises 
the company’s activities and organization 45 
and the structure of the company. 46 In Bell 
 et al. ’s 47 framework, core business proc-
esses and activities, and the analysis hereof, 
are viewed in the light of a value chain 
 perspective. Likewise, Chesbrough and 
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Rosenbloom 48 imply that the value chain 
perspective leads to identifi cation of the 
activities and assets (inputs) that are neces-
sary to deliver the company’s value proposi-
tion (outputs).  
 However, there exist other value confi gu-
ration models than the value chain. Stabell 
and Fjeldstad 49 suggest that the value chain 
is but one of three generic value confi gura-
tion models. Stabell and Fjeldstad 50 distin-
guish between three generic value confi gu-
ration models: 
1.  The value chain; 
2.  The value shop; and 
3.  The value network. 
 They argue that such a distinction is 
required in order to create an understand-
ing and ultimately facilitate the analysis of 
company-level value creation across a broad 
range of industries and companies. Accord-
ing to Giertz, 51 each type of business is based 
on this kind of unique value creation logic. 
Understanding and managing companies, 
he argues, thus requires a simulation that 
will test the business model and its strategy. 
Sweet 52 argues for the necessity of under-
standing how the business model and its 
value creating elements work, as a prereq-
uisite for managing the company. Ramirez 53 
too, offers an alternative view to that associ-
ated with value creation in industrial produc-
tion, arguing that technical breakthroughs 
and social innovations in actual value crea-
tion render the alternative, a so-called value 
co-production framework.  
 The value proposition or offering of the 
company depicts which value it intends to 
deliver to its customers. “A ‘business model’ 
is … a precise defi nition of who customers 
are, and how the company intends to  satisfy 
their needs both today and tomorrow.” 54 
Morris’s defi nition, departing in the value of 
the companies offering to the end users, is 
very close to the defi nition of the knowledge 
narrative from the Danish guideline for intel-
lectual capital statements. The knowledge 
narrative “expresses the company’s ambition 
to increase the value a user receives from a 
company’s goods or services.” 55 Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom 56 similarly defi ne the value 
proposition as the value created for the user 
of the company’s offering. According to 
Webb and Gile, 57 departing from the notion 
of customer needs is the only true strategic 
approach to take, thereby arguing against the 
previous literature stating that the compa-
ny’s resources ought to be the starting point 
for strategy formulation. For Hedman and 
Kalling 58 the company’s value proposition is 
equivalent to the generic strategy of the com-
pany. In a likewise manner, Alt and Zimmer-
mann 59 defi ne the value proposition as a part 
of the company’s mission statement together 
with its vision and strategic goals.  
 Each type of business has its unique value 
proposition logic 60 as the value proposition 
is closely linked to the products and services 
delivered.  
 Interconnections That Drive Value 
 The fi nal category of business model char-
acteristics concerns descriptions of internal 
linkages in the company related to perform-
ance and creating value. By performance-
related linkages we mean elements such as 
value drivers, value creation processes, and 
causality between, for example, activities, 
resources, and processes. These three cat-
egories regard the internal aspects of a com-
pany’s business model because they all are 
concerned with  how value is created. Bray 61 
perceives value drivers as the link between 
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key  performance indicators and business 
objectives, at the same time underlining 
that value drivers are not outcome-oriented 
key performance indicators; rather they are 
forward-oriented performance measures. 
As value drivers imply causal relationships, 
they are more clearly visualized in a busi-
ness model.  
 As Bray depicted above, key performance 
indicators are linked to business objectives 
via identifi cation of the key drivers of value, 
which in turn can be interpreted as key suc-
cess factors. 62 Value drivers are not static 
performance measures. Rather they will 
vary over time, both within a business cycle 
and from business cycle to business cycle. 63 
Eventually the company’s present value-
drivers will be replaced. This may be a result 
of the company changing its strategy or busi-
ness model, which must have an effect on the 
drivers involved in the value chain and value 
creation process, or it could be an effect of 
the changing external environment. 
 A business model is inevitably a represen-
tation of how the company creates value, and 
 value creation , therefore, is a cornerstone of 
the business model concept. The external pre-
requisite, the value proposition, is a central 
notion when referring to the internal prerequi-
site value creation, as the company’s offering 
affects which value it must create and deliver 
to its customers and the users of its products 
or services. According to Linder and Can-
trell, 64 “a real business model is the organiza-
tion’s core logic for creating value.” Alt and 
Zimmermann 65 also link the business model 
to value creation, by stating that it describes 
the logic that lies behind the actual processes 
of a ‘business system’ for creating value. 
 The ability of establishing precise con-
nections and causal links and relationships 
between knowledge resources, competences, 
intellectual capital, etc., and the value crea-
tion of an organization, has been in the inter-
est of the business and academic communi-
ties for a long time. Via a business model 
approach it is possible to identify causal 
loops that depict linkages between key per-
formance measures and fi nancial results 66 
and that link combinations of assets to value 
creation. 67 
 Data and Research Methodology 
 In the empirical part of this article, we 
examine the fi nancial analyst’s way of think-
ing about strategy and business models in 
terms of the techniques, methodologies, pro-
cedures, systems, presentations, frameworks, 
etc., that are used when they articulate their 
understandings of the strategy of a specifi c 
Danish case company, Coloplast.  
 In addressing this issue a qualitative 
research approach will be used. Financial 
analysts that regularly analyze the company, 
participate in corporate presentations, etc., 
and thus have a detailed knowledge about 
the company, its strategy and the industry, 
have been interviewed and the interviews 
are analyzed where the nine characteristics 
of the business model have been used as a 
starting point for the analysis of the data. 
 The Case Company, Coloplast 
 The case company, Coloplast ( www. 
coloplast.com ), founded in 1957, is a world-
wide provider of high quality and innovative 
health care products and services, and is 
represented in 30 countries. In the fi scal year 
2006/07, its revenue amounted to approx. 
€ 1.070 mill., and group profi t before tax was 
approx. € 80 mill. Coloplast employs more 
than 7,000 people, 2,500 of them working 
in Denmark, and the fi rm has production 
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 facilities in six countries with approximately 
75 percent of Coloplast’s products being 
produced in Denmark.  
 Coloplast’s vision is to be the preferred 
source of medical devices and associated 
services, contributing to a better quality of 
life for the users of its products. Via close 
customer relationships, Coloplast aims at 
fulfi lling the customer’s needs with innova-
tive, high-quality solutions. Further, Colo-
plast seeks to earn customer loyalty through 
responsiveness and dependability. 
 With respect to communicating externally 
about performance drivers, strategy, and 
knowledge resources, Coloplast is rather 
unique. Since 1998, Coloplast has published 
a supplementary section on intellectual capi-
tal, shareholders, and other external stake-
holders as an integral part of its annual report. 
In Denmark, Coloplast’s business reporting 
is generally regarded as a best-practise case. 
The company was for instance used as one 
of the main cases in the fi rst Danish guide-
line for intellectual capital reporting, 68 and 
was suggested by DiPiazza and Eccles 69 as 
the main example of disclosing information 
on “how the company creates value.” Fur-
thermore, in October 2005, Coloplast won 
the Danish Financial Analyst Associations 
prize for best fi nancial report for the second 
time in three years. 
 The Interview Data 
 The data collection was based on semi-
structured interviews covering four themes, 
each with a number of associated questions 
according to an interview guide. If possible 
the wording and the order of the questions 
remained unchanged for all respondents; 
however, the respondents were allowed to 
talk freely and the questions were adjusted 
according to that. The form of  interviewing 
chosen was based on the principle of dia-
logue between the interviewer and the 
respondent 70 and has some similarities with 
the type of interview that Yin 71 calls ‘focused 
interviews.’ 
 We interviewed all the sell-side analysts 
that followed Coloplast on a regular basis. 
The contact information of 12 analysts in 
total was attained from Coloplast and the 
analysts were contacted by the research-
ers after having received a letter of recom-
mendation from Coloplast’s Chief Financial 
Offi cer. All analysts confi rmed that they 
performed regular analyses of Coloplast 
including the dissemination of these through 
analyst reports and all were willing to par-
ticipate in the research project.  
 Of the 12 analysts actively following 
Coloplast eight were Scandinavian while 
four were large European investment banks 
located in Copenhagen, Stockholm, or Lon-
don. The typical analyst specialized in four to 
six companies within the medico-technology 
sector and sporadically followed four to six 
major competing companies. However, there 
were also analysts with a broader focus, and 
some analysts were actively following up to 
15 to 20 companies. All analysts were inter-
viewed in December 2003, a few weeks after 
Coloplast’s annual earnings announcement.  
 Our focus when conducting the interviews 
was on the general building blocks or ele-
ments that constitute a business model from 
the analysts’ point of view. The interviews 
were structured around four themes. First, 
we focused at the  analyst’s background, 
experience, and specialization. Next we 
shifted focus to the  company , Coloplast, ask-
ing broadly about how the analyst perceives 
the company, its management, strategy, 
value creation, and what critical information 
they look for, etc. Thirdly, we asked about 
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the analysis  process ,  i.e ., what information 
is used, how the information is used, how 
the interaction with the company is, how the 
information is structured during the analysis, 
etc. As a continuation of the issues around 
the process we ended the interview by ask-
ing about the  annual report , how it was used, 
how the different parts were perceived, etc.  
 The themes and questions were kept as 
close to the daily routines of the analysts as 
possible and we attempted to avoid refer-
ring to specifi c notions from the literature 
on business models. As a structuring device, 
we used an interview guide with a number 
of pre-determined questions or sub-themes 
for each interview theme. Not all questions 
were necessarily brought up in every inter-
view, and as far as possible we let the ana-
lysts create their own structure during the 
interviews.  
 Analysis 
 Taking the nine business model character-
istics identifi ed earlier as a point of depar-
ture,  see Figure 1, our analysis focuses on 
how and why these are mobilized by the 
respondents during the interviews.  
 The Overall Criteria for Performance 
 First of all, it is remarkable that the fi rst 
characteristic, sustainable development, 
is not mentioned at all, while strategy was 
referred to rather constantly. This is rather 
interesting because the case company, Colo-
plast, spends a lot of energy in its fi nancial 
report, on the Internet and in presentations 
on communicating about how its products 
relate to creating quality of life for users and 
how the company works towards a healthy 
environment in the local community and for 
employees.  
 As previously described, strategy along 
with competitive advantage actually rep-
resented the analysts’ overall approach to 
understanding the business model. Strat-
egy concerned the mobilization of the core 
elements of the organization. Through the 
notions of strategy, the analysts described, 
often in great detail, how Coloplast’s value 
creation was constituted, also depicting 
how these elements were adjusted to Colo-
plast’s value proposition, company values, 
and vision. Strategy therefore relates to the 
different elements of the business (model) 
that are an integral part of the value creation 
process,  i.e ., production, distribution, and 
logistics, along with marketing aspects.  
 Strategy also relates to strategic manage-
ment processes, such as disclosure strategy 
and the management of the fi nancial posi-
tion, such as investment and disclosure strat-
egy. In this sense, the business model to a 
great extent concerns core elements of the 
company’s value creation process. It is also 
intimately connected with competitive strat-
egy, as strategy becomes important in rela-
tion to the key business model characteris-
tics of the company,  i.e ., how the company 
mobilizes each core value creation (business 
model) element in order to create competi-
tive advantage. If we differentiate between 
corporate strategy and strategy on an opera-
tive level, it would be compelling to suggest 
that the company’s overall strategy is its busi-
ness model and strategy on the more detailed 
levels concerns the ways of effectuating it.  
 Efforts with respect to improving the busi-
ness are often mentioned as points within 
the realm of ‘changes in strategy.’ Moving 
production facilities overseas, increased 
focus on cost reduction and effi ciency, and 
efforts with respect to maintaining quality 
in production, thereby ensuring excellence 
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in products, are drawn forth meticulously 
by the respondents. Improving the busi-
ness is also connected with innovation and 
product improvement. In Coloplast’s case, 
innovation is mentioned mainly in the sense 
of product development. One analyst com-
mented that, “maintaining their high degree 
of product innovation is a key driver of 
growth [for Coloplast].” Thus, innovation 
is connected to future performance from an 
excellence perspective in the sense that mar-
ket growth is achieved through better than 
average products.  
 Performance-Related Elements 
 The second category, performance-related 
elements, relates to overall modules that 
make up the company. For example, the 
value proposition or offering of the company 
relates to what the products or services do 
for users and customers. The resource base 
concerns the assets and inputs necessary for 
creating the offering, while the value chain 
regards the structure of the company and its 
value creation process. The resource base is 
related to the assets and inputs that are prereq-
uisites for making the company’s products. 
Thus it is a prerequisite for value creation. In 
production companies inputs are normally 
raw materials or components. In Coloplast’s 
case, this would be plastic and other mate-
rials. But assets and inputs are more than 
merely materials. First of all, being a capi-
tal intensive production company, fi nancial 
assets become of the utmost importance. For 
example, capital is a necessity for increasing 
production capacity. An important resource 
base is also technology. In Coloplast’s case, 
it is the so-called adhesive-technology that 
is the central aspect. This technology was 
emphasized as the main synergy connect-
ing Coloplast’s various  business areas, 
although some analysts declared it too low-
 technological to be a distinct competitive 
advantage for the company.  
 Also among the core resources in Colo-
plast are the employees. Respondents argued 
for the importance in not only having the 
right employees, but moreover having satis-
fi ed employees. Finally, knowledge about the 
customer and the customer’s needs are a cen-
tral resource for Coloplast’s value creation.  
 The value chain perspective was also 
partly illustrated above in the analysts’ 
understanding of strategy and the business 
model. When the analysts were asked about 
their views of Coloplast’s strategy, a major 
part of their reasoning was based on differ-
ent elements of the business model, also ele-
ments pertaining to the value chain. This, of 
course, should be viewed in the light of the 
fact that Coloplast in essence is a traditional 
production company and thus is largely 
structured according to the value chain ideas. 
The value chain characteristic is mobilized 
in connection with production and distri-
bution  features. With respect to production 
characteristics regarding the value chain, 
“Coloplast has gone from having everything 
in-house to develop their production strategy 
by fi rst outsourcing production to contrac-
tors, e.g. Mærsk Medical, and second step in 
this development story is to move own pro-
duction from Denmark overseas.”  
 Distribution features concern mainly their 
forward-integration strategy through, for 
example, their distribution affi liates HSC 
and Sterling, but also their progression into 
the home care segment is perceived as a suc-
cessful operation by several of the respond-
ents. The only worries aired in this connec-
tion have been that the operating margins in 
this section of the business are signifi cantly 
lower than the other more lucrative areas. It 
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seems that Coloplast must evaluate the costs 
and benefi ts of attaining a lower average 
return on invested capital against maintain-
ing closer relationships with the markets and 
customers.  
 Finally, within this category, the business 
model is associated with the value proposi-
tion of the company,  i.e ., the use value of 
the products or services delivered. In this 
sense the business model illustrates how the 
company goes about delivering its market 
offering, in other words, depicting the value 
creation process. Essentially, Coloplast is a 
production company, mass producing stand-
ard single use medical devices. But, Colo-
plast differentiates itself from being ‘merely’ 
a mass production company by basing its 
operations on an alternative set of values. 
One analyst summed up the link between 
Coloplast’s value proposition and business 
model in the following manner: “Coloplast 
puts the patient fi rst, and does not consider 
bulk production. Coloplast asks themselves 
how they are able to improve the quality of 
life for patients and the users of our products 
and that is why they invest so much money 
in improving products, always being fi rst to 
market with improved versions of products 
that are sellable at marginally higher prices, 
and all this has turned out to be a rather lucra-
tive strategy for Coloplast.” Thus, through 
the improving the quality of life proposition, 
Coloplast’s business model is product-inno-
vation and customer-needs oriented rather 
than production focused.  
 Relationships Among Elements 
 As opposed to the previous category of 
characteristics, relationships among ele-
ments are more concerned with an action 
perspective of the business model,  i.e ., what 
the processes are, what is done, etc. The 
three characteristics pertaining to this cat-
egory are:  
1.  Value drivers;  
2.  Value creation processes; and  
3.  Causal links between different activities 
and elements of the business model.  
 Value drivers are in a sense key success 
factors with respect to the company’s future 
performance both competition-wise and 
fi nancially. When asked to describe the value 
drivers of the company, most of the analysts 
apply the terminology “growth drivers.” This 
reveals the analysts’ focus on their valua-
tion models, in which the growth rate of the 
company plays a central role. Although not 
mentioned explicitly, there seemed to be a 
consensus that a growth rate of 10 percent 
a year was vital in relation to the valuation 
of the company. The reason behind this very 
specifi c number may be because the Boston 
Consulting Group matrix, which is widely 
applied in most business schools worldwide, 
differentiates between high- and low-growth 
companies at precisely this level.  
 There does not exist a fi nal defi nition of 
what a value driver is and what a growth 
driver is. The analysts used them inter-
changeably along with a third term, trigger 
points. A slight difference between the two 
terms could be that growth drivers often 
are connected to these share-triggers, while 
value drivers would be considered to be 
more long term.  
 Along the line of argumentation that trig-
ger points and value drivers are not the same, 
one analyst stated that “everything revolves 
around value drivers. What you could say is 
that some information differs from value driv-
ers with respect to being what we call trigger 
points.” Furthermore the analyst elaborated 
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that, “value drivers typically have duration 
of one to two years; whereas, when you talk 
of trigger points, then you are talking more 
about the kind of news fl ow that moves the 
share price.” Our empirical evidence also 
leads us to suggest that a discontinuity in a 
value driver constitutes a trigger point.  
 The value drivers emphasized by the ana-
lysts included the already elaborated aspect 
of innovation, marketing and distribution, 
and a business model based on excellence. 
In addition, penetration of the US market 
was among the most debated themes in the 
interviews. In connection with Coloplast’s 
recently released objectives for the next fi ve 
years, the issue of establishing itself on the 
US market was given a key role. Finally, and 
quite surprisingly, only two analysts men-
tioned demography as a value driver. The 
fact that the fraction of older people will 
increase signifi cantly in the next 20 years is 
a considerable growth driver of the market in 
which Coloplast operates.  
 Surprisingly, value creation and value 
creation processes as such are not mentioned 
in connection with the business model. From 
the analysts’ perspectives, value creation is 
only thought of in terms of attaining reve-
nues and thereby boosting profi ts and other 
shareholder value measures. An important 
insight from this study is, therefore, that the 
fi nancial analysts have grave diffi culties in 
distinguishing between the health care com-
panies’ business model and the model by 
which the payment of revenues are allocated 
between end users and reimbursing organi-
zations. These revenue streams are illus-
trated in greater detail in Figure 2, where it 
is evident that the revenue streams indeed 
are complex.  
 The fi nal characteristic in this category, 
causality, concerns the identifi cation and 
Figure 2. The Health Care Revenue Model 
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signifi cance of links between activities, 
resources, processes, and other value driv-
ers. Although Coloplast, according to one 
analyst, operates in a sector that is not espe-
cially homogenous, causality between Colo-
plast’s product segments is attained through 
its core adhesive technology: “Coloplast is 
a much diversifi ed company seen from a 
product portfolio perspective. Despite this, 
there is a connection between the divisions. 
There are some technological connections, 
 i.e ., the adhesive technology.” However, 
other respondents disagree with this state-
ment. One opponent comments that, “with 
regard to the general structure of the com-
pany, some of the divisions are total misfi ts. 
I cannot see any synergies in those divisions 
at all.” 
 As the grand fi nale, causality is the 
key to the success of Coloplast’s business 
model. First of all, there is an inevitable link 
between Coloplast’s vision and values and 
the customer segment it serves. This is the 
link between improving quality of life and a 
business model based on excellence. Excel-
lence was also the key causal relationship 
identifi ed among market relationships, prod-
uct innovation, and production. This causal 
relationship among this tripartite is the key to 
understanding Coloplast’s business model; 
whereas, the link between vision, values, 
industry segment, and the former tripartite 
functions as a test of the appropriateness of 
these causalities, precisely like the narra-
tive test of the business model that Magretta 
suggests. 72 
 Conclusion 
 The initial literature review identifi ed a 
series of focal-points concerning the content 
of a general defi nition of business models. 
Here, three overall  business model themes, 
namely:  
1.  The overall criteria that determine 
long-term performance;  
2.  The point(s) of departure for value cre-
ation; and  
3.  The key interconnections that drive the 
value generation of the company, were 
identifi ed.  
 Hence, in the following empirical sec-
tions, the fi nancial analysts’ perceptions of 
a health care company’s business model was 
analyzed in accordance with these themes.  
 Having taken our point of departure in 
how analysts understand strategy and which 
elements they perceive as constituting the 
business model of the health care company, 
we were able to examine whether the char-
acteristics suggested in the literature review 
were refl ected empirically. By studying 
the fi nancial analysts’ perceptions of the 
health care company’s business model, its 
structure, competitive strengths, and strat-
egy, we are able to point out a number of 
critical success factors for communicating 
business models and other forward-looking 
statements.  
 First, the analysis demonstrated that 
‘excellence’ was the key notion of a number 
of the characteristics that were identifi ed for 
the business model of Coloplast. The busi-
ness model was seen to revolve around a 
link between improving quality of life and 
a competitive strategy based on excellence. 
Excellence was also the key causal relation-
ship identifi ed among market relationships, 
product innovation, and production. The 
causal relationships among this tripartite is 
identifi ed as the key to understanding Colo-
plast’s business model.  
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 This study indicates that the fi nancial 
analysts’ understanding incorporated a wide 
array of elements of the business model. For 
example, the analysts described the method 
of doing business: focusing on the whole 
enterprise system and the company’s archi-
tecture for generating value as well empha-
sizing roles and relationships,  describing 
the uniqueness of the value generating 
infrastructure, links, processes, and causal 
relationships.  
 The analysts’ understanding of Coloplast’s 
business model was strongly related to the 
company’s distribution strategy, where there 
were marked differences across product and 
market segments. This made it diffi cult to 
describe Coloplast’s business model very 
precisely, at least on an aggregated level, 
suggesting that Coloplast operates with frag-
mented distribution (business) models on the 
geographical and segment levels. Also, it was 
by many respondents stated that Coloplast’s 
competitive advantage lies in its adhesive 
technology. Rather than being product-devel-
opment oriented, Coloplast’s business model 
was focused around a marketing relationship 
and excellence perspective.  
 If the business model should be useful in 
the communication of the company’s strat-
egy, it should be able to simultaneously 
express the uniqueness of the company’s 
strategy and the market it operates in and 
at a general level facilitate a comparison 
between the company and its competitors. 
In the analysis it was indicated that the busi-
ness model constitutes an explicit link to 
understanding the company’s uniqueness, 
competitive advantage, and strategy—in a 
sense, being a link to understanding the key 
causal relationships that make up a busi-
nesses value creation process. Thus, if man-
agement is able to convey its understanding 
of the company’s value creation logic in a 
way that corresponds to that of  external 
stakeholders, communication would be 
eased signifi cantly.  
 While the fi nancial analysts studied in 
this article all had direct access to the com-
pany’s management team, private investors 
do not have access to the same sources and 
amounts of information. Therefore, disclos-
ing more information of the same type as 
used by the fi nancial analysts via reporting 
media,  e.g ., in relation to the business model, 
would be a signifi cant improvement for the 
private investors, despite the fact that the 
analysts may not indicate that they in fact 
need such types of information. The latter is 
due to the fact, as stated earlier in this arti-
cle, that fi nancial analysts primarily get the 
more complex types of information directly 
from the company and not through volun-
tary reporting. Eccles  et al . 73 have argued 
for better disclosure from this point of view, 
but still the investors would be left with little 
clue about how indicators on, for example, 
intellectual capital should be interpreted. 
 Sometimes companies report in their 
annual reports only key performance indica-
tors or similar information without disclos-
ing them within the context of the business 
model that explains their interconnected-
ness and why it is precisely this bundle of 
indicators that is relevant for understanding 
this particular companies’ strategy and value 
creation. If this is the case, the interpretation 
must be done by the readers of the report. 
However, at the present there exists only 
limited research-based insight into how this 
reading and interpretation is conducted.  
 From an accounting point of view, 
improved disclosure is more or less about 
determining the types of information that 
most signifi cantly explains market value, in 
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order that these numbers can be disclosed 
and fed into the decision-making process, 
maybe even capitalized, but at least used for 
benchmarking purposes. It is, however, ques-
tionable whether the fi nancial market,  i.e ., 
investors and analysts, would regard capi-
talization or standardised non- accounting 
information as improved disclosure.  
 The analysts and professional investors 
already have deep insight into a lot of details 
on the company, and the most important 
information is likely to be related to the spe-
cifi c strategies of the companies and hence 
diffi cult to compare and interpret unless it is 
disclosed as an integral part of a framework 
that explains how value is created. Since 
understanding value  confi gurations and 
customer value creation is more of interest 
from a strategy point of view, a possible rec-
onciliation of the reporting-understanding 
gap could be for the company to disclose its 
business model,  i.e ., the story that explains 
how the enterprise works, who the customer 
is, and what the customer  values—and 
based on this—determine how the company 
is supposed to make money. As previously 
noted in this article, such a description 
should also help the fi nancial community 
in understanding the differences between 
the—often complicated— revenue model of 
the health care company, and its  strategic 
business model.  
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 Security Market Reaction to FDA Fast 
Track Designations 
 Christopher W. Anderson and Ying “Jenny” Zhang 
 Pharmaceutical fi rms can apply for the Food and Drug Administration to ‘fast track’ research and de-
velopment on new drugs, accelerating clinical trials and expediting regulatory review required prior to 
marketing to consumers. We investigate security market reaction to more than 100 fast track designa-
tions from 1998 to 2004. Fast track designation appears to enhance investor recognition of fi rm value. 
Specifi cally, fast track designation coincides with abnormal trading volume and excess daily stock re-
turns for sponsoring fi rms. Institutional ownership and analyst attention also increase. Market response 
is more pronounced for fi rms that are smaller, do not yet market products, and have low institutional 
ownership. Keywords:  Fast track, FDA, pharmaceuticals, research and development, announcement 
returns, clinical trials.  
 “Fast, fast, fast track your drug 
 Swiftly down the pipeline. 
 Merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily 
 Cash is a biotech’s lifeline!” 
 —Tom Jacobs writing for 
The Motley Fool in 2002 1 
 T he US Food and Drug Administra-tion (FDA) requirements for safety and effi cacy testing impose sub-
stantial costs on pharmaceutical companies 
seeking to discover and commercialize new 
drugs and medical devices. Since passage 
of the 1997 Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act (FDAMA), the FDA has 
been authorized to grant drug sponsors so-
called fast track status to expedite develop-
ment and approval of drugs with potential 
to address unmet needs for serious or life-
threatening conditions. While fast tracked 
drugs remain subject to a low frequency of 
ultimate commercialization, recent studies 
suggest that fast track status reduces clinical 
development time by as much as three years 
from the standard time of more than eight 
years, potentially saving drug developers 
hundreds of millions of dollars for each new 
drug. 2 In addition, researching and develop-
ing drugs under fast track designation may 
favorably resolve uncertainty regarding the 
real options embedded in a pharmaceutical 
fi rm’s drug pipeline and therefore enhance 
fi rm value for investors. 
 In this study we investigate how the secu-
rity market responds when publicly traded 
pharmaceutical companies announce that 
the FDA has granted fast track designation 
to a sponsored drug. Notably, these fast track 
announcements convey no incremental sci-
entifi c data and little specifi c economic infor-
mation about a drug’s medical or commercial 
potential. For example, these announcements 
are not made coincidental with news about 
whether a drug has been successful in phase-
one, -two, or -three clinical trials, and the 
drugs still face stringent scientifi c and costly 
regulatory hurdles that must be cleared prior 
to commercialization. Nevertheless, we fi nd 
that fi nancial markets respond favorably in 
several dimensions when a pharmaceutical 
fi rm announces that one of its new drugs has 
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been granted fast track designation by the 
FDA.  
 Specifi cally, we identify more than 100 
instances between 1998 and 2004 in which 
pharmaceutical fi rms with publicly traded 
common equity announce FDA award of fast 
track designation for sponsored drugs. We 
then investigate how trading volume, stock 
prices, institutional ownership, and analyst 
coverage respond to the announcement of the 
fast track designation. We fi nd that fast track 
announcements coincide with abnormal 
trading volume and positive abnormal stock 
returns that average about 9 percent across 
several alternative benchmarking techniques. 
Abnormal returns are highest among small 
fi rms, fi rms that have yet to commercialize 
a product, and fi rms with low levels of insti-
tutional ownership. Institutional ownership 
increases materially around fast track events, 
especially for small fi rms, and analyst cover-
age improves and becomes more favorable. 
Overall, our results suggest that the award of 
fast track designation conveys positive infor-
mation about a drug’s sponsoring company. 
Market response suggests that fast track des-
ignation lowers expected regulatory costs, 
reveals positive information about the qual-
ity of the fi rm’s growth opportunities, and 
enhances investor recognition. 
 The FDA Drug Approval Process 
and Fast Track Designation 
 Testing for safety and effi cacy as regu-
lated by the FDA imposes substantial costs 
on the development of new drugs and 
delays the commercialization of innova-
tions in health care. 3 Figure 1 summarizes 
the various aspects of new drug discovery 
Figure 1. The Drug Discovery and FDA Approval Process
Clinical Trials
Five out of 5,000 compounds in discovery stage enter clinical trials.
       Phase 1:
Safety and side-
effects evaluation
on 20 to 80 healthy
volunteers.  
Trial costs $
20% of phase 1
drugs may be on
the market later. 
Phase 2: 
Relatively small
scale test of drug’s
effectiveness and
safety on tens to 
hundreds of patients
with targeted 
disease symptoms. 
Trial costs $$ 
40% of phase 2
drugs may be on the
market later. 
Phase 3: 
Comprehensive
evaluation of drug’s
effectiveness and
safety on hundreds to
thousands of patients
with targeted disease
symptoms. 
Trial costs $$$$$ 
60% of phase 3 drugs
may be on the market
later.
Commercialization
and
Post-Marketing
Evaluation
On average only one
of the 5,000
compounds in the
discovery stage makes
it to the market as a
drug. Drugs subject to
post-marketing 
evaluation and so-
called phase 4 clinical
trials.
IND
(Investigational New Drug)
Application is filed with the FDA
after completion of pre-clinical
testing. This permits testing of
the drug in humans. 
NDA
(New Drug Application
If the drug is determined to be)
safe and effective, an NDA is
filed with the FDA at completion
of the clinical trials.
Discovery and Pre-
Clinical Testing 
Laboratory tests,
in vitro, and animal
studies are conducted
at this stage.  
Roughly 5,000
chemical compounds
are tested at this
stage, which may lead
to a single drug that
finally makes it to the
market.
Sources: Food and Drug Administration, “The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and 
Effective, FDA Consumer Magazine, July–Aug. 2002, Pub. No. FDA05-3242, available at http://www.fda.
gov/fdac/features/2002/402_drug.html. 
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and the FDA approval process. 4 Identify-
ing potentially valuable new drugs in pre-
 clinical testing, obtaining investigational 
new drug (IND) status, conducting success-
ful phase-one, -two, and -three clinical trials 
on human subjects, and obtaining approval 
for a new drug application (NDA) prior to 
a product’s commercialization require con-
siderable time and money. The FDA recently 
estimated that the total capitalized cost of 
developing a new drug is $1.7 billion, con-
siderably higher than earlier estimates of 
$231 million as of 1987 and $800 million 
as of 2000. 5 Furthermore, new drug approv-
als fell to 20 for 2005, compared to 36 for 
2004, and the time to complete clinical trials 
required for FDA approval now averages 8.5 
years. 6 In response to these alarming trends, 
the FDA has recently proposed new rules 
to reduce drug development costs and has 
sponsored new programs aimed at fostering 
innovative practices among pharmaceuti-
cal fi rms, research institutes, and universi-
ties with the goal of accelerating clinical 
trials.  
 Earlier concerns about whether the FDA 
approval process had become too burden-
some preceded the passage of the FDAMA 
in 1997. In particular, the US Congress acted 
in response to criticisms from the AIDS 
and cancer victims’ communities about the 
slow pace of drug development in the face 
of increasing incidence of disease and a lack 
of innovation that would decrease mortality 
rates. 7 Among the provisions of the FDAMA 
is the allowance for so-called fast track des-
ignation for products in the review process. 
Specifi cally, Section 112 of the FDAMA 
directs the FDA to “at the request of the 
sponsor of a new drug, facilitate the devel-
opment and expedite the review of such drug 
if it is intended for the treatment of a  serious 
life-threatening condition and it demon-
strates the potential to address unmet medi-
cal needs for such a condition.” 8 
 A new drug is eligible for several FDA 
programs upon being granted fast track sta-
tus, including:  
1.  Closer communication with the FDA in 
designing clinical trials and regulatory 
review, enhancing predictability in FDA 
decisions; 
2.  Greater likelihood of receiving prior-
ity review when an NDA is submitted, 
reducing FDA review time from ten to 
six months; and 
3  Access to the accelerated approval 
process under which a drug may be 
commercialized with conditional FDA 
approval on the basis of incomplete but 
promising clinical trials. 9 
 Several of these FDA programs, includ-
ing accelerated approval, predate the 1997 
FDAMA but were underutilized by drug 
companies due to excessive bureaucratic red 
tape and regulatory opacity. 10 
 Industry response to the FDAMA has been 
enthusiastic even though some FDA offi cials 
and industry observers initially indicated 
that fast track would not materially affect 
FDA procedures. 11 According to Milne and 
Bergman’s 12 survey of pharmaceutical fi rms, 
respondents cited the following among vari-
ous operational factors responsible for the 
fast track program’s benefi ts:  
 Better interaction with the FDA—83 
percent; 
 Publicity from designation—65 percent; 
 Face-to-face contact at the FDA—
61 percent; and  
 Indication of likely priority review—
57 percent. 13 
•
•
•
•
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 Furthermore, evidence seems to suggest 
that fast track has succeeded in reducing the 
time required for FDA approval. A recent 
study released by the Tufts Center for Drug 
Development suggests that clinical devel-
opment time for fast track drugs approved 
between 1998 and 2003 was two-and-a-
half years shorter than for non-fast tracked 
drugs. 14 Extrapolating from the evidence in 
DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 15 reducing 
clinical trial time by 25 percent would reduce 
total drug development costs by nearly 15 
percent or almost $130 million per new drug 
on average. 16 Consequently, analysts who 
follow drug companies often applaud fast 
track designations for their likely positive 
effect on company fi nances. 17 
 Nevertheless, a fast tracked drug is by no 
means guaranteed eventual FDA approval 
of a NDA nor eventual success in the phar-
maceutical marketplace. In particular, fast 
tracked drugs still frequently fail to meet 
scientifi c criteria for safety and effi cacy and 
related regulatory hurdles and therefore are 
never commercialized. For example, one 
online industry publication advised caution 
for investors seeking to interpret fast track 
announcements:  
 First of all, the list of indications that fast 
track products target reads like a Hit Parade 
of notoriously incurable diseases. Add to that 
the fact that fast track drugs tend to involve 
new approaches and cutting edge technolo-
gies and you’ve got a recipe for high stakes, 
high-risk drug development at its most 
unpredictable. 18 
 In particular, while priority review and 
accelerated approval are likely to be sought 
for fast tracked drugs with promising phase-
two clinical trials for small-scale effi cacy or 
phase-three trials for large-scale effi cacy, 
many drugs are designated as fast track 
drugs prior to phase-two trials or even on the 
basis of animal testing that precedes trials 
with human subjects. For many such drugs, 
fast track may very well mean a fast track 
to failure, which would be a good outcome 
for the sponsoring drug company if such a 
conclusion would have been reached with 
delay and at greater cost in the absence of 
fast track mechanisms. 19 Notably, even drugs 
that receive accelerated approval on the basis 
of promising but incomplete testing are sub-
ject to negative FDA advisories or even prod-
uct recall if additional post-marketing trials 
reveal adverse information about safety or 
effi cacy. 20 
 Market Reaction to Fast Track 
Announcements 
 The pharmaceutical industry provides 
an interesting laboratory in which natural 
experiments of interest to fi nancial econo-
mists occur. The industry is driven by 
research and development, and pharmaceu-
tical and biotech fi rms are typically classi-
fi ed as the ultimate growth fi rms,  i.e ., fi rms 
whose value is largely attributable to intan-
gible assets, such as risky real options cre-
ated by costly and time-consuming research 
and development. 21 The investment growth 
options embedded in these risky but poten-
tially profi table new drug therapies may be 
exercised and turned into marketable prod-
ucts that generate future cash fl ows, or these 
options may be abandoned due to lack of 
commercial viability. 22 Unlike growth fi rms 
in sectors such as microelectronics or Inter-
net communications, the development and 
exercise of growth options by US pharma-
ceutical fi rms takes place under the regula-
tory scrutiny of the FDA. As discussed in the 
prior section, the regulatory process can be 
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burdensome and costly. For investors and 
scholars, however, the highly regulated drug 
development and testing process results in 
externally visible news events that reveal 
the value of a fi rm’s growth options. In par-
ticular, investors scrutinize publication of 
clinical trial results, announcements about 
the commencement of next phase trials, 
and other non-traditional information about 
growth options that might materially affect 
fi rm valuation and stock price movements. 
Consequently, observable regulatory events 
concerning pharmaceutical fi rms are excel-
lent candidates for the event-study method 
of analysis.  
 Several studies employ event-study meth-
ods to examine the effect of proposed health 
care price controls or other adverse regula-
tions on the value and investment plans of 
the pharmaceutical industry. 23 Other studies 
examine the impact of fi rm-specifi c news 
such as patent awards or FDA approval of 
drugs on prices of equity securities for the 
affected fi rms. 24 In general, these studies fi nd 
that the stock prices of pharmaceutical fi rms 
are very sensitive to information revealed 
through regulatory decisions because such 
decisions are often decisive about risk and 
value of intangible assets such as unproven 
drugs. One study also examines fast track 
announcements for stock price reaction. 
Alefantis, Kulkarni, and Vora 25 examine 26 
fast track announcements between 1998 and 
mid-2001 and report a 10 percent two-day 
abnormal return for sponsoring fi rms. We 
also rely on an event study design to discern 
the stock price impact of fast track designa-
tions, but our sample period is longer, our 
sample size is considerably larger, and we 
extend the analysis in several dimensions. 
Specifi cally, we examine not only stock price 
reaction but also trading  volume,  institutional 
ownership, and analyst coverage, as well as 
how fast track effects vary across sample 
fi rms according to fi rm- specifi c character-
istics such as fi rm size, existence of mar-
keted products, and institutional ownership 
levels.  
 To implement this study, we collect a 
sample of announcements by pharmaceuti-
cal fi rms that they have received fast track 
designation for a sponsored drug. The FDA 
does not provide an independent listing of 
such designations, nor of any clinical drug 
trial outcomes short of NDA approvals. 
Consequently, we rely on self-disclosure 
of fast track designations by affected fi rms. 
We search on the  Factiva new archive using 
keywords such as “fast track” in conjunction 
with terms such as “drugs, pharmaceuticals, 
biotech, FDA,” and so on. We also compare 
our sample with a listing of pharmaceutical 
fi rm announcements of fast track status main-
tained by Recombinant Capital’s database 
(ReCap). We fi nd that the sample derived 
from ReCap is a subset of our  Factiva -based 
sample. As shown in panel A of Figure 2, this 
search results in 162 announcements of fast 
track designation for drugs sponsored by 169 
companies. We impose the requirement that 
any announcements are for US-traded pub-
lic fi rms with stock-price data available on 
the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) database. We identify a single pri-
mary sponsor for each drug, and we do not 
double count a small number of announce-
ments of multiple fast tracked drugs that 
occur on the same day.  
 The resulting sample is 109 fast track 
announcements by 82 fi rms (60 fi rms with 
one announcement, 17 with two, and fi ve 
with three). Panel A of Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of sample announcements over 
1998 to 2004, showing that over one half of 
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the announcements (56) occurred in the last 
two sample years. 26 Two sample fast track 
announcements occur within one month 
of the sponsor fi rm’s initial public offering 
(IPO). When we examine trading volume and 
returns, we eliminate these two observations, 
reducing the sample to 107 announcements. 
 Panel B of Figure 2 provides some sample 
statistics with respect to fi rm size,  institutional 
holdings of stock for the quarter prior to the 
fast track announcement, and the number of 
fi rms with marketed products as identifi ed 
in fast track announcements texts, company 
Web sites, and disclosure documents, such 
as 10-Ks and proxy statements. With respect 
to market value of equity, the sample of 
fi rms is skewed, with a mean of $4,375 mil-
lion and a median of $443  million. There is 
Panel A shows the distribution of fast track designations as revealed by a Factiva search for 
years 1998 through 2004, and how the sample is reduced to a fi nal sample of 109 single-date 
announcements for primary sponsor fi rms with CRSP stock price data. Panel B shows descriptive 
information on sample fi rms. Market capitalization of common equity is calculated on the day 
before the fast track designation announcement, as is number of years since the fi rm’s IPO. The 
information on institutional holdings is reported at the end of quarter prior to each sponsoring 
fi rm’s very fi rst fast track designation. There are 60 fi rms with a single announcement, 17 fi rms with 
two distinct announcements, and fi ve fi rms with three distinct announcements. We infer whether a 
fi rm has already marketed products to consumers through examination of press releases, company 
Web sites, and disclosure documents, such as 10-Ks and proxy statements.
Year
All Fast Track 
Announcements 
in Factiva
Sponsoring 
Firms
Announcements 
with Two 
Sponsors
Firms with 
Multiple 
Announcements
Firms with 
CRSP Data
Final Sample of 
Announcements
1998  12  12 0 0  7  7
1999  14  15 1 0  13  12
2000  15  17 2 0  12  10
2001  12  13 1 0  11  9
2002  22  23 2 1  15  15 
2003  39  41 2 1  29  28
2004  48  48 1 1  30  28 
Total 162 169 9  3  117 109
 N Mean 75th Median 25th
Market capitalization in millions 109 $4,375 $1,180 $443 $129
Years since IPO 109 10.9 12.9 7.8 3.4
Institutional stockholders  82 94 109 51 18
Institutional stock holdings %  82 36.8% 58.0% 30.5% 15.3%
Firms with marketed products  36
Firms without marketed products  73
Figure 2. Sample of Announcements of Fast Track Designation
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a similar skew with respect to fi rm age, with 
a mean of 10.9 years since a fi rm’s IPO and 
a median of 7.8 years. Notable, one quarter 
of the sample is made up of relatively small 
fi rms with market capitalization less than 
$129 million and vintage since IPO of fewer 
than 3.4 years. There are parallel skews with 
respect to number of institutions that hold 
the stock and the percentage of stock held 
by institutions. Finally, while 36 announce-
ments are made by fi rms that have already 
commercialized pharmaceutical products, 
73 announcements are by fi rms without any 
products in the market place at the time of 
the announcement. In short, the sample is 
composed of fast track announcements by 
some large, widely held, well-established 
fi rms that have already marketed drugs and 
some smaller, younger fi rms with fewer 
institutional shareholders and without any 
commercialized products. We exploit this 
heterogeneity with respect to fi rm charac-
teristics to better understand when fast track 
designation is more likely to be material with 
respect to a company’s value and the trading 
characteristics of its stock. 
 Empirical Results 
 For each announcement we conduct event 
study analysis with respect to trading activ-
ity, short-term and long-run stock price 
changes, institutional ownership, and ana-
lyst coverage. With respect to each of these 
various dimensions we investigate whether 
fast track designation coincides with unu-
sual trading volume, abnormal stock returns, 
unusual changes in institutional ownership, 
and unusual changes in analyst coverage and 
recommendations. We also investigate how 
changes in stock prices and trading activity 
vary by fi rm-specifi c characteristics such as 
fi rm size, maturity of each fi rm’s portfolio of 
products, and institutional ownership.  
 Trading Activity  
 For each announcement, we obtain from 
CRSP the daily volume (number of shares 
traded) and daily turnover (shares traded 
shares outstanding) for the period from 131 
trading days to 31 trading days before the 
fast track announcement and for the 21-day 
period centered on the date of the fast track 
announcement. For the announcement day 
and for the ten preceding and ten follow-
ing days we calculate abnormal volume and 
abnormal turnover as follows: 27 
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 Figure 3 presents the results of our anal-
ysis of abnormal trading activity. Trading 
activity is indeed unusually high when 
fi rms announce fast track designation for 
their sponsored drugs. In particular, on day 
zero mean excess trading volume (turno-
ver) is 7.88 times (7.49 times) the standard 
deviation of trading volume observed in the 
day 131 to day 31 estimation period. 
Based on sample means, trading volume 
and turnover appear unusually high from 
about day 5 through day 2 relative to 
the fast track announcement date. These 
measures of trading activity are skewed, 
however, as median abnormal volume 
(turnover) is 1.87x (1.72x) on day zero, 
with no observable trends on surround-
ing days. Nevertheless, the median excess 
volume and excess turnover on day zero 
suggest that fast track announcements are 
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 associated with  unusually high levels of 
trading activity among sample fi rms.  
 Figure 4 tracks median abnormal turnover 
relative to the fast track announcement day, 
clearly showing a spike in trading activity 
for the announcement date and the day after. 
Post-announcement trading activity appears 
to revert to normal levels, however. In short, 
information contained in fast track announce-
ments appears to be material because such 
Figure 3. Stock Trading Volume and Turnover Surrounding 
Fast Track Designations
Figure 3 shows measures of abnormal trading activity in the stocks of 
fi rms for the 21 days centered on announcement of fast track designation 
for a sponsored drug. Panel A shows results for abnormal trading volume 
(measured as number of shares traded) relative to benchmarked volume for 
days 131 to 31 prior to the fast track announcement on day zero. Panel B 
shows results for abnormal trading turnover relative to benchmarked turnover 
(measured as shares traded relative to total shares outstanding) for days 131 
to 31 prior to the fast track announcement on day zero. Asterisks indicate 
p-values associated with t-tests for means and sign tests for percent positive.
Event Day Mean 75% Median 25% %Positive 
10 0.34 ** 0.60 0.27 0.49 39.45 **
 9 0.17 0.40 0.24 0.52 33.03 **
 8 0.06 0.38 0.24 0.50 35.78 ***
 7 0.19 0.36 0.24 0.52 33.94 ***
 6 1.35 0.41 0.23 0.54 34.86 ***
 5 0.58 * 0.33 0.21 0.55 37.61 **
 4 0.36 * 0.49 0.22 0.47 33.03 ***
 3 0.28 ** 0.51 0.17 0.47 35.78 ***
 2 0.52 ** 0.89 0.24 0.51 35.78 ***
 1 0.65 *** 0.72   0.03 0.40 53.21
  0 7.88 *** 6.14   1.87 0.42 78.90 ***
1 4.87 ** 1.89   0.35 0.15 63.30 ***
2 2.24 ** 1.02   0.08 0.27 55.96
3 6.71 0.64 0.04 0.42 47.71
4 2.73 0.85 0.06 0.45 47.71
5 1.96 0.91 0.10 0.49 47.71
6 1.02 0.85 0.04 0.38 45.87
7 1.22 0.87 0.14 0.47 45.87
8 1.05 ** 0.82 0.12 0.44 45.87
9 0.87 ** 0.85 0.06 0.52 46.79
10 0.87 *** 0.60 0.02 0.42 46.79
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announcements coincide with signifi cantly 
higher than normal trading activity. 28 
 Figure 5 shows abnormal turnover and 
volume for sample fi rms sorted by fi rm size 
into quartiles, by whether a fi rm has a mar-
keted product, and by institutional ownership 
of each fi rm’s common equity. The results 
shown in Figure 5 indicate that changes 
in trading activity in response to fast track 
announcements are greater for smaller fi rms, 
for fi rms that have yet to market a product, 
and for fi rms with lower institutional own-
ership. Specifi cally, abnormal turnover and 
volume both decrease as fi rm size increases, 
and abnormal trading activity is insignifi -
cantly positive for the largest quartile of 
fi rms. Similarly, abnormal trading activity is 
only signifi cantly positive for the 73 sample 
fi rms that have yet to market a pharmaceuti-
cal product. Finally, increases in turnover and 
Panel B: Abnormal turnovert  
TO
−131,−31
31,131t TOTO
σ
− −−
 
Event day Mean 75% Median 25% %positive 
10 0.30 * 0.55 0.28 0.53 34.86 ***
9 0.13 0.36 0.26 0.52 30.28 ***
8 0.02 0.35 0.28 0.53 33.03 ***
7 0.15 0.26 0.28 0.53 29.36 ***
6 1.28 0.35 0.24 0.57 32.11 ***
5 0.53 * 0.30 0.24 0.56 33.94 ***
4 0.32 0.45 0.24 0.51 32.11 ***
3 0.23 * 0.49 0.22 0.49 33.94 ***
2 0.46 ** 0.82 0.24 0.54 35.78 ***
1 0.56 *** 0.67 0.02 0.44 50.46
0 7.49 *** 5.76 1.72 0.30 78.90 ***
1 4.64 * 1.82 0.30 0.20 61.47 ***
2 2.12 ** 0.97 0.05 0.28 51.38
3 6.63 0.51 0.05 0.44 46.79
4 2.62 0.80 0.07 0.46 46.79
5 1.83 0.87 0.15 0.49 45.87
6 0.87 0.76 0.08 0.42 44.04
7 1.05 * 0.71 0.14 0.50 45.87
8 0.82 * 0.76 0.15 0.44 43.12
9 0.74 ** 0.83 0.10 0.53 44.04
10 0.70 ** 0.42 0.08 0.46 42.20
*** signifi cance at p-value<1%, ** signifi cance at p-value<5%, 
*  signifi cance at p-value<10%
Figure 3. Continued...
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volume are decreasing in the level of institu-
tional ownership. In summary, these results 
suggest that fast track announcements vary 
in materiality by fi rm size, product portfolio, 
and institutional ownership.  
 Stock Returns  
 We next examine if fi rms announcing fast 
track designations for sponsored drugs expe-
rience unusual stock-price movements coin-
cidental with and following the announce-
ment. We anticipate that benchmarking of 
returns, especially long-run returns, will be 
problematic for our sample.  Specifi cally, 
by design our sample is composed of high 
growth stocks that have been shown to 
under-perform more balanced portfolios of 
stocks on average. Second, our sample spans 
both large established fi rms and small young 
fi rms. Finally, our sample is concentrated 
in a single industry, and pharmaceutical 
stocks in general have been shown to devi-
ate from overall market movements, espe-
cially in response to common events such 
as proposed or rumored changes in regula-
tion. 29 Consequently, we employ a variety of 
benchmarks, each designed to address some 
aspects of the unique nature of our sample.  
Figure 4. Median Abnormal Turnover Surrounding Fast Track  Designations
Figure 4 shows the median daily abnormal turnover relative to benchmarked turnover 
(measured as shares traded relative to total shares outstanding) for days 131 to 31 
prior to the fast track announcement on day zero. Daily abnormal turnover is estimated 
according to equation (2) as follows:
TO
−131,−31
31,131t TOTO
σ
− −− 
tAbnormal Turnover =
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
Event day
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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 For each announcement we obtain daily 
returns for the period from 131 trading 
days to 31 trading days before the fast track 
announcement and for the 21-day period cen-
tered on the date of the fast track announce-
ment. We use days 131 to 31 to estimate 
parameters for alternative benchmark models 
of expected returns. We fi rst estimate a Fama-
French three-factor model of returns using 
daily returns from day 131 to 31: 
 
 
tjtjt,Mjjt,jt,j HMLĥSMBŝRˆˆRAR −−β−α−=  (3) 
 R 
j,,t
 is the return to fi rm j on day t, R 
M,,t
 is 
daily return on the value-weighted market 
portfolio, SMB 
t
 is the difference between 
the daily return on a portfolio of small stocks 
minus the return on a portfolio of large-cap 
stocks, and HML 
t
 is the daily return on a 
portfolio of value stocks minus the return 
on a portfolio of growth stocks. The daily 
returns for sample stocks are obtained from 
CRSP, and the factor returns are obtained 
from Kenneth French’s data library. 30 Coef-
fi cient estimates for each fi rm are then used 
to estimate abnormal daily return for any 
day t around the fast track announcement 
as follows: 
 t,jtjtjt,Mjjt,j HMLhSMBsRR ε+++β+α=  (4) 
The sample of announcements of fast track designation is divided into sub-samples based on, 
alternatively, market value of equity, whether the sponsor fi rm has commercialized a product or 
not, and the level of institutional holdings in the quarter prior to the announcement. Measures 
of abnormal trading volume and abnormal turnover, measured as per equations (1) and (2), are 
provided for each respective sub-sample for the announcement day. Asterisks indicate p-values 
for sign tests associated with %positive.
N
Mean 
Abnormal 
Volume
Median 
Abnormal 
Volume %Positive 
Mean 
Abnormal 
Turnover
Median 
Abnormal 
Turnover %Positive 
Smallest 
quartile 27 22.47 5.89 96.3 *** 21.71 5.70 96.3 ***
Quartile 2 26  6.45 2.89 77.8 ***  5.85 2.25 77.8 ***
Quartile 3 27  2.74 1.71 82.1 ***  2.54 1.46 82.1 ***
Largest 
quartile 27  0.54 0.52 59.3  0.49 0.61 59.3
No products 72 10.83 2.84 87.7 *** 10.30 2.45 87.7 ***
Marketed 
products 35  1.80 0.66 61.1  1.70 0.66 61.1
<25% 39 12.68 4.24 82.9 *** 12.15 3.74 82.9 ***
25%-50% 29  6.90 1.90 89.7 ***  6.36 1.90 89.7 ***
>50% 39  3.81 0.77 66.7 **  3.66 0.71 66.7 **
*** signifi cance at p-value<1%, ** signifi cance at p-value<5%, * signifi cance at p-value<10%
Figure 5. Stock Trading Activity Surrounding Fast Track Designations for Firms 
Distinguished by Size, Products, and Institutional Ownership
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 We also report results for single-factor 
versions of equations (3) and (4) in which 
we employ alternatively as a single pricing 
factor one of the following: the returns to the 
value-weighted market portfolio, the equally 
weighted market portfolio, a drug company 
stock index, or a biotech company stock 
index.  
 Figure 6 reports abnormal stock returns 
coincidental with the announcement of fast 
track designation for a sponsored drug. The 
upper section of Figure 6 shows the abnor-
mal return on the day of the announcement. 
Average announcement day returns range 
from 8.60 percent for the biotech index 
benchmarked model of expected returns to 
Figure 6 shows abnormal returns upon announcement of fast track designation of a 
sponsored drug on day zero and cumulative abnormal returns for the three-day period 
centered on day zero. Abnormal returns are estimated relative to a three-factor Fama-
French model of returns estimated over days 131 to 31 relative to the announcement, 
or alternatively by one of four single-factor models employing alternative market portfolios 
or sector-specifi c indexes. For example, the three-factor model abnormal returns for fi rm j 
on day t are calculated according to equation (4) as follows: 
 
tjtjt,Mjjt,jt,j HMLĥSMBŝRˆˆRAR −−β−α−= , where the three factors are the daily return 
on the value-weighted CRSP market portfolio, the differential return on small stocks net 
returns on big stocks, and the differential return on value stocks net returns on growth 
stocks. The three pricing factors are obtained from Ken French’s on-line data library. The 
single factor models employ, alternatively, the equally weighted market return, the value-
weighted market return, returns to a drug industry index, and returns to a biotech index. 
Asterisks indicate p-values for t-tests of mean returns and sign tests for median returns.
 Mean 75% Median 25%
Day 0 returns
Three-factor model  9.69% ***  9.91% 5.40% ***  0.48%
Equally weighted market 
model  9.73% *** 10.25% 5.56% ***  0.73%
Value-weighted market model  9.62% *** 10.02% 4.91% ***  0.74%
Drug industry index model  9.63% ***  9.59% 5.02% ***  1.10%
Biotech index model  8.60% *** 10.10% 4.41% ***  0.63%
Day 1 to +1 returns
FF 3-factor model 10.11% *** 13.10% 4.50% *** 1.24%
Market model (equal w.) 10.28% *** 14.27% 4.46% *** 0.88%
Market model (value w.) 10.05% *** 13.43% 4.56% *** 1.21%
Drug index model adjusted 10.14% *** 13.95% 3.98% *** 0.41%
Biotech index model adjusted  8.70% *** 14.52% 3.27% *** 0.94%
*** signifi cance at p-value<1% 
Figure 6. Abnormal Stock Returns Surrounding Announcements 
of Fast Track Designation
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9.73 percent for the equally weighted mar-
ket index model. Median abnormal returns 
range from 4.41 percent for the biotech 
index model to 5.56 percent for the equally 
weighted market index model. Both means 
and medians are signifi cantly different from 
zero at  p -values below 1 percent. Figure 6 
also shows the cumulative abnormal returns 
for the three-day period centered on the fast 
track announcement. Mean three-day returns 
are slightly higher than the single-day returns, 
median three-day returns are slightly lower, 
and a smaller percentage of three-day returns 
are positive. Nevertheless, abnormal returns 
appear meaningfully different from zero for 
this three-day window, too.  
 Figure 7 shows the pattern of aver-
age cumulative abnormal return accord-
ing to various benchmarks over the 21-day 
period centered on the day zero fast track 
0%
-1%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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11%
12%
Event day
Three-factor model abnormal returns
Equally-weighted market portfolio
Value-weighted market portfolio
Drug industry index
Biotech index
Figure 7 shows mean cumulative abnormal returns for days 10 to +10 relative to the 
announcement of fast track designation of a sponsored drug on day zero. Abnormal 
returns are estimated relative to a three-factor Fama-French model of returns 
estimated over days 131 to 31 relative to the announcement, or alternatively by one 
of four single-factor models employing alternative market portfolios or sector-specifi c 
indexes. For example, the three-factor model abnormal returns for fi rm j on day t are 
calculated according to equation (4) as follows: 
 
tjtjt,Mjjt,jt,j HMLĥSMBŝRˆˆRAR −−β−α−=
Figure 7. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Announcements 
of Fast Track Designations
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 announcement. Taken together, the results 
reported in Figure 6 and Figure 7 suggest 
that the fast track announcement is a mate-
rial event in terms of stock price movement 
across several alternative benchmarks for 
expected daily returns. 
 Figure 8 shows mean and median abnor-
mal returns on fast track announcement 
days for sample partitions based on mar-
ket capitalization, whether a sample fi rm 
already markets pharmaceutical products 
at the time of the announcement and the 
level of institutional ownership of the fi rm’s 
stock prior to the fast track announcement. 
Exhibit 8 indicates that abnormal returns 
are higher for smaller fi rms, for fi rms that 
Figure 8 shows the mean (median) abnormal returns on the day of a fast track 
designation announcement under alternative model benchmarks and for sample splits 
by fi rm size, by whether a fi rm has already marketed products to consumers, and by 
institutional ownership of common equity.
Mean (median) abnormal returns under alternative 
models for benchmarked expected returns
 
Three-Factor 
Model
Equally 
Weighted 
Market
Value-
Weighted 
Market
Drug 
Industry 
Index
Biotech 
Index
Smallest quartile
(median MVE $61 million)
21.92% 21.99% 21.96% 22.20% 19.07%
(10.19%) (10.13%) (10.23%) (9.87%) (11.41%)
Quartile 2
(median MVE $224 million
11.26% 11.04% 10.85% 10.40% 10.40%
(8.52%) (8.21%) (7.95%) (6.85%) (5.80%)
Quartile 3
(median MVE $676 million)
5.21% 5.38% 5.07% 4.92% 4.78%
(5.38%) (5.36%) (4.92%) (4.85%) (4.22%)
Largest quartile
(median MVE $3,965 million
1.05% 1.18% 1.28% 1.66% 0.87%
(0.43%) (0.63%) (0.62%) (0.96%) (0.73%)
No products
(72 fi rms)
12.89% 12.87% 12.75% 12.78% 11.36%
(6.43%) (6.64%) (6.36%) (6.40%) (5.71%)
Marketed products
(35 fi rms)
3.11% 3.27% 3.20% 3.13% 2.85%
(1.02%) (1.36%) (1.41%) (1.33%) (1.24%)
Holdings<10%
(23 fi rms)
18.92% 18.88% 18.67% 18.79% 15.03%
(9.38%) (10.25%) (10.04%) (9.59%) (6.00%)
 10%<Holdings<25%
(16 fi rms)
10.47% 10.45% 10.51% 10.31% 10.51%
(8.41%) (8.02%) (8.09%) (8.21%) (8.77%)
 25%<Holdings<50%
(29 fi rms)
11.50% 11.41% 11.25% 11.02% 10.65%
(7.15%) (6.64%) (5.99%) (6.61%) (5.95%)
 Holdings >50%
(39 fi rms)
2.59% 2.79% 2.71% 2.91% 2.53%
(2.10%) (1.40%) (1.41%) (2.11%) (1.34%)
Figure 8. Abnormal returns surrounding fast track designations for fi rms 
distinguished by size, products, and institutional ownership
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have yet to market products, and for fi rms 
whose stock is subject to lower levels of 
institutional ownership. These three charac-
teristics are positively but imperfectly cor-
related, so we next turn to cross-sectional 
regression analysis to determine which 
characteristics affect the level of abnormal 
returns in response to fast track announce-
ments. Figure 9 reports regression results 
where the dependent variable is abnormal 
return on the announcement date based on 
the three-factor model; results are similar 
when alternative benchmarks or three-day 
return measures are employed. Regression 
coeffi cient estimates for each characteristic 
confi rm the prima facie impressions from 
Figure 8; abnormal returns are inversely 
related to market capitalization, an indica-
tor variable for commercialized products, 
and institutional ownership. Combining any 
two of these factors or all three together sug-
gests that market capitalization and institu-
tional ownership are both related inversely 
to abnormal returns, but that the effect of 
the indicator variable for existing commer-
cialized products attenuates after control-
ling for fi rm size.  
 We also investigate whether the clinical 
trial phase of the fast tracked drug affects 
the security price reaction. Fast track drugs 
in earlier phases might enjoy faster clinical 
trials and subsequently lower cumulative 
development costs than drugs that are fast 
tracked only in last phases of clinical trials. 
Figure 9 reports estimated results for cross-sectional regressions of abnormal returns. The 
dependent variable is the announcement day abnormal return estimated using the three-factor 
model (see equations (3) and (4)). Explanatory variables are the natural log of the market 
value of equity, an indicator variable equal to one if a fi rm has already marketed products 
to consumers, and the natural log of 1+ the percentage of a fi rm’s common equity held by 
institutions at the end of the prior quarter. The number of observations equals 107 for all 
estimations. The fi gures reported below the coeffi cient estimates in parentheses are t-statistics.
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Intercept
0.8154 0.1289 0.1893 0.7790 0.2090 0.7186 0.6407
(5.01) (6.27) (6.20) (4.04) (6.75) (4.29) (3.19)
ln (MVE)
0.0360 0.0339 0.0284 0.0238
(4.43) (3.39) (3.21) (2.18)
Marketed products 
(0 or 1)
0.0977 0.0150 0.0834 0.0297
(2.72) (0.36) (2.41) (0.71)
ln (1+ %institutional 
holdings)
0.3049 0.2797 0.1820 0.1928
  (3.59)  (3.34) (2.02) (2.11)
F-test 19.66 7.41 12.88 9.81 9.64 12.16 8.24
p-value < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
R 2 0.1577 0.0659 0.1093 0.1587 0.1565 0.1896 0.1935
adj. R 2 0.1497 0.0570 0.1008 0.1425 0.1402 0.1740 0.1700
Figure 9. Regression Analysis of Abnormal Returns
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On the other hand, the likelihood that drugs 
in early phases will eventually qualify for an 
NDA and result in marketable products is 
much lower than for late-phase drugs. Con-
sequently, it is diffi cult to predict how clini-
cal trial phase affects stock price reaction 
to fast track announcements. We divide the 
sample of 107 observations into announce-
ments concerning drugs at phase two or ear-
lier (42 announcements) versus later phases 
(60 announcements); we could not identify 
clinical trial phase for fi ve announcements. 
Our empirical results from this exercise show 
no material difference in stock price reaction 
for early stage versus late stage drugs, even 
after controlling for fi rm-specifi c character-
istics. For the sake of parsimony we do not 
report these results.  
 We next turn our attention to long-term 
measures of stock price movement follow-
ing fast track announcements. Cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) over various mul-
tiple day periods are reported in Figure 10. 
Panel A shows long-term returns across sev-
eral alternative benchmarks. In general, the 
average post-announcement CARs are nega-
tive, although none is signifi cantly different 
from zero. In contrast, CARs for the entire 
(30 days, 120 days) period are posi-
tive for all benchmarks except the equally 
Mean Abnormal Returns by Firm Size Quartile
Return Model and Time Period Small Quartile Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Large Quartile
Three-factor model
(+1, +120) 23.36% 19.25% 4.94% 23.32%
(30, +120) 45.68% ** 2.28% 0.37% 22.41% *
Drug industry index model
(+1, +120) 35.47% ** 32.95% ** 16.64% 29.33% ***
(30, +120) 57.83% *** 17.59% 12.48% 22.99% **
*** signifi cance at p-value<1%, ** signifi cance at p-value<5%, * signifi cance at p-value<10%
Figure 10 shows mean cumulative abnormal returns for alternative time periods, under 
alternative benchmark models for expected returns, and for sample fi rms segmented by market 
capitalization. Asterisks indicate p-values associated with t-tests. 
Mean Abnormal Returns
Under Alternative Models for Benchmarked Expected Returns
Time Period Three-Factor 
Model
Equally Weighted 
Market
Value-Weighted 
Market
Drug Industry 
Index
Biotech 
Index
(+1, +30) 4.39%  4.17% 4.13%  4.29% 4.09%
(+1, +60) 7.87%  9.72% * 6.85%  6.93% 7.13%
(+1, +90) 6.28% 12.41% * 5.38%  7.89% 6.96%
(+1, +120) 6.18% 14.58% * 5.71% 11.14% 9.85%
(-30, +120)    4.79%  4.19%    5.51%     0.71%    0.30%
Figure 10. Long-Run Abnormal Returns
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weighted index model, but none of these 
longer-term CARs is reliably different from 
zero. In contrast to our results, Alefantis, 
Kulkarni, and Vora 31 report positive long-run 
returns following fast track designations for 
their 26 sample events. Our different fi ndings 
for larger sample and a longer sample period 
suggest that this prior fi nding is confi ned to 
their small sample of merely 26 events that 
occur between 1998 and 2001.  
 Panel B of Figure 10 shows the CARs 
across sample partitions based on fi rm size. 
These results suggest that longer period 
returns are positive for smaller fi rms, nega-
tive but indistinguishable from zero for mid-
sized fi rms, and negative for large fi rms. 
That fast track announcements would have 
a larger and more longer-lasting effect on 
stock price for small fi rms is consistent with 
the evidence on the announcement day return 
itself. That long-term returns are negative 
for the larger fi rms in the sample (especially 
after adjusting for size and valuation effects 
in the three-factor model) is a puzzle. We 
conjecture that idiosyncratic events within 
our sample period regarding other aspects 
of these large fi rms’ businesses may explain 
these long-term negative returns.  
 Institutional Ownership  
 We next turn to additional aspects of secu-
rity market response. We fi rst examine insti-
tutional holdings data furnished by Thomp-
son Financial based on 13F fi lings to see if 
the number of institutional investors and their 
total holdings as a percentage of outstanding 
shares change in the calendar quarters around 
announcements of fast track designations. 
We divide the sample into three sub-samples 
based on percentage institutional holdings at 
the end of the calendar quarter preceding the 
fast track announcement. Specifi cally, we 
distinguish fi rms with initially low institu-
tional ownership (<25 percent of outstand-
ing shares held by institutions of all types), 
medium institutional ownership (between 
25 percent and 50 percent of shares), and 
high institutional ownership (>50 percent of 
shares). Results are shown in Figure 11.  
 Figure 11 shows that the number of insti-
tutional investors and their total holdings 
tend to increase in the period surrounding 
fast track announcements. For a narrow event 
window that compares the quarter prior to the 
fast track announcement (Q 
1
 ) to the second 
following quarter (Q 
1
 ), Figure 11 shows 
that the number of institutions and their total 
holdings increase most materially for the 
sub-sample of fi rms with initially low insti-
tutional holdings. For a longer event window 
that compares Q 
3
 to Q 
3
 there appears to be 
a material increase in institutional holdings 
across all three sub-samples.  
 Analyst Coverage 
 As a fi nal dimension of capital market 
response to fast track announcements we 
examine behavior by fi nancial analysts. 
From Thompson Financial we collect earn-
ings forecasts for sample fi rms provided up 
to 180 days prior to the fast track announce-
ment by fi nancial analysts. We then exam-
ine whether earnings forecasts are revised 
upwardly or downwardly within 30 days 
of the fast track announcement. Panel A of 
Figure 12 shows the results. For the entire 
sample, there are substantially more upward 
revisions (59.8 percent) versus downward 
revisions (39.6 percent). However, further 
analysis reveals that the upward revisions 
are concentrated among fi rms that have 
marketed products (upward revisions by 
64.7 percent of analysts) and for the fi rms in 
the sample with market capitalizations that 
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exceed $1 billion (upward revisions by 66 
percent of analysts). There is no evidence of 
upward revisions among analysts for small 
fi rms or fi rms without marketed products. At 
fi rst this result might seem surprising given 
the evidence on abnormal stock returns con-
centrated among small fi rms as shown in Fig-
ure 8 and Figure 9. What is more surprising 
is that we see any systematic skew in earn-
ings forecasts revisions at all. Specifi cally, 
fast tracked drugs are unlikely to generate 
revenues that would affect earnings within 
any reasonable forecast horizon for any of 
the sample fi rms due to the delays between 
clinical trials, NDA application, and com-
mercialization of products—for both small 
and large fi rms and for both fi rms with prod-
ucts and those without. That analysts’ fore-
casts systematically improve among large 
fi rms and fi rms with products suggest either 
Figure 12 shows activity by fi nancial analysts concerning fi rms that announce fast 
track designations. Panel A shows revisions in earnings forecasts made by fi nancial 
analysts as reported in I/B/E/S as reported by Thompson Financial. Panel B shows 
changes in analyst recommendations and coverage initiations as reported by the 
Yahoo Finance Web site (http://finance.yahoo.com/ ). 
Earnings Forecast Revisions
Downward No Change Upward
Entire sample 193 3 291
487 earnings forecasts (39.6%) (0.6%) (59.8%)
Firms with marketed products 127 0 233
360 earnings forecasts (35.3%) (0.0%) (64.7%)
Firms without marketed products 66 3 58
127 earnings forecasts (52.0%) (2.4%) (45.7%)
MVE>$1 billion 105 0 204
309 earnings forecasts (34.0%) (0.0%) (66.0%)
MVE<$1 billion 88 3 87
178 earnings forecasts (49.4%) (1.7%) (48.9%)
Analyst Recommendations or Actions
Downgrade Upgrade Initiation
30 days prior to fast track designation 4 4 11
19 analyst recommendations or  coverage 
initiations (21%) (21%) (58%)
30 days after fast track designation 2 5 18
25 analyst recommendations or  coverage 
initiations (8%) (20%) (72%)
Figure 12. Analyst Coverage of Firms That Announce Fast Track Designations
Security Market Reaction to FDA 45
that analysts infer positive synergies from 
fast track relations with the FDA for other 
products in various stages of development 
or commercialization, or that there is some 
secular trend in unexpected earnings growth 
among large multi-product pharmaceutical 
fi rms within our sample period.  
 Panel B of Figure 12 shows data from 
the popular fi nance Web site sponsored by 
 yahoo.com on the number of analysts who 
upgrade or downgrade their investment rec-
ommendations or initiate coverage of a stock 
around the time of the fast track announce-
ments. Over the 30 days prior to the fast 
track announcement there are a substantial 
number of coverage initiations, but upgrades 
and downgrades balance out at four of each. 
After the fast track announcement there are 
even more coverage initiations and upgrades 
exceed downgrades. Taken in conjunction 
with the evidence on earnings forecasts 
shown in panel A of Figure 12, this evi-
dence suggests that a fast track announce-
ment attracts analysts’ attention and elic-
its their optimism about the sponsoring 
fi rm’s stock.  
 Conclusions 
 The FDA is authorized to designate fast 
track status for new drugs with potential 
to address unmet needs for serious or life-
threatening conditions. Drugs on the fast 
track benefi t from accelerated clinical tri-
als and expedited FDA reviews for safety 
and effi cacy. We hypothesize that fast track 
designation accelerates resolution of uncer-
tainty regarding the real options embedded 
in a pharmaceutical fi rm’s drug pipeline and 
enhances value for investors, and we inves-
tigate security market response to announce-
ments of fast track designation. Specifi cally, 
we examine patterns in trading activity, stock 
prices, institutional holdings, and analyst 
coverage around fast track designations for 
publicly traded pharmaceutical fi rms.  
 We fi nd that fi nancial markets respond 
favorably to fast track announcements. Spe-
cifi cally, for 107 fast track announcements 
that occurred between 1998 and 2004 we 
fi nd evidence of abnormal trading volume 
in sponsor fi rms’ common equity and posi-
tive abnormal stock returns that average 
about 9 percent across several alternative 
benchmarking techniques. Abnormal trading 
activity and stock returns are highest among 
smaller fi rms, fi rms that have yet to commer-
cialize a product, and fi rms with low levels 
of institutional ownership. Institutional own-
ership increases materially around fast track 
events, especially for small fi rms, and analyst 
coverage improves and becomes more favo-
rable. Our fi ndings suggest that the award of 
fast track designation conveys positive infor-
mation about a drug’s sponsoring company. 
The positive market response suggests that 
fast track designation lowers expected regu-
latory costs and reveals positive informa-
tion about the quality of the fi rm’s growth 
opportunities.  
 REFERENCES 
  1. Jacobs, T, “Millennium Hits the Fast Track, The 
Motley Fool, June 11, 2002, available at  http://
www.fool.com/portfolios/RuleBreaker/2002/
rulebreaker020611.htm. 
  2. Kaitin, KI, (editor), “FDA’s Fast Track Initiative 
Cut Total Drug Development Time by 3 Years,” 
 Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Develop-
ment Impact Report , 5 (6), Nov./Dec. 2003. 
46 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE/Winter 2010
  3. Ward, MR, “Drug Approval Overregulation,” 
(1992)  Regulation: The Review of Business 
& Government , 15, available at  http://www.
cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg15n4e.html ; 
Becker, GS, “Get the FDA Out of the Way, and 
Drug Prices Will Drop,”  Business Week avail-
able at  http://www.businessweek.com/maga-
zine/content/02_37/b3799028.htm , Sept. 16, 
2002.  
  4. Lipsky, MS, Sharp, LK, “From Idea to Market: 
The Drug Approval Process,”  Journal of the 
American Board of Family Practice , 14, 362–
367 (2001); Food and Drug Administration, 
“The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring 
Drugs Are Safe and Effective,  FDA Consumer 
Magazine , July–Aug. 2002, Pub. No. FDA05-
3242, available at  http://www.fda.gov/fdac/
features/2002/402_drug.html. 
  5. DiMasi, JA, Hansen, RW, Grabowski, HG, 
Lasagna, L, “Cost of Innovation in the Phar-
maceutical Industry,  Journal of Health Eco-
nomics , 10, 107–142 (1991); DiMasi, JA, 
Hansen, RW, Grabowski, HG, “The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Develop-
ment Costs,  Journal of Health Economics , 22, 
151–185 (2003).  
  6. Henderson, D, “FDA Rules Aim to Speed Drug 
Tests and Trim Costs,” Boston Globe, Jan. 13, 
2006, available at http://www.boston.com/
business/healthcare/articles/2006/01/13/fda_
rules_aim_to_speed_drug_tests_and_trim_
costs/.  
  7. Roberts, TG, Chabner, BA, “Beyond Fast Track 
for Drug Approvals,”  New England Journal of 
Medicine , 351, 501–505 (2004).  
  8. Food and Drug Administration Modernization 
Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105–115, 
§ 112, Expediting Study and Approval of Fast 
Track Drugs. The text of Section 112 of the 
FDAMA and guidance for industry regarding 
fast track can be located in FDA-CDER (Center 
for Drug Evaluation and Research), 2004, 
“Guidance for Industry: Fast Track Develop-
ment Programs—Designation, Development, 
and Application Review (July 2004), available 
at  http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/fsttrk.pdf. 
 Unless otherwise noted, details on the fast 
track program are sourced from this docu-
ment.  
  9. Roberts and Chabner,  supra , n.7.  
 10. Milne, C-P, “The Food and Drug Administra-
tion Modernization Act and the Food and 
Drug Administration: Metamorphosis or 
Makeover?”  Drug Information Journal , 34, 
681–692 (2000).  
 11.  E.g ., Lipicky, R, “An Interview with Director 
of the Division of Cardio-Renal Drug Prod-
ucts, Raymond Lipicky, M.D.,”  US Regulatory 
Reporter , 16 (4), 3–7 (1999).  
 12. Milne, C-P, Bergman, E, “Fast Track Prod-
uct Designation Under the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act: The Indus-
try Experience,  Drug Information Journal , 35, 
71–83 (2001).  
 13. A recent and notable exception to enthusi-
asm for the accelerated approval process—an 
important component mechanism of fast 
track—is the report by the staff of U.S. Rep-
resentative Edward Markey, D-Massachusetts 
(Markey, EJ, “Conspiracy of Silence: How the 
FDA Allows Companies to Abuse the Acceler-
ated Approval Process,” US House of Repre-
sentatives Energy and Commerce Committee 
(June 1, 2005), available at  http://www.house.
gov/markey/Issues/iss_health_rep050601.
pdf ). The Markey report suggests that many 
companies are not promptly following up 
on required additional clinical trials or post-
marketing testing for drugs that have received 
accelerated approval on the basis of incom-
plete but promising clinical trials, nor are 
companies routinely disclosing the results of 
those post-commercialization tests to inves-
tors. 
 14. Kaitin,  supra , n.2.  
 15. DiMasi, JA, Hansen, RW, Grabowski, HG, 
“The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs,  Journal of Health 
Economics , 22, 151–185, 2003.  
 16. Henderson,  supra , n.6.  
 17. E.g., Jacobs, T, “Millennium Hits the Fast 
Track, The Motley Fool, June 11, 2002, avail-
able at  http://www.fool.com/portfolios/Rule-
Breaker/2002/rulebreaker020611.htm. 
 18. Piercy, L, “Life in the Fast Lane,” Signals: The 
Online Magazine of Biotechnology Industry 
Analysis, May 23, 2003, available at  www.
signalsmag.com. 
 19. Guedj and Scharfstein (Guedj, I Scharfstein, 
D, “Organizational Scope and Investment: 
Security Market Reaction to FDA 47
Evidence from the Drug Development Strat-
egies and Performance of Biopharmaceutical 
Firms,” NBER working paper 10933 (2004)) 
provide evidence that clinical trials frequently 
go on for too long for drugs sponsored by 
young fi rms without marketed drug products, 
suggesting that such fi rms overinvest in spec-
ulative drugs in an attempt to ‘swing for the 
fences’ and achieve an unlikely breakthrough. 
Multiproduct fi rms are less likely to display 
this behavior, suggesting a benefi t of internal 
capital markets at larger, more mature fi rms.  
 20. For example,  Iressa , a lung cancer drug manu-
factured by AstraZeneca, received accelerated 
approval in May 2003 but was later shown by 
post-marketing studies to be no more effec-
tive than existing but less expensive therapies 
(Markey, EJ, “Conspiracy of Silence: How the 
FDA Allows Companies to Abuse the Acceler-
ated Approval Process,” US House of Repre-
sentatives Energy and Commerce Committee 
(June 1, 2005), available at  http://www.house.
gov/markey/Issues/iss_health_rep050601.
pdf ). AstraZeneca promptly disclosed these 
fi ndings, and the FDA issued an advisory 
that most patients would be better treated 
with other therapies (Food and Drug Admin-
istration, “The FDA’s Drug Review Process: 
Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective,  FDA 
Consumer Magazine , July–Aug. 2002, Pub. 
No. FDA05-3242, available at  http://www.
fda.gov/fdac/features/2002/402_drug.html. ) 
 21. Chauvin, KW, Hirschey, M, “Advertising, R&D 
Expenditures, and the Market Value of the 
Firm,”  Financial Management , 22, 128–140 
(1993). 
 22. The pedagogical case study of Merck & Co. 
by Rubick and Krieger (Rubick, RS, Krieger, 
D, Merck & Co., “Evaluating a Drug Licens-
ing Opportunity,” Harvard Business School 
case # 9-201-023 (2000)) demonstrates how 
to envision the drug development process as 
a series of real options. Charnes and Kellogg 
(Charnes, JM, Kellogg, D, Real-Options Valu-
ation for a Biotechnology Company,  Financial 
Analysts Journal , 56, 76–84 (2000)) provide 
an analytical framework for valuing such real 
options at biotechnology fi rms. 
 23. Ellison, SF, Mullin, W, “Gradual Incorpora-
tion of Iinformation: Pharmaceutical Stocks 
and the Evolution of Health Care Reform,” 
 Journal of Law and Economics , 44, 89–129 
(2001); Dohlman, E, Hall, T, and Somwaru, 
A, “Regulatory Events and Biotech Firm Share 
Price,”  Review of Agricultural Economics , 24, 
108–122 (2002); Bastin, Hubner, G, “Con-
centrated Announcements on Clustered Data: 
An Event Study on Biotechnology Stocks,” 
 Financial Management , 35, 129–157 (2006); 
Golec, J, Hegde, S, Vernon, J, “Pharmaceuti-
cal Stock Price Reactions to Price Constraint 
Threats and Firm-Level R&D Spending,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 11229 (2005). 
 24. Austin, DH, “An Event Study Approach to 
Measuring Innovative Output: The Case of 
Biotechnology,”  American Economic Review , 
83, 253–258 (1993); Torabzadeh, K, Wood-
ruff, CG, Sen, N, “FDA Decision on New 
Drug Application and the Market Value of 
Pharmaceutical Firms,  American Business 
Review , 6, page 42–50 (1998); Sharma, A, 
Lacey, N, “Linking Product Development 
Outcomes to Market Valuation of the Firm: 
The Case of U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry,” 
 Journal of Product Innovation Management , 
21, 297–308 (2004).  
 25. Alefantis, TG, Kulkarni, MS, Vora, PP, “Wealth 
Effects of Food and Drug Administration “Fast 
Track” Designation,  Journal of Pharmaceuti-
cal Finance, Economics, and Policy , 13, 41–
53 (2005). 
 26. A listing of each sample announcement, its 
precise date, the sponsoring fi rm(s), the drug 
and its indication, and some additional infor-
mation will be provided by the authors upon 
request.  
 27. Garfi nkel, JA, Sokobin, JS, “Volume, Opinion 
Divergence and Returns: A Study of Post-Earn-
ings Announcement Drift, Journal of Account-
ing Research , 44, 85–112 (2006).  
 28. We also conduct but do not report assorted 
tests for long-run changes in trading activity 
as measured by volume and turnover; these 
tests do not indicate any unusual long-term 
changes in trading activity.  
 29.  Supra , n.23. 
 30. French, KR, 2007, Data Library, http://mba.
tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data_library.html.  
 31.  Supra , n.25. 
48
 Nursing Home Safety: Does Financial 
Performance Matter? 
 Reid M. Oetjen, Mei Zhao, Darren Liu, and Henry J. Carretta 
 Objectives: This study examines the relationship between fi nancial performance and selected safety 
measures of nursing homes in the State of Florida. 
 Methods: We used descriptive analysis on a total sample of 1,197. Safety information was from the 
Online Survey, Certifi cation and Reporting (OSCAR) data of 2003 to 2005, while the fi nancial perform-
ance measures were from the Medicare cost reports of 2002 to 2004. Finally, we examined the most 
frequently cited defi ciencies as well as the relationship between fi nancial performance and quality in-
dicators. 
 Results: Nursing homes in the bottom quartile of fi nancial performance perform poorly on most 
resident-safety measures of care; however, nursing homes in the top two fi nancial categories also ex-
perienced a higher number of defi ciencies. Nursing homes in the next to lowest quartile of fi nancial 
performance category best perform on most of these safety measures. 
 Conclusions: The results reinforce the need to monitor nursing home quality and resident safety in 
US nursing homes, especially among facilities with poor overall fi nancial performance. 
 Key words: Nursing homes, safety, quality, fi nancial performance. 
 Florida’s nursing home industry has experienced close scrutiny since the mid-1990s when it had a signifi cant 
increase in litigation for poor quality. 1 In 
2004, Florida’s state legislature enacted 
Senate Bill 1202, which raised nursing 
home staffi ng standards in an attempt to 
improve the quality of care provided in nurs-
ing homes. Its nursing homes have achieved 
a reduction in total defi ciencies, in both fre-
quency and severity, since the enactment 
of this law. The quality of care in Florida 
nursing homes, however, still cannot com-
pete with that of the majority of states, with 
Florida ranking 35th in total number of 
nursing home defi ciencies in 2006. 2 These 
issues warrant a closer look at nursing home 
safety.  
 Around the same time of the passage of 
this bill, Florida’s nursing home industry 
experienced signifi cant fi nancial diffi culties. 
In 2003, its average shortfall in Medicaid 
reimbursement equaled $11.76 per Medic-
aid patient-day. This number increased to 
$14.38 in 2004 and again to $14.58 in 2006. 3 
 Medicare has historically cross-subsidized 
these nursing homes, but this source of 
 revenue has declined with refi nements to the 
Medicare payment system. 4 
 The multidimensional concept of qual-
ity includes many dimensions, especially 
as it pertains to nursing homes. 5 The Joint 
Commission 6 and the Institute of Medicine 7 
include safety as one of their dimensions 
of quality; the Joint Commission defi ning 
it as “the degree to which the healthcare 
 intervention minimizes risks of adverse 
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 outcomes for both patient and provider and 
the degree to which the risk of an interven-
tion and risk in the care environment are 
reduced for the patient and others, including 
the healthcare provider.” 8 
 Despite the fact that many continue to 
examine nursing home industry quality, only 
a few pieces of literature address nursing 
home safety as compared with care delivered 
in other settings. Previous research on nurs-
ing home quality focused on organizational 
issues in nursing homes, such as quality 
improvement initiatives, teamwork, commu-
nication, and leadership. Other studies inves-
tigated such specifi c patient-safety issues as 
falls, pressure sores, restraint usage, medi-
cation administration, and infection rates. 9 
To date, only O’Neill, Harrington, Kitch-
ener, and Saliba 10 have linked nursing home 
fi nancial performance to quality of nursing 
home care. Although many of these studies 
examined safety issues in nursing homes, 
no research to date has investigated the rela-
tionship between fi nancial performance and 
nursing home safety. 
 Despite the lack of research in this area, 
a link regarding the fi nancial performance 
and safety can be hypothesized based upon 
the fact that one can argue that investments 
that affect staffi ng levels, training budg-
ets, and the provision of additional direct 
care services ultimately impact nursing 
home quality and safety. Given that many 
of these activities that enhance resident 
care quality involve considerable costs, the 
fi nancial performance of nursing facilities 
may prove to be a valuable predicator of 
safety, one of the key dimensions of qual-
ity performance. Therefore, nursing homes 
experiencing poor fi nancial performance 
may eliminate some of these activities. In 
fact, existing  quality studies in the hospital 
industry  support this assertion. 11 This study 
is exploratory in nature and examines the 
relationship between fi nancial performance 
and select safety measures in nursing homes 
in Florida from 2003 to 2005.  
 Financial viability and quality of nurs-
ing home care are of signifi cant interest to 
Florida’s taxpayers and government agen-
cies, as nearly 17 percent of the population 
has reached the age of 65 or older—the 
highest percentage of any state. 12 Efforts in 
monitoring fi nancial stability and safety of 
the care in Florida’s nursing homes prove 
critical to ensuring care for the state’s elder 
population. 
 Methods  
 Sample and Data 
 Data were collected from Florida’s fed-
erally certifi ed nursing homes for the years 
2003 to 2005. Only freestanding nursing 
homes were included in the analysis. Nurs-
ing homes that were part of another facility, 
such as an acute-care or rehabilitation hos-
pital, were excluded because these facilities 
generally have higher reimbursement and 
staffi ng levels.  
 The data sources for this study included 
the Online Survey, Certifi cation and Report-
ing (OSCAR) data reports for 2003 to 2005 
and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS) Medicare cost reports for 
2002 to 2004.  
 A national database, OSCAR com-
prises self-reported nursing home informa-
tion provided to state surveyor agencies 
during annual inspections. This database 
included data on quality and resident safety 
 indicators—the total number of defi ciencies 
cited during each standard recertifi cation 
survey. The Medicare cost-reports data for 
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nursing homes provided data on fi nancial 
performance. 
 To eliminate extreme outliers, nursing 
homes with a total margin beyond three 
standard deviation points from the mean in 
either direction were excluded. Approxi-
mately 400 nursing homes remained in each 
year, for a total sample of 1,197; the study 
used descriptive analysis. 
 Safety Measures 
 This study utilized nine safety measures 
from OSCAR data—specifi cally, the total 
number of defi ciencies reported for each 
nursing home by surveyors as a result of 
the annual federal survey mandated by 
CMS for all facilities participating in the 
Medicaid or Medicare programs. Although 
federal law requires nursing homes to be 
surveyed each fi scal year, investigators can 
conduct surveys up to 15 months from the 
previous survey. 13 CMS defi nes the stand-
ards the nursing home industry must meet 
to receive reimbursement from Medicare 
and  Medicaid.  Violations of these  standards 
result in defi ciencies, reported through 
OSCAR databases. 14 
 Figure 1 shows the most frequently cited 
defi ciencies in Florida related to safety for 
2006. 15 Among the top-20 cited defi ciencies, 
this study focused on the following nine to 
represent nursing home safety: 
 1. Food sanitation (F-371); 
 2. Records complete (F-514); 
 3. Accuracy of assessments (F-278); 
 4. Assessment by qualifi ed staff (F-282); 
 5. Drug storage (F-432); 
 6. Pharmacy procedures (F-426); 
 7. Infection control (F-441); 
 8. Medication errors greater than 5 per-
cent (F-332); and 
 9. Unnecessary drugs (F-329).  
 These nine measures represent both 
organizational issues and specifi c clinical 
processes related to resident safety.  
 To better understand what each meas-
ure entails, a brief description of the intent 
and safety implications of each regulation 
Rank Tag Requirement Facilities Cited (%)
 1 F-371 Food sanitation 50.73%
 5 F-514 Records complete 28.01%
 7 F-278 Accuracy of assessments 20.09%
 8 F-282 Assessment by qualifi ed staff 18.18%
10 F-432 Drug storage 17.45%
12 F-426 Pharmacy procedures 16.86%
13 F-441 Infection control 16.42%
18 F-332 Medication errors > 5% 14.22%
20 F-329 Unnecessary drugs 11.44%
Adapted from Cowles CM: Nursing Home Statistical Yearbook. 
McMinnville, OR, Cowles Research Group, 2007.
Figure 1. Most Frequently Cited Nursing Home 
Defi ciencies in Florida, 2006
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follows together with the validity of these 
measures. 
 Food Sanitation  
 The food sanitation regulation aims to 
prevent the spread of food-borne illness by 
ensuring that nursing homes store, prepare, 
distribute, and serve food under sanitary 
conditions. Compliance with this regulation 
proves especially important because food-
borne illness often becomes fatal for nursing 
home residents. 16 
 Records Complete 
 The records complete regulation endeav-
ors to ensure each nursing home maintains 
accurate, organized, accessible, and com-
plete clinical records for each resident. The 
presence of a complete record that provides 
an accurate functional representation of the 
actual experience of the resident signals an 
indication that the facility knows the status 
of its patients and has adequately planned for 
each resident’s care. 17 Previous research has 
shown that the communication of inappro-
priate or inaccurate information in nursing 
homes were barriers to timely care, which 
ultimately has the potential of affecting the 
safety of nursing home residents. Based 
upon this reasoning, the completeness and 
accuracy of a resident’s record could have a 
signifi cant impact on the resident’s safety. 18 
 Accuracy of Assessments  
 The accuracy of assessments regulation 
attempts to guarantee each resident receives 
an accurate assessment by appropriate per-
sonnel to ascertain each resident’s medical, 
functional, and psychosocial problems. This 
assessment provides a baseline for ongoing 
assessment and assures residents have safe-
care plans. 19 
 Assessment by Qualifi ed Staff 
 The purpose of the assessment by qualifi ed 
staff regulation is to ensure qualifi ed staff 
members care for residents. Direct caregiv-
ers must be knowledgeable about the care, 
services, and expected outcomes of the care 
they provide; otherwise, the safety of this 
care can become suspect. 20 This is an impor-
tant indicator of safety because research has 
shown that improved outcomes are associ-
ated with use of properly trained nurses. 21 
Thus, residents who are assessed by unquali-
fi ed, or poorly trained staff, may be at risk of 
receiving improper assessments which could 
negatively impact patient safety. 
 Drug Storage 
 The drug storage regulation maintains 
only authorized personnel should have 
access to drugs. Nursing homes must limit 
access to drugs to authorized personnel and 
store all drugs in locked compartments in 
accordance with all state and federal laws to 
prevent residents from becoming exposed to 
potentially dangerous situations. 22 
 Pharmacy Procedures 
 The pharmacy procedures regulation 
attempts to safeguard the drug needs of each 
resident. To maintain the optimal health and 
functional status of each resident, each facil-
ity “must provide pharmaceutical services 
(including procedures that assure the accu-
rate acquiring, receiving, dispensing, and 
administering of all drugs and biologicals) 
to meet the needs of each resident.” 23 Previ-
ous research regarding adverse drug events 
(ADEs) in nursing homes found that most 
errors occurred most often at the stage of 
prescribing and monitoring. 24 Thus, there is 
a clear link between the proper distribution 
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and storage of drugs (drug storage, phar-
macy procedures) and patient safety. 
 Infection Control 
 The infection control regulation requires 
the facility to have an effective infection 
control program for investigating, control-
ling, and preventing infection; it ensures 
each facility protects its residents from the 
transmission of disease and infection and 
provides a safe, sanitary, and comfortable 
environment.    Better nursing home outcomes 
have been linked to the presence of an effec-
tive infection control program; thus, an 
effective infection control program is critical 
in maintaining patient safety. 25 
 Medication Errors Greater Than 5 Percent  
 This regulation aims to safeguard resi-
dents from medication errors in excess of 
5 percent. If facilities have error rates in 
excess of 5 percent, this indicates systemic 
problems exist within their drug-distribu-
tion systems. 26 Previous study regarding 
medication errors in nursing homes has 
shown that medication errors have the 
potential to impact patient safety. In fact, 
researchers have shown that 7 percent of 
medication errors have the potential to 
harm patients. 27 
 Unnecessary Drugs  
 The unnecessary drugs regulation add-
resses each resident’s drug regimen to 
ensure they are not prescribed any unnec-
essary drugs. In the interest of safety, resi-
dents should only receive prescriptions for 
psychopharmacological drugs when they 
suffer from mental illness and not from 
underlying environmental or psychosocial 
stressors. 28 
 Florida’s Most Frequently Cited Defi ciencies 
 These nine defi ciencies help paint a pic-
ture of resident safety. Unnecessary drugs, 
drug storage, pharmacy procedures, and 
medication errors represent critical meas-
ures necessary to assuring residents receive 
proper medications and dosages. Complete 
records, accurate assessments conducted by 
qualifi ed staff members, and infection con-
trol serves as a proxy underlying manage-
ment practices. The presence of defi ciencies 
in these areas may indicate managerial over-
sight lacks something critical to providing 
the best quality of care. Among these meas-
ures, food sanitation represents the number 1 
defi ciency in Florida’s nursing homes. 29 
 Financial Performance Measures 
 Total margin, the excess of revenue over 
expenses divided by total revenues, repre-
sented fi nancial performance in this analysis. 
It refl ects profi ts from both nursing home 
operations and nonoperational sources (typi-
cally investment income). Owing to typical lag 
in time that occurs between a facility’s fi nan-
cial problems and any subsequent quality and 
safety changes, nursing home fi nancial meas-
ures from the previous year were collected. 
 This study classifi ed the fi nancial per-
formance of each nursing home relative to 
all nursing homes based on their rank in the 
percentile distribution of total margin. In 
particular, it distinguished facilities based 
on whether they fell into the fi rst, second, 
third, or fourth quartiles. Previous stud-
ies have used the percentile distribution of 
fi nancial indicators to distinguish nursing 
facilities’ fi nancial performance. The advan-
tage of classifying nursing homes in this way 
emerges from the ability to assess whether 
relatively broad fi nancial  performance 
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 categories, rather than small incremental dif-
ferences, are associated with resident safety 
problems for study subjects. 
 Results 
 The median total margin for this analy-
sis was 0.8 percent (ranging from 93.2% 
to 29.3%); the fi rst quartile was 4.2 per-
cent, and the third quartile was 4.2 percent. 
Fig ure 2 presents results for the four drug-
related quality indicators. Drug storage, 
prescription administration, and distribution 
play important roles in meeting the needs of 
residents and ensuring nursing home safety. 
Figure 3 presents the results for the infec-
tion, staffi ng, and management quality indi-
cators. The food sanitation indicator stands 
alone, because it represents the most com-
monly occurring defi ciency ( see Figure 3).  
 Drug-related defi ciencies were found 
in 5.9 percent to 24.1 percent of the facili-
ties, depending on their fi nancial perform-
ance ( see Figure 2), and from 8.7 percent to 
23.1 percent for the indicators in Figure 3. 
The proportion of nursing homes with defi -
ciencies was higher in the lowest fi nancial 
performance group (quartile 1), compared 
with facilities in the second lowest fi nan-
cial performing category (quartile 2). For 
example, 21.4 percent of nursing homes in 
the lowest fi nancial performance category 
received citations for defi ciencies in accu-
racy of assessments; this number was only 
13.9 percent in the second lowest fi nancial 
performance category. Similarly, drug stor-
age citation was 24.1 percent and 16.4 per-
cent for the poorest fi nancial performance 
category and the second poorest category, 
respectively.  
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 Interestingly, six of these eight safety 
indicators occurred less often among nurs-
ing homes in the second lowest performance 
category, rather than those in the highest 
fi nancial performers in the third and fourth 
quartiles. For example, the proportion of 
nursing homes cited for infection control 
was 12.3 percent in the  second lowest fi nan-
cial performance quartile, compared with 
17.1 percent in the second highest fi nancial 
performing category ( see Figure 3).  
 Similarly, unnecessary drug citations 
occurred in only 8.9 percent of the facilities 
in the second quartile compared with 12.7 
percent in the third quartile ( see  Figure 2). 
This fi nding implies nursing homes experi-
encing very poor fi nancial performance may 
not have suffi cient resources to ensure resi-
dent safety and the proper level of quality to 
meet the requirements for federal and state 
survey agencies. Therefore, they are more 
likely to receive citations. On the other hand, 
nursing homes with the highest margins may 
have achieved these results by sacrifi cing the 
quality of care provided to and safety of its 
residents.  
 Figure 4 illustrates the relationship 
between fi nancial performance and food-
sanitation citations. Nursing homes in the 
poorest fi nancial group had the highest per-
centage of food sanitation citations, whereas 
those in the third fi nancial group had the 
lowest proportion of citations for food defi -
ciencies. This contradicts the fi ndings for 
most of the other indicators, which occurred 
least in the second fi nancial group. 
 Discussion 
 The nursing home industry in Florida 
has undergone an intense period of pub-
lic  scrutiny regarding quality and resident 
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safety while simultaneously experiencing 
widespread fi nancial diffi culties. The fi nd-
ings from this study suggest these two phe-
nomena may have some relation to each 
other.  
 Results indicate nursing homes in the bot-
tom quartile of fi nancial performance per-
form poorly on most of the resident safety 
measures of care. However, nursing homes 
in the next to lowest quartile of fi nancial per-
formance category perform the best on most 
of these safety measures. Nursing homes in 
the higher margin categories (quartiles 3 and 
4) tend to have more defi ciency citations, as 
compared with those in the second quartile 
of fi nancial performance. These fi ndings 
are consistent with previous study fi ndings 
that found increased margin is more likely 
to affect quality adversely in proprietary 
facilities. 30 
 Our study had several limitations. First, 
although Florida has more than 600  nursing 
homes, this study represents only 4 per-
cent of US nursing facilities. Therefore, the 
results of this analysis cannot be generalized 
to other states. Future studies should expand 
the sample size to the national nursing 
homes and further examine the relationship 
between fi nancial performance and  specifi c 
safety indicators. Second, because this study 
only includes nine measures of nursing 
home safety, these measures cannot fully 
refl ect the dimension of nursing home qual-
ity. Future research should examine other 
indicators that relate to safety.  
 Third, data in the OSCAR and CMS cost 
report fi les have limitations associated with 
the study of nursing home safety. That is, 
the surveyors who collect OSCAR exercise 
judgment could only base on their education 
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and experience. This may lead to a low inter-
rater reliability among surveyors. This may 
understate or overstate the frequency and 
severity of quality issues in the annual sur-
vey process. 31 
 Fourth, data from OSCAR surveyors 
summarize facility-level data, rather than 
resident-level data, which preclude a more 
refi ned approach than one might use with 
patient-level assessment of safety measures. 
Additionally, OSCAR data only provide a 
snapshot of safety at a point in time; they 
may not accurately represent some facilities 
over longer periods. Nursing home fi nancial 
data from CMS may have shortcomings in 
relation to their accuracy and completeness 
because many fi nancial statements were not 
audited. 
 Finally, the analysis only comprised one 
measure of fi nancial performance; future 
research should include many other fac-
tors that could infl uence nursing home 
resident safety, such as size, ownership, 
chain  affi  liation, and staffi ng, so that the 
potentially  confounding effects could be 
control led for.  
 Despite these limitations, this study does 
suggest the importance of certain issues for 
policy makers and providers. In particular, 
the results reinforce the need to monitor 
nursing home quality and resident safety in 
US nursing homes, especially among facili-
ties with poor overall fi nancial performance. 
Nursing homes with the weakest fi nancial 
performance appear to have more defi -
ciency citations relevant to patient-safety 
measures. This suggests that such homes 
may not have fi nancial resources to provide 
 residents with a safe environment. Poli-
cymakers may want to consider increased 
surveillance of these poor performers or 
changes to reimbursement  formulas to 
increase the  likelihood that residents in 
these facilities remain safe.  
 Nursing homes in the top two fi nancial cat-
egories also experienced a higher number of 
defi ciencies. This suggests that the top per-
formers may overemphasize fi nancial per-
formance at the expense of resident safety. 
On the other hand, nursing homes in the 
second performance category outperformed 
both lower performing and higher perform-
ing facilities in all but two safety measures. 
This implies they may have arrived at a 
more optimal level of resource allocation for 
patient safety measures than other facilities 
in this study; this might prove useful in fur-
ther assessment of the relationship between 
fi nancial performance and nursing home 
patient safety indicators. 
 Conclusion 
 The nursing home industry plays a critical 
role in providing long-term care to elders. 
This study makes several contributions to 
the literature on nursing home safety. First, 
it examines the overall fi nancial health of 
nursing homes, rather than the effects of a 
specifi c policy change. Second, this study 
has clearly shown the poorest performing 
nursing homes produce the least favorable 
safety results. In order for this segment of 
the industry to improve quality, it must either 
improve effi ciency or rely on policy makers 
to increase reimbursement. Lastly, it provides 
evidence that nursing homes in the top two 
fi nancial performance categories have more 
defi ciency citations compared with those in 
the second quartile of fi nancial performance. 
This fi nding warrants closer examination 
and further study to ensure Florida nursing 
homes provide their residents a safe, quality 
environment. 
Nursing Home Safety 57
  1. Tanner, R, Nursing Home Liability Insurance 
(issue brief), National Conference of State 
Legislatures Health Policy Tracking Service 
(July 2004). 
  2. Schaefer, M, Burwell, B, Medstat, T, “The 
Nursing Home Liability Insurance Market: 
A Case Study of Florida,” US Department of 
Health and Human Services ( aspe.hhs.gov/
daltcp/reports/2006/nhliab-fl .pdf ) (June 1, 
2006); Cowles, CM,  Nursing Home Statis-
tical Yearbook , McMinnville, OR, Cowles 
Research Group (2007). 
  3. A Report on Shortfalls in Medicaid Funding 
for Nursing Home Care, BDO Seidman, LLP 
( ahca.org/brief/seidmanstudy0606.pdf ) (June 
2006). 
  4. Konetzka, RT, Norton, EC, Stearns, SC, “Medi-
care Payment Changes and Nursing Home 
Quality: Effects on Long-Stay Residents,” 
 Intl J Health Care Finance Econ , 2006; 6:
173–189. 
  5. Zimmerman, DR, Karon, SL, Arling, G,  et al ., 
“Development and Testing of Nursing Home 
Quality Indicators,”  Health Care Finance Rev , 
16:107–127 (1995). 
  6. 2006–2007 Comprehensive Accreditation 
Manual for Behavioral Health Care, Oakbrook 
Terrace, Illinois, Joint Commission (2006). 
  7. Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health 
System for the 21st Century, Washington, DC, 
National Academies Press (2001). 
  8.  Supra , n.6. 
  9. Scott-Cawiezell, J, Vogelsmeier, A, “Nursing 
Home Safety: A Review of the Literature,” 
 Annu Rev Nurs Res , 24:179–215 (2006). 
 10. O’Neill, C, Harrington, C, Kitchener, M,  et al., 
“Quality of Care in Nursing Homes: An Anal-
ysis of Relationships Aamong Profi t, Quality, 
and Ownership,”  Med Care , 41:1318–1330 
(2003). 
 11. Bazzoli, G, Clement, J, Lindrooth, R, Chen, 
H, Aydede, S,  et al ., “Hospital Financial Con-
dition and Operational Decisions Related 
to the Quality of Hospital Care,”  Med Care , 
64 (2):148–168 (2007); Ciliberto, F, Lindrooth, 
R, “Exit from the Hospital Industry,”  Economic 
Inquiry , 45(1):71–82 (2007). 
 12. Bernstein, R, “Census Bureau Estimates 
Number of Children and Adults in the States 
and Puerto Rico (press release), US Census 
Bureau ( www.census.gov/Press-Release/
www/releases/archives/population/004083.
html )(Mar. 10, 2005). 
 13. Annual Quality Improvement Report on the 
Nursing Home Survey Process and Progress 
Reports on Other Legislatively Directed 
Activities, Minnesota Department of Health 
(health.state.mn.us/divs/fpc/AQIRnhs2004.
pdf) (2004). 
 14. Harrington, C, Carrillo, H, Thollang, SC,  et al ., 
 Nursing Facilities, Staffi ng, Residents and 
Facility Defi ciencies, 1993–1999 , San Fran-
cisco, University of California Department of 
Social and Behavioral Sciences (2000). 
 15. Cowles,  supra , n.2. 
 16.  Long-Term Care Survey , Washington, DC, 
American Health Care Association (Dec. 
2006). 
 17.  Id. 
 18. Longo, D, Youngh, J, Mehr, D, Lindbloom, E, 
Salerno, L, “Barriers to Timely Care of Acute 
Infections in Nursing Homes: A Preliminary 
Qualitative Study,”  Journal of the American 
Medical Directors Association , 5:s5–s10 
(2004). 
 19. Bernstein,  supra , n.12. 
 20.  Supra , n.16. 
 21. Mor, V, “Hospitalization of Nursing Home 
Residents: A Review of Clinical, Organiza-
tion and Policy Determinants,” unpublished 
manuscript, Brown University Gerontology 
Center, Providence, Rhode Island (1999). 
 22.  Supra , n.16. 
 23.  Id. 
 24. Gurwitz, J, Field, T, Avorn, J, McCormick, D, 
Jain S, Eckler, M, “Incidence and Prevent-
ability of Adverse Drug Events in Nursing 
Homes,  The American Journal of Medi-
cine  109:87–94 (2000); Gurwitz, J, Ochon, 
P, Harrold, L Cadoret, C, “The Incidence of 
Adverse Drug Events in Two Large Academic 
Long-Term Care Facilities,”  The Ameri-
can Journal of Medicine , 118(3):251–258 
(2005). 
 REFERENCES 
58 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE/Winter 2010
 25.  Supra , n.18. 
 26.  Supra , n.16. 
 27. Barker, K, Flynn, E, Pepper, G, Bates, D, 
Mikeal, R, “Medication Errors Observed in 36 
Health Care Facilities, “ Archives of Internal 
Medicine , 162(16):1897–1903 (2002). 
 28.  Supra , n.16.  
 29. Cowles,  supra , n.2. 
 30.  Supra , n.10. 
 31. Nursing Homes: Despite Increased Oversight, 
Challenges Remain in Ensuring High-Quality 
Care and Resident Safety. Washington, DC, 
Government Accountability Offi ce publica-
tion No. (GAO) 06-117, 2005. 
59
 Health Care Providers Under Pressure: 
Making the Most of Challenging Times 
 Scott B. Davis and Phillip J. Robinson 
 Between the slowing economic recovery, tight credit markets, increasing costs, and the uncertainty 
surrounding health care reform, the health care industry faces some sizeable challenges. These factors 
have put considerable strain on the industry’s traditional fi nancing options that the industry has relied 
on in the past—bonds, banks, fi nance companies, private equity, venture capital, real estate investment 
trusts, private philanthropy, and grants. At the same time, providers are dealing with rising costs, lower 
reimbursement rates, shrinking demand for elective procedures, higher levels of charitable care and bad 
debt, and increased scrutiny of tax-exempt hospitals. Providers face these challenges against a back-
ground of uncertainty created by health care reform.  
 W hile the current challenges are numerous, health care is a dynamic and growing industry 
that currently commands 17 percent of the 
US gross domestic product (GDP) and is 
expected to increase to 19 percent over the 
next ten years ( see Figure 1). The oppor-
tunities in the US health care industry are 
nearly limitless when you consider the high 
demand and prioritization for health care in 
the United States.  
 Health care providers must take a strate-
gic and forward-looking approach to these 
obstacles and challenges to be successful. 
What follows is an overview of the major 
challenges facing the industry and recom-
mendations for positioning your organiza-
tion to survive the current downturn and 
capitalize on potential opportunities.  
 Industry Challenges 
 Demographic and Economic Trends 
Affecting Health Care Providers 
 Current US demographic and economic 
trends are putting a growing strain on health 
care systems. Rising unemployment lev-
els have negatively affected many systems’ 
payer mix. Most states are experiencing 
severe defi cits and consequently are cutting 
health care funding. At the same time, health 
care providers are dealing with increasing 
acuity levels due to an aging population 
with worsening health. While there has been 
some economic recovery in 2010, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board recently noted that the 
pace of the recovery has slowed.  
 There is signifi cant demand from employ-
ers, consumers, and government to reduce 
costs as health care cost increases are far 
exceeding infl ation. Moreover, the weak 
economy is causing an unprecedented 
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 reduction in charitable contributions and 
grants, and mixed returns on investment 
portfolios. Endowed institutions have suf-
fered severe portfolio write-downs and have 
signifi cantly less investment income. Mak-
ing matters worse, signifi cant capital invest-
ment is needed to replace aging physical 
plants that need to be modernized to enable 
providers to deliver quality health care and 
remain competitive. 
 Operating and Financial Pressures 
 The decline in demand for hospital beds 
driven by the increased usage of outpatient 
services at the same time as costs are rising 
faster than reimbursement rates has made it 
harder than ever for health care providers to 
remain “in the black” ( see Figure 2). 
 Labor costs also present a challenge. 
Labor costs are far and away the largest cost 
of providers. Managing labor cost includes: 
 Working closely with organized labor 
to maintain a compensation model and 
•
working conditions that are fair but do 
not unduly stress the system;  
 Establishing and adhering to staffi ng 
grids that properly staff medical depart-
ments; and  
 Encouraging the use of new medical or 
administrative technology that helps to 
minimize labor cost. 
 Malpractice liability is also a signifi cant 
cost. High insurance premiums, potential 
crippling malpractice settlements, and the 
high cost of practicing defensive medicine 
add up fast.  
 Access to capital is a growing issue for 
many providers. Limited access to capital 
severely restricts many providers’ ability to 
update aging facilities, and upgrade infor-
mation technology and medical equipment. 
Failure to improve technology makes it more 
diffi cult to compete. At the same time, recent 
regulatory mandates require health care 
organizations to invest in electronic health 
records and data security. 
•
•
 Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Offi ce of the Actuary, Mar. 2010. 
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 In the face of these fi nancial pressures, 
stand-alone health care facilities fi nd it 
very diffi cult to compete with multi-state 
and multi-hospital systems. Consolidation 
of health care providers is a growing trend, 
driven by limitations on access to capital, 
mandates on quality of care and survival due 
to pressure on the bottom line. Future con-
solidation will likely be driven by pressure 
to reduce costs that cannot be passed along 
to payers, as well as higher capital invest-
ment requirements and continuing economic 
uncertainty. 
 Uncertainties Related to Health Care Reform 
 Health care reform has created a great 
deal of uncertainty, which is contributing 
to diffi culties among health care providers. 
The major effect of recent legislation for 
providers is that 32 million Americans who 
previously did not have medical insurance 
will soon be covered. It is far from clear if 
quality health care services can be delivered 
to these added enrollees given that, arguably, 
the existing facilities, medical professionals, 
and systems are inadequate for the existing 
level of patients. 
 There is little doubt that the increase in 
access to health care services will signifi cantly 
reduce uncompensated care and charity care. 
However, the estimated $1 trillion cost of 
health care reform will be paid, in part, from 
anticipated reductions in the cost of health 
care delivery and reduction of current reim-
bursement rates to providers and insurers. 
This will be diffi cult to accomplish. Health 
care reform also places a major emphasis on 
pay-for-performance and quality-of-care ini-
tiatives that will likely come with a high price 
tag. It remains to be seen whether the posi-
tive impact of having more insured patients 
will offset the effect of reduced reimburse-
ment rates and the added strain on the already 
stressed health care delivery system. 
 We know that major health care policy 
changes always create winners and losers, 
as the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 dem-
onstrated. The impact of health care reform 
will be much broader and will have a lasting 
impact on every provider. 
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 What Your Organization Be Doing Now 
 Given the many changes and pressures, 
what should your organization be doing now 
to address these challenges and position 
itself effectively for the future? We offer the 
following eight recommendations: 
 1. Perform a self-evaluation; 
 2. Update your strategic plan; 
 3. Seek out opportunities for synergistic 
consolidation and joint ventures; 
 4. Optimize cost structure and improve 
margins; 
 5.  Explore all available fi nancing strate gies; 
 6. Protect liquidity; 
 7. Minimize collection risk and maximize 
revenues; and 
 8. Consider an integrated health care model. 
 Perform a Self-Evaluation 
 Now is the time for a close and forthright 
evaluation of where your organization stands 
relative to the competition. Ask questions 
including,  
 What is our current position in the mar-
ketplace?  
 Where do we want to be?  
 How do we best serve our community 
given our local demographics, competi-
tion, and mission?  
 What will it take to get there?  
 Do we have the management depth, 
access to capital, and infrastructure that 
we need to succeed? 
 Can we achieve these objectives alone 
or should we consider a joint venture or 
consolidation? 
 Update Your Strategic Plan 
 Given the uncertainties, now is the time for 
effective strategic planning at the board and 
•
•
•
•
•
•
senior-management levels. It’s essential to 
establish a plan and communicate it through-
out your organization. Obtaining buy-in 
from employees, physicians, labor unions, 
and community leaders is also critical. 
 The board and management should update 
the organization’s strategic plan to ensure 
that it is appropriately focused on service 
structure, local conditions, payer mix, and 
cost structure. The plan should also address 
issues including quality of care, patient fl ow, 
management effectiveness, communica-
tion plans, the governmental/political envi-
ronment, and fi nancial strength. The plan 
should be monitored and modifi ed periodi-
cally and as regulatory and economic con-
ditions change. Also, health care reform 
 developments should be closely monitored 
since these impact strategic planning. 
 Seek Out Opportunities for Synergistic 
 Consolidation and Joint Venture  
 Smaller systems are seeing that their 
very survival may be dependent on merging 
with or being acquired by another system. 
Consolidated systems generally have better 
access to capital and also tend to have higher 
bond ratings than stand-alone systems. In 
the current environment, consolidation can 
be an opportunity for health care systems, 
large and small, to be better positioned to 
fulfi ll their mission and deliver quality, cost-
 effective care.  
 If you don’t have strong market share, a 
dedicated medical staff, and easy access to 
capital, consider consolidation options, stra-
tegic partnerships, or joint ventures with 
other providers in your marketplace, such as 
physician practices, ambulatory care  centers, 
surgery centers, and imaging centers. Also 
consider public-private partnerships whereby 
government funding is combined with pri-
vate provider health care delivery expertise 
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to meet local challenges. A strong partner-
ship with a primary care physician organiza-
tion will be important as health care reform 
adds 32 million new patients into the system, 
who are expected to primarily utilize tradi-
tional entry points rather than emergency 
rooms.  
 Optimize Cost Structure and 
Improve Margins 
 Knowing where to cut expenses is key 
to maintaining effi cient and stable opera-
tions since cost reductions typically provide 
quicker results than revenue-enhancement 
efforts. Focus on expenses with the greatest 
impact. Labor and medical supplies are gen-
erally the two largest cost centers of health 
care organizations’ operating expenses. Ana-
lyze these categories of spending thoroughly 
to get the highest potential savings impact. 
Examine your administrative expenses, 
such as use of consultants, temporary staff, 
and managerial salaries, as well as your 
entire indirect cost structure to ensure that it 
links directly with patient services. Take the 
view that all costs are variable, particularly 
administrative costs, then justify their value 
by linking them with the revenue-generating 
activities that the cost supports. Also, take 
this opportunity to implement metrics and 
benchmarking to evaluate service lines that 
either need to be fi xed or dropped. 
 Explore All Available Financing Strategies 
 Given that many health care lenders 
have exited the market and access to the 
tax-exempt bond market has been inter-
rupted in the last two years, many health 
care  organizations are scrambling to secure 
fi nancing. Commercial lending activity is on 
the rise but terms and covenants are more 
restrictive than before. Stronger systems 
can pursue tax-exempt bond fi nancing but 
weaker ones typically cannot, which puts 
them at a distinct disadvantage due to the 
higher cost of capital. 
 View all assets—tangible and  intangible—
and activities of the hospital as potential 
sources of capital or fi nancing. If structured 
properly, you can maintain quality and oper-
ating control via a sale/leaseback or some 
other contractual arrangement. Aggressively 
access nontraditional fi nancing sources 
including sales of assets, joint ventures, 
and public and private grants. Facility capi-
tal spending demands are so large that they 
leave less capital for equipment spending, 
which is needed to remain competitive. Uti-
lize all available leasing/fi nancing options 
for the smaller equipment purchases. Equip-
ment leasing continues to grow as a means 
of fi nancing smaller transactions. Focus on 
how each capital asset acquired or leased 
will improve fi nancial performance and meet 
organization goals. 
 Now is also an ideal time to negotiate 
with suppliers for consignment opportuni-
ties, extended terms, and larger, early-pay 
discounts. If your health care system has 
multiple facilities, consider opportunities to 
consolidate its buying power into a central-
ized purchasing department in order to pur-
chase more for less.  
 Protect Liquidity 
 In recent months, many health care organ-
izations have found out the hard way that 
cash matters more than earnings. A slower 
economy puts additional pressure on cash 
fl ow because payers are likely to pay more 
slowly, third-party reimbursement rates may 
be reduced, revenues and profi tability may 
diminish, and banks are less inclined to lend 
against insuffi cient or aging collateral. If not 
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monitored closely, liquidity can become con-
strained very quickly and without warning. 
 Establishing a cash-fl ow projection and 
then closely monitoring adherence to that 
projection is essential for health care organi-
zations. This will give advance warning of 
points at which cash may not be suffi cient to 
maintain existing operating levels or main-
tain compliance with loan covenants involv-
ing cash balances. This discipline will also 
give you the ability to aggressively manage 
cash as necessary under the circumstances.  
 Minimize Collection Risk and 
Maximize Revenues 
 The staggeringly high rates of unpaid med-
ical bills are growing quickly as more patients 
lose employment, insurance coverage, and 
their ability to pay for care. To minimize the 
impact of collection risk to your liquidity and 
your bottom line, strengthen your registration 
and admissions process, verify data inputs, 
and maintain accurate and complete medical 
records. This will allow you to avoid costly 
payment deferrals and denials. 
 Analyze clinical documentation to ensure 
all reimbursable complications or co-
 morbidities are captured in order to maxi-
mize revenue. Stay ahead of third-party con-
tract renewals, and realign incentives when 
possible. In many recent hospital failures a 
major contributing factor has been the ina-
bility to capture and bill for all the charges 
that are being incurred. 
 It is also a good idea to speed up the col-
lection process. Create an atmosphere of 
zero tolerance for signifi cant delays to col-
lect. After patient care, managing the rev-
enue cycle is the most complex process in 
provider management. Seamless operational 
integration and fl awless execution are essen-
tial to maximize net-revenue realization.  
 Consider an Integrated Health Care Model 
 Many health care systems are moving 
toward an integrated health care model, in 
which there is a high degree of collaboration 
and communication among health care pro-
fessionals and their patients. In this model, 
physicians, hospitals, ambulatory care cent-
ers, system management, and primary health 
plans are coordinated with common goals 
and incentives, both fi nancially and as they 
pertain to quality of care. 
 Integrated health care will be highly 
dependent on information technology capa-
bilities because of the required sharing of 
data among various constituents including 
the patient. Providers that are able to adopt 
this approach effectively undoubtedly will 
be better positioned for the future than those 
that do not.  
 Looking Ahead 
 The forces competing for quality patient 
care, patient access, and affordability, com-
bined with the uncertainties surrounding 
health care reform and a challenging eco-
nomic environment, exert a tremendous 
amount of pressure on the health care indus-
try. This pressure demands a back-to-basics 
approach that embraces sound business 
practices and requires health care executives 
to aggressively address issues and respond 
to signs of danger. This means considering 
a range of strategic options and seeking help 
as needed from outside advisers before your 
hospital or health system experiences signif-
icant distress. Organizations that do so effec-
tively will not only have a greater number 
of options and alternatives available to them, 
but also will be ready to capitalize on oppor-
tunities in the future. 
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 Inpatient Cancer Treatment: 
An Analysis of Financial and 
Nonfi nancial Performance Measures 
by Hospital-Ownership Type 
 Ashley N. Newton and Sid R. Ewer 
 This study uses longitudinal data of inpatient treatment from the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality’s (AHRQ’s) Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) to examine the differences in his-
torical trends and build future projections of charges, costs, and lengths of stay (LOS) for inpatient treat-
ment of four of the most prevalent cancer types: breast, colon, lung, and prostate. We stratify our data 
by hospital ownership type and for the aforementioned four major cancer types. We use the Kruskal-
Wallis (nonparametric ANOVA) Test and time series models to analyze variance and build projections, 
respectively, for mean charges per discharge, mean costs per discharge, mean LOS per discharge, mean 
charges per day, and mean costs per day. We fi nd that signifi cant differences exist in both the mean 
charges per discharge and mean charges per day for breast, colon, lung, and prostate cancers and in the 
mean LOS per discharge for breast cancer. Additionally, we fi nd that both mean charges and mean costs 
are forecast to continue increasing while mean LOS are forecast to continue decreasing over the forecast 
period 2008 to 2012. The methodologies we employ may be used by individual hospital systems, and by 
health care policy-makers, for various fi nancial planning purposes. Future studies could examine addi-
tional fi nancial and nonfi nancial variables for these and other cancer types, test for geographic dispari-
ties, or focus on procedural-level hospital measures. Key words:  cancer treatment, hospital ownership 
types,mean charges, mean costs, mean LOS. 
 Both common sense and economic theory demonstrate that the com-petitive behavior and fi nancial per-
formance of nonprofi t hospitals—including 
the incentive to raise prices when faced with 
less competition—will not differ materially 
from investor-owned hospitals. 1 
 — Robert E. Bloch, Antitrust Division, 
US Department of Justice 
 Cancer accounts for approximately one 
fourth of all deaths in the United States, sec-
ond only to heart diseases. Cancer ranked 
as the third most costly illness in the United 
States for 2008 with an estimated cost of 
$70 billion ( see Figure 1). 2 The relationship 
among cancer inpatient charges, cancer inpa-
tient costs, and length of stay (LOS), strati-
fi ed by hospital ownership type (for-profi t, 
government, and not-for-profi t), has never 
been evaluated in a nationally representative 
sample for time series forecasting purposes, 
to our knowledge. Hospital-level decision-
makers study actual and projected hospital 
utilization, charges, and costs when allocat-
ing resources. Local, state, and national poli-
cymakers study these factors when making 
decisions of a broader scope. Statistics on 
actual and projected patient outcomes, such 
as LOS, help to identify and correct potential 
defi ciencies in the quality of medical care. 
Given that cancer is relatively more prevalent 
among elderly populations when compared 
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to younger populations, and that baby boom-
ers in the aggregate are facing increased can-
cer risk as they age, uncertainty about future 
costs and outcomes of cancer care has never 
been greater. 
 The Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project (HCUP), sponsored by the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ), provides health care databases and 
software tools used to assess a wide range of 
health policy issues, including trend analy-
ses of cost, quality, access, outcomes, and 
market dynamics indicators for specifi c ill-
nesses. 3 We extracted longitudinal data for 
mean charge per discharge (1998–2007), 
mean cost per discharge (2000–2007), and 
mean LOS per discharge (1998–2007) for 
each of breast, colon, lung, and prostate can-
cers, stratifi ed into for-profi t, government, 
and not-for-profi t ownership types using 
HCUP. We limit our scope to these four can-
cers because they historically represent: 
 The most frequently diagnosed cancers; 
and 
 The largest proportion of cancer deaths 
as a percentage of all cancer patients in 
a given year. 4 
•
•
 We use the Kruskal-Wallis (nonparametric 
ANOVA) Test and time series models to ana-
lyze variance and build projections, respec-
tively, for mean charges per discharge, mean 
costs per discharge, mean lengths of stay per 
discharge, mean charges per day, and mean 
costs per day, stratifi ed by hospital owner-
ship type and for four major cancer types: 
breast, colon, lung, and prostate. We recog-
nize that hospitals will not collect what they 
charge primarily because they contractually 
adjust their charges to third-party payers 
(insurance companies, Medicare, Medicaid, 
etc.). Nevertheless, hospital charges refl ect 
management judgment about the value they 
place on their institutions’ services and the 
pecuniary direction those services will be 
taking. Our goal is not to make a determi-
nation as to which hospital ownership type 
is the most effective or effi cient, but rather 
illustrate trends and build forecasts for each 
of these variables. 
 Prior Research: Hospital 
Ownership Structure 
 Prior research has documented signifi cant 
similarities and differences among hospital 
Figure 1. Top Ten Most Costly Illnesses for 2008
 1. Heart Conditions—$76 billion
 2. Trauma disorders—$72 billion
 3. Cancer—$70 billion
 4.  Mental disorders, including depression—$56 billion
 5.  Asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease—$54 billion
 6. High blood pressure—$42 billion
 7. Type 2 diabetes—$34 billion
 8.  Osteoarthritis and other joint diseases—$34 billion
 9. Back problems—$32 billion
10. Normal childbirth—$32 billion
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s News and 
Numbers, 2008.
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ownership types, both fi nancial and nonfi -
nancial in nature. These elements include 
hospital profi tability, expenditures, pricing, 
capital structure, patient outcomes, corpo-
rate governance, and regulatory constraints. 
 Profi tability 
 Prior research has documented mixed 
fi ndings about whether hospital ownership 
structure is causally related to hospital prof-
itability. Valvona and Sloan 5 use Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compu-
stat, American Hospital Association (AHA) 
surveys, and both 10-K and annual reports 
to compare the fi nancial performance of the 
“fi ve largest for-profi t hospital companies 
in continuous existence from 1972 through 
1985” 6 with the fi nancial performance of 
other hospital ownership types as well as with 
companies from fi ve other industries: manu-
facturing, transportation, communications, 
commercial, and public utility. They fi nd that 
for-profi t (investor-owned) hospitals reported 
substantially higher margins and return on 
equity than other hospital types, and “stock 
returns more than twice as large as returns for 
other industries between 1972 and 1983.” 7 
 Twenty years later and in direct contrast 
to Valvona and Sloan’s fi nding that for-profi t 
hospitals are more profi table than other hos-
pital types, Alam, Elshafi e, and Jarjoura 8 fi nd 
that not-for-profi t hospitals are in fact more 
profi table when compared with for-profi t and 
government hospitals. They caution the reader 
that this generality was made based on a sam-
ple of 125 hospitals in the State of Washing-
ton consisting of for-profi t, government, and 
not-for-profi t ownership types, and that simi-
lar methods should be applied to other states 
in order to evaluate the generality’s merit.  
 Gowrisankaran and Town 9 use a dynamic 
model to identify key differences between 
for-profi t and not-for-profi t hospitals. One 
key difference they document is that for-
profi t hospitals are in fact profi t maximizers 
while not-for-profi t hospitals focus on some 
combination of service quality and profi t.  
 Deneffe and Masson 10 test pertinent 
hypotheses on a sample of Virginia not-
for-profi t hospitals and conclude that these 
hospitals consider both profi ts and output as 
objectives; that is, they show that not-for-
profi t hospitals exclusively maximize  neither 
profi t nor output. Clearly, much disparity 
prevails about this issue. 
 Expenditures 
 Hospital profi tability differentials across 
ownership types may fi nd their explana-
tion, at least in part, by carefully analyzing 
expenditures. Carter, Massa, and Power 11 
confi rm prior fi ndings (e.g., see Pattison 
and Katz), 12 that for-profi t hospitals face 
greater expenditures than their not-for-
profi t counterparts. Despite this generality, 
the researchers did fi nd that for-profi t hos-
pitals see operational expenses, adminis-
trative salaries, and number of employees 
that are actually less and fewer than those 
of other hospital ownership types. Kes-
sler and McClellan 13 analyze cases of heart 
attack over the period 1985 to 1996, strati-
fi ed by hospital ownership type, and fi nd 
that regions with a presence of for-profi t 
hospitals are associated with a decrease of 
approximately 2.4 percent in total hospital 
expenditures with virtually no difference in 
patient outcomes. The researchers’ rationale 
was that the existence of a competitive mar-
ket (i.e., one with a presence of for-profi t 
hospitals) causes not-for-profi t hospitals to 
become more productive and cost-effi cient. 
Similarly, Duggan 14 fi nds that not-for-profi t 
hospitals tend to mimic the behavior of their 
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for-profi t equivalents when there is a signifi -
cant presence of for-profi t providers. 
 Pricing 
 Hospital charges have been used as a basis 
for allocating hospital resources. Based on 
an analysis of all hospitals included in the 
Healthcare Cost Report Information System 
(HCRIS) in 2004, Anderson 15 fi nds dispro-
portionate pricing structures across hospi-
tal ownership types. Specifi cally, Anderson 
identifi es differences in the ratio of total 
charges/total costs in the order of 2.49 (gov-
ernment hospitals), 2.99 (voluntary hospi-
tals), and 4.10 (proprietary hospitals). Lynk 16 
analyzed a sample of California hospitals to 
fi nd that private not-for-profi t hospitals have 
a signifi cantly lower association between 
higher prices and higher market share in 
cases of hospital mergers. In fact, increased 
not-for-profi t market share is shown to be 
associated with lower, not higher, prices.  
 Capital Structure  
 Fundamental differences arise in the 
capital structure arrangements of for-profi t, 
government, and not-for-profi t hospitals. 
Gowrisankaran and Town 17 pinpoint the not-
for-profi t hospital’s unique ability to issue 
tax-exempt bonds as a provision that contrib-
utes to differing costs of capital when com-
paring not-for-profi t hospitals to other own-
ership types. One decade earlier, Valvona 
and Sloan 18 fi nd that for-profi t hospitals 
assume signifi cant levels of leverage when 
compared to other hospital ownership types 
and even more so than other industries.  
 Patient Outcomes 
 Researchers have shown that minimal 
disparity exists in patient health outcomes 
across various hospital ownership types. 
Sloan et al. 19 studied the quality of care for 
Medicare patients in for-profi t hospitals ver-
sus not-for-profi t and government hospitals. 
They found no difference in health care qual-
ity across the ownership types, with quality 
defi ned in terms of mortality rates as well as 
changes in functional and cognitive states 
(specifi c to particular illnesses). Similarly, 
Baker et al. 20 conduct an extensive synthe-
sis of existing literature to fi nd that associa-
tions between hospital ownership type and 
patient outcomes will vary only as a function 
of the outcome variable studied. They also 
fi nd mixed or inconclusive evidence about 
differentials in access to care, morbidity, and 
mortality across hospital ownership types.  
 Corporate Governance and Regulatory 
Constraints  
 Two other differences among ownership 
types pertain to corporate governance and 
the government hospital budget constraint. 
Eldenburg  et al . 21 fi nd that poor fi nancial 
performance is associated with CEO and 
governing board member turnover across 
all hospital ownership types except for 
those that are government owned. Dug-
gan 22 identifi es the soft budget constraint 
of government hospitals as the critical dif-
ference among for-profi t, government, and 
not-for-profi t hospital ownership types. This 
soft budget constraint is evident when gov-
ernment hospitals choose not to respond to 
fi nancial incentives because the local gov-
ernments that own the hospitals will capture 
any increase in revenues. 
 Prior Research: Cancer Costs, 
Charges, and Outcomes 
 Cancer is one of the most costly and 
devastating illnesses. Cancer accounted for 
Inpatient Cancer Treatment 69
approximately one fourth of all deaths in the 
United States, second only to heart disease. 
In 2006, there were 559,688 cancer deaths in 
the United States. As previously mentioned, 
cancer ranked as the third most costly illness 
in the United States for 2008 with an esti-
mated cost of $70 billion. 23 A major com-
plicating factor in patients’ ability to afford 
cancer treatment is lack of adequate health 
insurance coverage. According to a 2008 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) 
estimate, 43.8 million persons of all ages 
(14.7 percent of the total population) were 
uninsured at the time of the NHIS interview 
and 55.9 million (18.7 percent) were underin-
sured for at least a portion of the year prior to 
the interview. 24 Without suffi cient insurance 
coverage, patients are deprived of  adequate 
access to care, an especially dangerous situ-
ation for cancer patients who often require 
extensive medical care. 
 Incidence and Prevalence 
 Certain types of cancer are historically 
more frequently diagnosed. A forecasted 1.5 
million new cancer cases were to be diag-
nosed in 2009. Prostate and breast cancers 
were expected to be the two most frequently 
diagnosed types in men and women, respec-
tively, followed by lung and colorectal can-
cers for both men and women. In fact, these 
four cancer types are historically the most 
frequently diagnosed cancers. Furthermore, 
these four cancer types, given the number 
of cases, are the most fatal of all cancers. 
According to the American Cancer Society, 
mortality incidence rates among all cancer 
deaths, ranked from highest to lowest (2008 
estimates) were: lung cancer (30 percent), 
prostate (9 percent) and colon and rectum 
(9 percent) for men; and lung (26 percent), 
breast (15 percent), and colon and rectum 
(9 percent) for women. 25 Fortunately, accord-
ing to the National Cancer Institute, mortal-
ity rates for these most common cancers, in 
addition to rates for all cancers combined, 
are decreasing. 26 Despite a decline in mor-
tality rates in the aggregate, cancer patients 
continue to face numerous physical, mental, 
emotional, and fi nancial concerns.  
 Cost of Care 
 The cost of cancer care is relevant for 
many reasons. With cancer consuming a 
larger proportion of the elderly population 
over younger populations, concern exists 
about the degree of impact an aging baby 
boomer generation will have on cancer costs 
in the aggregate and fl uctuations in cost per 
case therein. In 2005, 42.5 million Ameri-
cans were enrolled in Medicare; by 2030, 
this number is expected to grow to nearly 70 
million. 27 Brown et al. 28 analyze Medicare 
claims linked to surveillance, epidemiol-
ogy, and end results data (SEER-Medicare 
database) for breast and colorectal cancer 
patients to fi nd that “the cost profi le for 
each individual has the appearance of a ‘U’-
shaped curve. … [In terms of] phase-specifi c 
estimates, the two vertical segments of the 
U represent initial and terminal phase costs, 
and the bottom of the U represents continu-
ing care costs.” 29 That is, initial- and end-
stage costs consume more medical resources 
than do middle-stage costs. Jacobson  et a l. 30 
fi nd that patient and provider discretion over 
the choice of cancer treatment regimen and 
therapy directly infl uence expenditure lev-
els. An aging population combined with the 
introduction of new technology, therapeutic 
agents, and unconventional treatment meth-
ods are sure to pose diffi culty in making 
accurate projections of cancer care costs into 
the future.  
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 As is the case for many chronic illnesses, 
patients seek treatment on both an outpatient 
and inpatient basis. Warren et al. 31 document 
that hospitalization costs accounted for the 
largest portion of total payments for each 
of breast, colon, lung, and prostate cancers 
in 2002. Suda, Motl, and Kuth 32 compared 
cancer inpatients with non-cancer inpatients. 
They fi nd that cancer patients had a sig-
nifi cantly longer LOS, signifi cantly higher 
average case mix index, utilized more hos-
pice services, or expired more frequently 
when compared to non-cancer patients. Ho 
and Aloia 33 fi nd that high levels of surgeon 
volume—and not high levels of hospital 
volume—is associated with lower inpa-
tient surgery costs. They further elaborate 
that this relationship has strengthened over 
recent years. 
 Research Questions 
 Prior research presents mixed results 
about charge, cost, and outcome differen-
tials among hospital ownership types. Fur-
thermore, the relationship among cancer 
inpatient charges, cancer inpatient costs, and 
lengths of stay (LOS), stratifi ed by hospital 
ownership type, has never been evaluated in 
a nationally representative sample for time 
series forecasting purposes, to our knowl-
edge. We analyze the variance and test for 
signifi cant differences in the mean charges 
per discharge, mean costs per discharge, 
mean LOS, mean charges per day, and mean 
costs per day for each of the four cancer types: 
breast, colon, lung, and prostate. We com-
pare results across hospital ownership types 
(for-profi t, government, not-for-profi t). Due 
to the availability of HCUP data, our period 
of analysis extends from 1998 to 2007 for 
hospital charges and LOS from 2000 to 2007 
for hospital costs. Using the same set of lon-
gitudinal data, we build forecasts about how 
these variables will behave over the period 
2008 to 2012. 
 Sample 
 The Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project (HCUP), sponsored by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 
provides a wealth of health care databases and 
software tools used to assess essential health 
policy issues. HCUP represents the largest 
collection of longitudinal hospital care data in 
the United States and the only national hos-
pital database of all-payer hospital charges. 
Patient-level, all-payer data allows research 
on many policy issues, including cost, qual-
ity, access, outcomes, and market dynamics. 
HCUP summary data are freely accessible 
through HCUPnet, an online query system 
(http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov). Raw data sets are 
available for purchase and include a Nation-
wide Inpatient Sample (NIS), Statewide 
Inpatient Database (SID), and Kids’ Inpatient 
Database (KID), to name a few. 34 
 In 1988, its fi rst year of existence, NIS 
data consisted of discharges from community 
hospitals across eight participating states; in 
2007, NIS data consist of 1,044 hospitals in 
40 states, representing an approximately 20 
percent stratifi ed sample of all US commu-
nity hospitals. More precisely, “the sampling 
frame for the 2007 NIS is a sample of hos-
pitals that represents approximately 90 per-
cent of all hospital discharges in the United 
States.” 35 For HCUP purposes, community 
hospitals are defi ned as: 
 short-term, non-Federal, general and 
other hospitals, excluding  hospital 
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units of other institutions (e.g., pris-
ons). Community hospitals (and 
HCUP data) include OB-GYN, ENT, 
orthopedic, cancer, pediatric, public, 
and academic medical hospitals. They 
exclude hospitals whose main focus is 
long-term care, psychiatric, and alco-
holism and chemical dependency treat-
ment, although discharges from these 
types of units that are part of commu-
nity hospitals are included. 36 
 HCUP classifi es data into disease- and 
procedure-specifi c categories using diagno-
sis related groups (DRG), major diagnostic 
categories (MDC), ICD-9-CM billing codes, 
and clinical classifi cation codes (CCS). The 
CCS system, a compilation of codes unique 
to HCUP, was created by collapsing the more 
than 14,000 diagnosis and 3,900 procedure 
ICD-9-CM codes into clinically meaningful 
categories that are not directly subjected to 
the frequent changes affecting DRG, ICD-9-
CM, and MDC coding systems. 37 
 A researcher using HCUPnet will defi ne 
his or her sample through a series of steps. 
First, the researcher must choose a data-
base to query ( e.g ., NIS, SID, KID, etc.), 
followed by a type of query (specifi c diag-
noses, specifi c procedures, all hospital stays, 
trends, or a rank order of specifi c diagnoses 
or procedures). Next, he or she will select 
the year of interest and subsequently decide 
what coding classifi cation to use when iden-
tifying the disease or procedure of interest 
(CCS, ICD-9-CM, DRG, or MDC). For dis-
ease-specifi c analyses, HCUPnet will then 
ask whether the researcher wishes to include 
discharges where the disease was the princi-
pal diagnosis (chief reason for the hospital 
stay) or include them among all-listed diag-
noses (includes all principal diagnoses and 
 coexisting  diagnoses, both at time of admis-
sion and those that develop during the hospi-
tal stay). Finally, the researcher will specify 
what outcomes and measures to gather sta-
tistics for ( e.g ., mean, median or aggregate 
measures of hospital charge, hospital cost, or 
LOS), followed by what patient and hospital 
characteristics by which to stratify. Exam-
ples of patient characteristics include patient 
age, gender, payer status, and median income 
by patients’ zip code (low vs. not low, using 
income ranges defi ned by the Census Bureau); 
examples of hospital characteristics include 
hospital region (Northwest, Midwest, South, 
or West, as defi ned by the Census Bureau), 
ownership type (for-profi t, government, or 
not-for-profi t), teaching status (teaching vs. 
not teaching, as defi ned by the AHA), and 
bed size (small, medium, or large). Results 
will display on the active Internet window 
but can be exported to Microsoft Excel if the 
researcher so chooses. 
 Study Design 
 We used HCUPnet to query the NIS about 
breast, colon, lung, and prostate cancers for 
the period 1998 to 2007. Although HCUP-
net data for 1997 were available, substantial 
changes made to the HCUP database during 
that year led us to exclude 1997 data. Accord-
ing to Houchens and Elixhauser, 38 “[in] 1998 
the [HCUP] sampling method changed to 
better refl ect the cross-sectional population 
of hospitals. The hospital stratifi cation vari-
ables were redefi ned, rehabilitation facilities 
were dropped from the target universe, and 
sampling preference was no longer given 
to prior year NIS hospitals.” 39 Furthermore, 
“this defi nitional change causes a ‘disconti-
nuity’ between 1997 and 1998 in estimates of 
trends in totals, such as total discharges.” 40 
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 We used CCS codes to identify hospital 
discharges where one of these four cancer 
types was classifi ed as the primary diagnosis; 
that is, the patient’s cancer illness is the chief 
reason for being admitted to a hospital. We 
recognize that in some cases, patients will 
seek medical care during their hospital stay 
for ailments that are unrelated to the primary 
diagnosis of a specifi c cancer. The charges, 
costs, and LOS data on medical care sought 
for these secondary ailments may introduce 
bias into our variables of interest. On aver-
age, however, hospitals and policy-makers 
must recognize the inevitability of second-
ary ailments in some of their cancer patients 
and plan accordingly.  
 Our variables of interest included mean 
hospital charges, mean hospital costs, and 
mean LOS. Used here, a mean hospital charge 
is the average hospital charge across all dis-
charges for a certain cancer type, excluding 
professional (MD) fees. The mean hospital 
cost is derived using Medicare Cost Report 
(MCR) cost-to-charge ratios (CCR). Every 
provider of services to Medicare benefi ciar-
ies fi les a MCR annually, and the CCR work-
sheet (Worksheet C) is used to specify perti-
nent costs and charges on a cost-center ( i.e ., 
outpatient, inpatient, ancillary) basis. Asper 41 
explains that while Medicare payments are a 
simple way to estimate the provider’s “cost,” 
the CCR is a frequently used alternative. 42 
HCUP converts charges to costs using hos-
pital-wide CCRs since detailed charges are 
not available in all HCUP states. The aver-
age ratio for a hospital’s stratum (as defi ned 
by bed size, location, ownership, region, and 
teaching status) was used in cases where 
a hospital’s CCR was not available. The 
mean LOS is the average number of nights a 
patient remained in the hospital during his or 
her entire hospital stay. Any patient admitted 
and discharged on the same day is assigned 
a “0” LOS. 43 We fi ltered these data by hos-
pital ownership type (for-profi t, government, 
not-for-profi t).  
 As mentioned, hospital costs were derived 
using hospital-wide CCRs. However, because 
the CCRs applied by HCUP are hospital-
wide rather than department-specifi c, cases 
that generate a high proportion of ancillary 
charges (such as major surgeries) tend to 
be overestimated and cases that generate a 
high proportion of room and board charges 
(such as mental illnesses) tend to be under-
estimated. Song and Friedman 44 employed 
a more precise and accurate cost estimation 
alternative by applying department-level 
CCRs to each CCS and APR-DRG category 
in a sample of ten HCUP states reporting 
detailed charges in 2006. When comparing 
their department-level CCR estimates of 
cost per discharge to HCUP’s hospital-wide 
CCR estimates of cost per discharge, the two 
amounts were signifi cantly different (less 
than 10 percent) in less than one third of all 
cases. The ten-state average adjustment fac-
tor applied to hospital-wide CCRs for breast, 
colon, lung, and prostate cancers were 0.87, 
0.95, 1.02, and 0.86, respectively. 45 An 
example of such computations is shown in 
 Figure 2. We chose to apply these  adjustment 
Figure 2. Example on the  Application 
of CCS Adjustment Factors. The 
computation below applies the colon 
cancer CCS adjustment factor to 
not-for-profi t mean costs in 2007.
Mean Cost, from HCUPnet $17,427
x Adj. Factor* 0.95
= Adj. Mean Cost $16,556
*Source:  Song and Friedman, 2008. 
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factors to the 2000-2007 raw cost estimates 
acquired from HCUPnet. 
 Longitudinal descriptive statistics about 
our data sample are presented in Figures 3 
through 9. We analyze these data using the 
Kruskal-Wallis Test of variance analysis 
to test for signifi cant differences in mean 
charges per discharge, mean costs per dis-
charge, mean LOS, mean charges per day, 
and mean costs per day across hospital own-
ership types. We then use linear time series 
models to build projections for our variables 
of interest (mean charges, mean costs, and 
mean LOS) and for each cancer type (breast, 
colon, lung, and prostate), comparing these 
projections across ownership types.  
 Results 
 Annual Trends in Variables of Interest 
 Figure 3 shows that the number of hos-
pital discharges for each cancer type exhib-
its no defi nitive trend over the time period 
of interest, 1998 to 2007. Figure 3 reveals 
the supremacy of not-for-profi t hospitals 
in terms of numbers of hospital discharges 
when compared to other ownership types. 
An informal review of our sample shows that 
not-for-profi t hospitals constitute at least 75 
percent of total hospital discharges in nearly 
all years and for any given cancer.  
 Figure 4 (mean charges) and 5 (mean 
costs) demonstrate a distinctive upward 
trend over the years examined, across all 
cancer and hospital types studied. Figure 6 
(mean LOS), on the other hand, exhibits a 
downward trend over the years, across all 
cancer and hospital types studied. Figures 7 
(mean charges per day) and 8 (mean costs 
per day) combine LOS data with charge and 
cost data, respectively. These fi gures reveal 
that decreasing LOS for cancer patients has 
done little to ameliorate inpatient charges or 
costs. Per day charges and per day costs have 
markedly increased over the years. Figure 9 
presents total changes over the time period in 
absolute and percentage terms. Even though 
LOS percentage changes are all negative, 
charge and cost percentage changes are all 
positive, and the per day charge and cost 
percentage changes are all greater than their 
respective mean charges and costs. These 
results could refl ect the well- recognized 
accretion over the years in health care costs 
and/or enhanced (and more expensive) treat-
ment options that have developed during this 
time period. Whether better patient outcomes 
have occurred during this period is beyond 
the scope of this study, but could be fodder 
for additional research. It is worthy to note 
that per charge data for for-profi t hospitals 
have accelerated faster than for other owner-
ship types for breast, colon, and lung can-
cers, and per cost data for for-profi t hospitals 
have risen more slowly than for other owner-
ship types for all cancers studied. Compari-
son of these variables among hospital types 
is within the scope of our study and is pre-
sented in the next section. 
 Comparisons of Financial and 
Nonfi nancial Performance Measures 
Across Ownership Types  
 We use variance analysis to test our 
hypotheses that, when analyzed over the 
given time frame, mean charges per dis-
charge, mean costs per discharge, mean LOS, 
mean charges per day, and mean costs per 
day are signifi cantly different across hospital 
ownership types. In examining for normal-
ity, we determined our longitudinal data for 
mean charges, mean costs, and mean LOS 
for our cancers of interest are not normally 
distributed. The Kruskal-Wallis Test—a 
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 nonparametric  alternative to one-way 
ANOVA testing—was used to determine the 
signifi cance of differences among ownership 
types for our fi ve dependent variables. Under 
the Kruskal-Wallis Test, our null hypothesis 
is that the distribution of each dependent 
variable (mean charges, mean costs, mean 
LOS, mean charges per day, mean costs per 
day) is the same in for-profi t, government, 
and not-for-profi t (independently sampled) 
populations for breast, colon, lung, and 
prostate cancer; our alternate hypothesis is 
that  at least two of the populations differ 
with respect to their medians, at the 5 per-
cent level of signifi cance (α  .05). Results 
of these tests, which were conducted using 
SAS 9.1, are shown in Figures 10 and 11. 
Mean charges per discharge among owner-
ship types were signifi cantly different for all 
cancers studied (p  0.0263, 0.0062, 0.0164, 
and 0.0097, for breast, colon, lung, and pros-
tate cancers, respectively). Mean charges 
per day among ownership types were also 
signifi cantly different for all cancers studied 
Figure 5. Mean Costs per Discharge for Breast, Colon, Lung, and Prostate Cancer 
Hospital Discharges in HCUP NIS, Stratifi ed by Hospital Ownership Type, 2000–2007
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Breast Cancer
 All types $4,735 $4,911 $5,294 $5,595 $5,991 $6,378 $6,791 $8,064
 For-profi t $6,419 $5,829 $5,966 $5,588 $6,087 $6,791 $7,049 $7,606
 Government $5,133 $5,485 $6,329 $5,899 $6,294 $6,507 $6,931 $8,405
 Not-for-profi t $4,448 $4,685 $5,024 $5,539 $5,927 $6,291 $6,727 $8,054
Colon Cancer
 All types $12,124 $12,949 $13,677 $13,979 $14,795 $15,514 $16,201 $16,688
 For-profi t $13,859 $13,859 $14,704 $14,843 $15,162 $16,392 $16,903 $16,632
 Government $13,482 $14,045 $14,661 $14,065 $14,902 $16,271 $16,947 $17,498
 Not-for-profi t $11,675 $12,654 $13,379 $13,832 $14,722 $15,253 $15,974 $16,556
Lung Cancer
 All types $11,205 $11,740 $12,698 $13,063 $13,340 $14,208 $14,498 $15,704
 For-profi t $12,136 $11,439 $13,301 $12,998 $12,201 $14,458 $13,842 $14,133
 Government $11,533 $11,529 $14,757 $12,423 $13,033 $14,407 $14,623 $17,287
 Not-for-profi t $11,024 $11,819 $12,249 $13,181 $13,556 $14,133 $14,573 $15,635
Prostate Cancer
 All types $5,631 $5,926 $6,192 $6,405 $6,953 $7,376 $7,646 $9,304
 For-profi t $7,085 $6,313 $6,822 $6,529 $7,115 $7,200 $7,232 $8,574
 Government $5,952 $6,755 $7,631 $6,828 $7,080 $6,810 $8,030 $9,192
 Not-for-profi t $5,416 $5,764 $5,879 $6,327 $6,912 $7,516 $7,657 $9,393
Source: http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov. Mean costs per HCUP were adjusted using factors determined by Song 
and Friedman (2008); see Figure 2 for an example of how these adjustment factors were applied.
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(p  0.0152, 0.0084, 0.0176, and 0.0310, 
for breast, colon, lung, and prostate cancers, 
respectively). Mean LOS among ownership 
types were signifi cantly different for breast 
cancer (p  0.0399) but not signifi cantly 
different for colon, lung, or prostate cancers. 
Neither mean costs per discharge nor mean 
costs per day were signifi cantly different 
among ownership types for any of the four 
cancers studied.  
 We also used Kruskal-Wallis Tests for 
pair-wise comparisons among the three hos-
pital ownership types. Results of these tests, 
also conducted using SAS 9.1, are shown 
in Figures 12 and 13. Mean charges per 
discharge for for-profi t versus government 
hospitals were signifi cantly different for all 
cancer types studied (p  0.0126, 0.0032, 
0.0102, and 0.0041,  for breast, colon, lung, 
and prostate cancers, respectively). Like-
wise, mean charges per day for for-profi t 
versus government hospitals were signifi -
cantly different for all cancer types studied 
(p  0.0065, 0.0052, 0.0082, and 0.0102, 
for breast, colon, lung, and prostate cancers, 
respectively). Mean charges per discharge for 
Figure 6. Mean LOS (in Days) for Breast, Colon, Lung, and Prostate Cancer Hospital 
Discharges in HCUP NIS, Stratifi ed by Hospital Ownership Type, 1998–2007 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Breast Cancer
 All types 2.95 2.92 2.72 2.48 2.51 2.71 2.72 2.75 2.58 2.53
 For-profi t 2.71 2.54 3.02 2.65 2.52 2.62 2.61 2.66 2.61 2.53
 Government 4.08 3.41 2.80 2.65 3.12 2.74 2.65 2.65 2.77 2.77
 Not-for-profi t 2.79 2.90 2.67 2.43 2.40 2.71 2.75 2.79 2.54 2.49
Colon Cancer
 All types 9.41 9.38 9.35 9.23 9.24 9.12 9.00 8.97 8.86 8.57
 For-profi t 9.31 8.60 9.22 9.34 8.99 8.91 9.06 8.77 9.28 8.48
 Government 9.16 9.50 9.54 9.37 9.35 8.79 8.70 8.86 8.88 8.48
 Not-for-profi t 9.47 9.47 9.34 9.19 9.26 9.20 9.04 9.02 8.80 8.60
Lung Cancer
 All types 7.92 8.09 8.03 7.72 7.77 7.84 7.78 7.77 7.47 7.30
 For-profi t 7.70 7.49 7.62 7.70 7.86 7.86 7.30 7.58 7.51 7.30
 Government 7.75 8.05 7.85 7.91 8.21 7.52 7.32 7.38 7.36 7.55
 Not-for-profi t 7.98 8.18 8.10 7.69 7.68 7.89 7.92 7.86 7.48 7.26
Prostate Cancer
 All types 3.93 3.77 3.70 3.53 3.40 3.50 3.44 3.31 2.85 2.61
 For-profi t 3.73 3.43 3.77 3.62 3.39 3.25 3.35 2.66 2.89 2.86
 Government 4.08 3.75 3.90 3.52 3.90 3.54 3.54 3.10 3.28 2.84
 Not-for-profi t 3.94 3.81 3.67 3.51 3.33 3.53 3.43 3.47 2.78 2.54
Source: http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov.
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for-profi t versus not-for-profi t hospitals were 
signifi cantly different for all cancer types 
studied (p  0.0343, 0.0156, 0.0494, and 
0.0233, for breast, colon, lung, and prostate 
cancers, respectively). Mean charges per day 
for for-profi t versus not-for-profi t hospitals 
were signifi cantly different for breast, colon, 
and lung cancers (p  0.0494, 0.0156, and 
0.0494, respectively). Neither mean charges 
per discharge nor mean charges per day for 
government versus not-for-profi t hospitals 
were signifi cantly different for any of the 
cancers studied. Thus, these results, given 
for-profi t’s higher charges across the board, 
signify that for-profi t charges are signifi cantly 
higher when compared to either government 
hospitals or not-for-profi t hospitals. Mean 
LOS for breast cancer were signifi cantly 
different for for-profi t versus  government 
hospitals (p  0.0082) but not signifi cantly 
different for either for-profi t versus not-
for-profi t hospitals or government versus 
Figure 8. Mean Costs per Day for Breast, Colon, Lung, and Prostate Cancer 
Hospital Discharges in HCUP NIS, Stratifi ed by Hospital Ownership Type, 
2000–2007, Computed as a Ratio of Mean Costs to Mean LOS
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Breast Cancer
 All types $1,741 $1,980 $2,109 $2,065 $2,203 $2,319 $2,632 $3,187 
 For-profi t $2,125 $2,200 $2,367 $2,133 $2,332 $2,553 $2,701 $3,006 
 Government $1,833 $2,070 $2,029 $2,153 $2,375 $2,455 $2,502 $3,034 
 Not-for-profi t $1,666 $1,928 $2,093 $2,044 $2,155 $2,255 $2,648 $3,235 
Colon Cancer
 All types $1,297 $1,403 $1,480 $1,533 $1,644 $1,730 $1,829 $1,947 
 For-profi t $1,503 $1,484 $1,636 $1,666 $1,674 $1,869 $1,821 $1,961 
 Government $1,413 $1,499 $1,568 $1,600 $1,713 $1,836 $1,908 $2,063 
 Not-for-profi t $1,250 $1,377 $1,445 $1,503 $1,629 $1,691 $1,815 $1,925 
Lung Cancer
 All types $1,395 $1,521 $1,634 $1,666 $1,715 $1,829 $1,941 $2,151 
 For-profi t $1,593 $1,486 $1,692 $1,654 $1,671 $1,907 $1,843 $1,936 
 Government $1,469 $1,458 $1,797 $1,652 $1,780 $1,952 $1,987 $2,290 
 Not-for-profi t $1,361 $1,537 $1,595 $1,671 $1,712 $1,798 $1,948 $2,154 
Prostate Cancer
 All types $1,522 $1,679 $1,821 $1,830 $2,021 $2,228 $2,683 $3,565 
 For-profi t $1,879 $1,744 $2,012 $2,009 $2,124 $2,707 $2,502 $2,998 
 Government $1,526 $1,919 $1,957 $1,929 $2,000 $2,197 $2,448 $3,237 
 Not-for-profi t $1,476 $1,642 $1,765 $1,792 $2,015 $2,166 $2,754 $3,698 
Source: http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov. Mean costs per HCUP were adjusted using factors determined 
by Song and Friedman (2008); see Figure 2 for an example of how these adjustment factors were 
applied.
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not-for-profi t hospitals. This indicates that 
the LOS for breast cancer patients is con-
sistently and signifi cantly lower in govern-
ment hospitals when compared to for-profi t 
hospitals. 
 Five-Year Forecast Projections 
 We project mean charges per discharge, 
mean costs per discharge, mean LOS, mean 
charges per day, and mean costs per day 
for our variables and cancers of interest, 
 differentiating by hospital ownership type, 
into future years using time series forecast-
ing models. Longitudinal, annual point esti-
mates for mean charges (1998 to 2007), mean 
costs (2000 to 2007), mean LOS (1998 to 
2007), mean charges per day (1998 to 2007), 
and mean costs per day (2000 to 2007) were 
used to build forecasts for the fi ve-year 
period 2008 to 2012. We allowed SAS 9.1 to 
automatically fi t time series models by mini-
mizing the root mean square error of each 
variable. We exported the forecast output 
from SAS to Microsoft Excel in order to cre-
ate plots and compute parameter estimates 
for slopes and confi dence intervals. Upper 
and lower 95 percent control limits for fi ve-
year forecasts (UCL and LCL, respectively) 
Figure 10. Results of Kruskal-Wallis 
(nonparametric ANOVA) Tests on Mean 
Charges per Discharge, Mean Costs per 
Discharge, and Mean Lengths of Stay 
for Breast, Colon, Lung, and Prostate 
Cancer Hospital Discharges in HCUP 
NIS, Stratifi ed by Hospital Ownership 
Type, 1998–2007
Dependent variable x2 p-value
Breast Cancer
 Mean Charges 7.28 0.0263*
 Mean Costs 2.24 0.3263
 Mean LOS 6.44 0.0399*
Colon Cancer
 Mean Charges 10.16 0.0062**
 Mean Costs 2.18 0.3362
 Mean LOS 1.00 0.6069
Lung Cancer   
 Mean Charges 8.22 0.0164*
 Mean Costs 0.72 0.6977
 Mean LOS 2.90 0.2348
Prostate Cancer
 Mean Charges 9.26 0.0097**
 Mean Costs 0.74 0.6907
 Mean LOS 2.25 0.3250
* Signifi cant at 5% level
** Signifi cant at 1% level
Figure 11. Results of Kruskal-
Wallis (nonparametric ANOVA) 
Tests on Mean Charges per Day 
and Mean Costs per Day for Breast, 
Colon, Lung, and Prostate Cancer 
Hospital Discharges in HCUP NIS, 
Stratifi ed by Hospital Ownership 
Type, 1998–2007  
Dependent variable x2 p-value
Breast Cancer
 Mean Charges 8.37 0.0152*
 Mean Costs 1.68 0.4317
Colon Cancer
 Mean Charges 9.56 0.0084**
 Mean Costs 1.52 0.4677
Lung Cancer
 Mean Charges 8.09 0.0176*
 Mean Costs 0.30 0.8586
Prostate Cancer
 Mean Charges 6.95 0.0310*
 Mean Costs 0.62 0.7334
* Signifi cant at 5% level
** Signifi cant at 1% level
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are indicated on each graph. Forecast plots, 
parameter estimates, and time series model 
identifi cations are presented in Figures 14 
through 33. Figures 15, 19, and 23 plot-
ting forecasted mean charges, mean costs 
and mean lengths of stay for colon cancer 
have been provided in the printed version 
of this article as a sample to the reader; all 
Figures 14 through 33 can be viewed in the 
online version at  www.healthbusinessand
policy.com. 
 In general, the ranking of mean charges 
 per discharge by hospital ownership type 
(highest to lowest) over the period 1998 to 
2007 were (1) for-profi t, (2) not-for-profi t, 
and (3) government. Charges have been con-
sistently trending upward over the ten-year 
period studied and are projected to increase 
over the forecast period 2008 to 2012. 
According to forecast output (Figure 14), 
mean charges per discharge for breast can-
cer hospital stays in not-for-profi t hospitals 
will actually exceed for-profi t hospitals by 
2011. Forecasted charges for governmental 
hospitals, while projected to continue rising, 
are projected to remain below both for-profi t 
and not-for-profi t hospital charges.  
Figure 12. Pair-wise Comparisons of 
 Hospital  Ownership Types Using Kruskal-
Wallis Tests for Mean Charges per 
 Discharge (All Cancer Types) and Mean 
LOS (Breast Cancer), 1998–2007
Dependent variable x2 p-value
Breast Cancer: Mean Charges   
 For-profi t vs. Government 6.22 0.0126*
 For-profi t vs. Not-for-Profi t 4.48 0.0343*
 Government vs. Not-for-Profi t 0.05 0.8206
Colon Cancer: Mean Charges   
 For-profi t vs. Government 8.69 0.0032**
 For-profi t vs. Not-for-Profi t 5.85 0.0156*
 Government vs. Not-for-Profi t 0.46 0.4963
Lung Cancer: Mean Charges   
 For-profi t vs. Government 6.61 0.0102*
 For-profi t vs. Not-for-Profi t 3.86 0.0494*
 Government vs. Not-for-Profi t 1.85 0.1736
Prostate Cancer: Mean Charges   
 For-profi t vs. Government 8.25 0.0041**
 For-profi t vs. Not-for-Profi t 5.14 0.0233*
 Government vs. Not-for-Profi t 0.28 0.5967
Breast Cancer: Mean LOS   
 For-profi t vs. Government 7.00 0.0082**
 For-profi t vs. Not-for-Profi t 0.14 0.7055
 Government vs. Not-for-Profi t 2.52 0.1124
* Signifi cant at 5% level
** Signifi cant at 1% level
Figure 13. Pair-wise Comparisons of Hospital 
Ownership Types Using Kruskal-Wallis 
Tests for Mean Charges per Day 
(All Cancer Types), 1998–2007
Dependent variable x2 p-value
Breast Cancer: Mean Charges   
 For-profi t vs. Government 7.41 0.0065**
 For-profi t vs. Not-for-Profi t 3.86 0.0494*
 Government vs. Not-for-Profi t 1.12 0.2899
Colon Cancer: Mean Charges   
 For-profi t vs. Government 7.82 0.0052**
 For-profi t vs. Not-for-Profi t 5.85 0.0156*
 Government vs. Not-for-Profi t 0.46 0.4963
Lung Cancer: Mean Charges   
 For-profi t vs. Government 7.00 0.0082**
 For-profi t vs. Not-for-Profi t 3.86 0.0494*
 Government vs. Not-for-Profi t 1.12 0.2899
Prostate Cancer: Mean Charges   
 For-profi t vs. Government 6.61 0.0102*
 For-profi t vs. Not-for-Profi t 3.29 0.0696
 Government vs. Not-for-Profi t 0.37 0.5453
* Signifi cant at 5% level
** Signifi cant at 1% level
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Figure 15.
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Historical trends and future projections in the mean charge per hospital discharge for patients with 
a primary diagnosis of colon cancer.  Historical (actual) data are plotted for 1998 through 2007 
and projected (forecast) data are plotted for 2008 to 2012.  
For-profi t mean charge data were forecast using a linear trend model. 
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 Figure 15 notes that mean charges per dis-
charge in not-for-profi t hospitals will align 
with government hospital charges by 2011 
for colon cancer and by 2012 for lung can-
cer (Figure 16). In both colon cancer and 
lung cancer, for-profi t charges are forecasted 
to rise and remain higher than the charges 
in the other two types of hospitals. Mean 
charges per discharge for prostate cancer 
hospital stays (Figure 17) are forecast to 
remain consistent with historical trends; 
that is, the ranking of charges by ownership 
type (highest to lowest) will remain (1) for-
profi t, (2) not-for-profi t, and (3) government. 
 However, the slopes of the rise in prostate 
cancer charges for all hospital types are fore-
casted to remain modestly positive. 
 Although exhibiting a generally upward 
linear trend overall, historical trends in mean 
costs  per discharge are highly variable and 
the ranking of highest to lowest cost by hos-
pital ownership type varies from year to year. 
According to forecast output, mean costs 
per discharge for both breast cancer (Figure 
18) and prostate cancer (Figure 21) hospital 
stays will follow a ranking (highest to low-
est) of (1) not-for-profi t, (2) government, and 
(3) for-profi t. Mean costs per discharge for 
lung cancer hospital stays (Figure 20) will 
follow a ranking of (1) government, (2) not-
for-profi t, and (3) for-profi t. These forecast 
results warrant further examination. First, 
note that for-profi t costs are forecast to drop 
below the other two hospital types in these 
cancers. As we observed when we discussed 
Figure 9 (net changes in our variables over the 
years), for-profi t costs rose at a much lesser 
rate than they did for the other hospital types, 
and our forecasts refl ect this. Mean costs per 
discharge for colon cancer (Figure 19) for all 
three hospital ownership types are forecast 
to nearly align with each other by 2012. 
 Similar to mean costs, historical trends in 
mean LOS per discharge are highly variable 
and the ranking of highest to lowest LOS by 
hospital ownership type varies from year to 
year. Generally, a lower LOS is indicative of 
more effi cient service, all else being equal. 
According to forecast output, mean LOS for 
colon cancer (Figure 23) and lung cancer 
(Figure 24) will follow a ranking (highest 
to lowest) of (1) for-profi t, (2) not-for-profi t, 
and (3) government. Colon cancer LOS are 
projected to remain consistent over the fore-
casted periods for for-profi t hospitals, while 
they are predicted to decrease for other hospi-
tal types. For lung cancer, LOS are predicted 
to decrease for all hospital types, although 
for-profi t LOS are expected to decrease more 
slowly. Mean lengths of stay for breast can-
cer (Figure 22) and prostate cancer (Figure 
25) are forecast to be highest in government 
hospitals and comparably lower in both for-
profi t and not-for-profi t hospitals.  
 In general, the ranking of mean charges 
 per day (Figures 26 through 29) by hospital 
ownership type (highest to lowest) over the 
period 1998 to 2007 were (1) for-profi t, (2) 
not-for-profi t, and (3) government. Charges 
have been consistently trending upward over 
the ten-year period studied and are projected 
to increase over the forecast period 2008 to 
2012. According to forecast output, mean 
charges per day for breast cancer (Figure 
26) hospital stays in not-for-profi t hospi-
tals will approximate for-profi t hospitals by 
2012. Mean charges per day in not-for-profi t 
hospitals will nearly align with government 
hospital charges by 2011 for colon cancer 
(Figure 27) and lung cancer (Figure 28). The 
forecasted charges per day for lung cancer 
patients will remain higher in for-profi t hos-
pitals. Mean charges per day for prostate 
cancer hospital stays (Figure 29) are forecast 
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Historical trends and future projections in the mean cost per hospital discharge for patients with a 
primary diagnosis of colon cancer.  Historical (actual) data are plotted for 2000 through 2007 and 
projected (forecast) data are plotted for 2008 to 2012.  
For-profi t mean cost data were forecast using a log linear trend model. 
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Figure 19.
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Historical trends and future projections in the mean LOS per hospital discharge for patients with a 
primary diagnosis of colon cancer.  Historical (actual) data are plotted for 1998 through 2007 and 
projected (forecast) data are plotted for 2008 to 2012.  
For-profi t mean LOS data were forecast using the mean of historical data. 
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to be (highest to lowest) (1) not-for-profi t, 
(2) for-profi t, and (3) government over the 
fi ve-year forecast period, thereby deviating 
from the historical norm.  
 Similar to mean costs per discharge, his-
torical mean costs  per day exhibit a gen-
erally upward yet highly variable trend. 
According to forecast output, mean costs per 
day for both breast cancer (Figure 30) and 
prostate cancer (Figure 33) hospital stays 
will follow a ranking (highest to lowest) of 
(1) not-for-profi t, (2) government, and (3) 
for-profi t. Mean costs per day for lung can-
cer (Figure 32) hospital stays will follow a 
ranking of (1) government, (2) not-for-profi t, 
and (3) for-profi t. Mean costs per day for 
colon cancer hospital stays (Figure 31) in 
government hospitals are forecast to exceed 
the  comparable forecast costs for for-profi t 
and not-for-profi t hospital ownership types 
throughout the fi ve-year forecast period. 
 Upon reviewing forecast plots, we caution 
the reader to take notice of the upper (UCL) 
and lower (LCL) 95 percent control limits. 
In some cases, confi dence intervals are rela-
tively wide and allow for signifi cant variation 
during the forecast period (for example, see 
forecast breast cancer charges per discharge 
for not-for-profi t hospitals in Figure 14). In 
other instances, confi dence intervals are rel-
atively narrow and indicative of very precise 
projections (see forecast lung cancer charges 
per discharge for not-for-profi t hospitals in 
Figure 16). When used correctly, confi dence 
intervals allow the reader to better interpret 
the accuracy of forecasts. 
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 I n recent years, budget pressures com-bined with the acceleration in the growth of hospital costs have forced 
policymakers at both federal and state lev-
els to limit future increases in government 
payers’ reimbursement rates or even cut the 
rates they currently pay providers. These 
cost containment efforts have resulted in 
substantial payment shortfalls for hospitals. 
According to the American Hospital Asso-
ciation, between 2000 and 2007, the aver-
age payment-to-cost ratios for Medicare 
and Medicaid patients fell from 99 to 91 
percent and from 95 to 88 percent, respec-
tively, while the average payment-to-cost 
ratio for privately insured patients rose from 
116 to 132 percent. 1 
 Hospital participation in Medicare and 
Medicaid is voluntary, yet—given that these 
two programs account for 55 percent of care 
provided by hospitals—very few hospitals 
can afford not to serve publicly insured 
patients. Consequently, most hospitals have 
no choice but to accept the payment rates and 
terms that lawmakers set for the treatment of 
Medicare and Medicaid patients. However, 
given government payers’ continued efforts 
to contain health care costs, hospital man-
agers have become increasingly concerned 
that serving Medicare and Medicaid patients 
could seriously undermine their performance 
 Hospital Revenue Cycle Management 
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at revenue cycle management,  i.e ., their abil-
ity to generate adequate amounts of patient 
care revenue and to collect on this revenue in 
a timely fashion. 
 This article explores the relationship 
between hospitals’ government payer mix, 
 i.e ., their proportions of Medicare and Med-
icaid patients, and the amount of patient care 
revenue hospitals generate as well as the 
speed with which hospitals collect their rev-
enue. We fi nd that serving larger numbers 
of Medicare and Medicaid patients does 
not necessarily undermine hospitals’ rev-
enue cycle management performance. For 
hospital managers, these fi ndings may rep-
resent good news. They show that, despite 
increases in the number of publicly insured 
patients served, managers have frequently 
been able to generate adequate amounts of 
patient revenue and collect it in a timely 
fashion.   
 Literature Review 
 Despite frequently voiced concerns by 
hospital practitioners that serving Medicare 
and Medicaid patients may undermine their 
ability to generate and collect patient care 
revenue, only a few studies have explored 
empirically the relationship between govern-
ment payer mix and hospitals’ performance 
at managing the revenue cycle. None of these 
studies has found evidence that government 
payers undermine hospitals’ ability to gen-
erate and collect patient care revenue. In a 
study of US hospitals in the 1990s, Medicare 
and Medicaid payer mix was not associated 
with the average amount of net revenue hos-
pitals generated per patient. 2 Additional evi-
dence for this lack of a relationship between 
government payer mix and hospitals’ ability 
to generate patient revenue was provided by 
a study of hospitals in the state of Washing-
ton in 1987, which found that hospitals’ pro-
vision of charity care, a revenue deduction 
and thus an important determinant of hospi-
tals’ net revenue per patient, was not associ-
ated with the proportion of publicly insured 
patients served. 3 Moreover, with respect to 
hospitals’ ability to collect patient care rev-
enue in a timely fashion, a study of not-for-
profi t hospitals in the late 1980s found that 
hospitals’ government payer mix did not 
undermine their collection performance. 4 On 
the contrary, for several subsets of hospitals 
analyzed, hospitals’ shares of Medicare and 
Medicaid patients were inversely related to 
their average collection periods, implying 
that serving more publicly insured patients 
allowed hospitals to collect on their patient 
revenues faster. 
 While empirical studies of hospitals in 
the 1980s and 1990s found no evidence that 
government payer mix undermined hospi-
tals’ ability to effectively manage the revenue 
cycle, the continuing efforts of public payers 
to contain hospital costs may limit the appli-
cability of prior empirical fi ndings to  hospitals 
operating in today’s business environment. 
Using fi nancial information from two national 
datasets for the years 2000 to 2007, our study 
expands on previous work by: 
 1. Analyzing the relationship between 
hospitals’ government payer mix and 
their performance at revenue cycle 
man agement in today’s business envi-
ronment; and 
 2. Employing a more comprehensive 
set of fi nancial indicators of revenue 
cycle management performance tak-
ing into account both the amount and 
the speed of hospitals’ patient revenue 
collection. 
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 Conceptual Framework 
 Payment policies and practices vary sub-
stantially across third-party payers and can 
be more or less generous with respect to how 
much and how fast hospitals are reimbursed 
for the services they provide. 5 A hospital’s 
payer mix,  i.e ., its relative proportions of 
Medicare, Medicaid, privately insured, and 
uninsured patients, may thus play an impor-
tant role in its ability to generate adequate 
amounts of patient care revenue and collect 
on this revenue in a timely fashion. 
 In general, the amount of patient revenue 
a hospital collects is a function of the price 
the hospital receives for its services and the 
volume of services provided. The composi-
tion of a hospital’s payer mix has a pervasive 
infl uence on both. Payer mix largely deter-
mines the average net revenue a hospital 
is able to generate for any given service. 6 
Unlike fi rms in most other industries, which 
use billed charges as the only type of pay-
ment, an average hospital may have several 
hundred different contractual relationships 
with third-party payers, all of which spec-
ify different rates of reimbursement for any 
given service. While Medicare and Med-
icaid pay hospitals according to pre-deter-
mined payment schedules—most frequently 
in the form of fi xed per-episode payments 
based on diagnosis-related groups—private 
third-party payers may negotiate reimburse-
ment rates individually with each hospital. 
On average, because of their market power, 
Medicare and Medicaid pay hospitals a sub-
stantially lower percentage of billed charges 
than most private insurers, resulting in pay-
ment shortfalls. 7 Unless hospitals are able 
to offset some of the underpayments from 
Medicare and Medicaid by negotiating 
higher prices from private health  insurers, 
hospitals serving more publicly insured 
patients likely collect reduced amounts of 
patient revenue.  
 A hospital’s payer mix, however, not only 
infl uences the average price the hospital can 
charge for each service but also the volume 
of services. Before a patient can be admit-
ted to the hospital, many third-party payers 
require pre-authorization of services. Once a 
patient has been admitted, payers frequently 
infl uence the number of services and the 
intensity of care provided through case man-
agement and utilization review. Some pay-
ers, such as managed care organizations, 
manage the volume of services provided to 
their insured more than others. 8 As a result, 
hospitals with higher shares of managed 
care patients, including Medicare patients 
enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans and 
Medicaid patients enrolled in health main-
tenance organizations (HMOs), may experi-
ence reductions in their volume of services 
and thus collect lower amounts of patient 
revenue when compared to hospitals with 
more patients covered under fee-for-service 
health insurance plans.  
 Equally important, but rarely discussed in 
the same context, a hospital’s payer mix also 
infl uences its speed of revenue collection. 
A long time between service provision and 
receipt of payment places a cash fl ow bur-
den on the hospital, perhaps necessitating 
that the hospital access short-term fi nancing 
to meet payroll or debt service.  Further, a 
long collection period means the hospital 
will carry relatively high levels of accounts 
receivable on its balance sheet. Accounts 
receivable is obviously an asset which must 
be fi nanced at considerable cost to the hos-
pital. Hospitals’ average collection periods 
vary greatly by payer. While some third-
party payers, such as Medicare and many 
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managed care organizations including Med-
icaid HMOs, are bound by federal or state 
laws to reimburse providers within speci-
fi ed periods of time, 9 other payers, such as 
private indemnity insurers, frequently take 
considerable amounts of time to reimburse 
hospitals because of disputes over coverage 
or reasonableness. 10 Collections from indi-
gent and self-pay patients often prove to be 
particularly diffi cult, resulting in substantial 
payment delays. 11 
 As a result, hospitals with higher shares of 
Medicare and managed care patients, includ-
ing Medicaid patients in states where Med-
icaid is mainly administered through private 
HMOs, may collect their patient revenue 
faster than hospitals serving more patients 
with traditional fee-for-service insurance 
coverage as well as more indigent and self-
pay patients. 
 Methods 
 Analytic Model  
 Following previous empirical studies, 12 
we modeled hospital revenue cycle manage-
ment performance, RCM 
it
 , as a function of 
payer mix, PayerMix 
it
 , and a set of control 
variables, represented as X 
it
 , whereby the 
subscripts i and t refer to hospital i in year t. 
 
itiititit XPayerMixRCM εμγβ +++=
 Because of the potential for hospital-level 
variation in the way hospitals manage the 
revenue cycle, we included a hospital-spe-
cifi c error term, µ 
i
 , which represents the 
unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals. 
Revenue cycle management has been found 
to vary substantially across hospitals. While 
some hospitals have a highly integrated, well 
managed revenue cycle encompassing every 
step from patient registration to the collec-
tion and posting of cash, 13 other hospitals are 
characterized by a silo structure of manag-
ing the revenue cycle with little integration 
of the functions of different departments. 14 
In general, hospital-level heterogeneity can 
be modeled using either fi xed or random 
effects. Hausman tests of the null hypothesis 
that the hospital-level effects are random, 
however, indicated that fi xed effects regres-
sion was preferred over random effects. For 
all regressions, we employed heteroskedas-
ticity robust White standard errors to account 
for the clustering of observations within hos-
pitals over time. 
 Measures 
 Hospital revenue cycle management 
performance, the dependent variable, was 
measured using three fi nancial indicators 
of hospitals’ ability to generate and collect 
patient care revenue, days in net accounts 
receivable, net patient revenue per adjusted 
discharge, and net patient revenue per total 
assets ( see  Figure 1). The most frequently 
used indicator of hospital revenue cycle man-
agement performance is days in net accounts 
receivable, or the average collection period, 
a measure of hospitals’ ability to collect 
patient revenue in a timely fashion. 15 Days 
in net accounts receivable is defi ned as net 
accounts receivable times 365 days divided 
by net patient revenue and represents the 
number of days of net patient revenue that 
a hospital has due from patient billings after 
all revenue deductions. 
 Whenever possible we used net patient 
revenue per adjusted discharge as an indica-
tor of the amount of patient revenue gener-
ated, which adjusts net patient revenues for 
a hospital’s wage index, case mix index, and 
proportion of outpatient business and thus 
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Variable Defi nition
Data 
source*
Mean 
(Standard 
deviation)
Revenue cycle management performance
Days in net 
accounts 
receivable
(Net accounts receivable × 365) ÷ Net patient revenue TR 57.16
(22.22)
MRS 59.74
(17.50)
Net patient 
revenue per 
adjusted discharge
{[(Net patient revenue × 0.71 ÷ CMS wage index) + (Net 
patient revenue × 0.29)] ÷ Adjusted discharges} ÷ Case 
mix index 
  whereby Adjusted discharges = Total acute care 
discharges × (Gross patient revenue ÷ Gross inpatient 
acute care revenue)
TR 5,806.46
(5,019.85)
Net patient revenue 
per total assets
(Net patient revenue ÷ Case mix index) ÷ Total assets MRS 0.65
(0.27)
Payer mix indicators
Medicare 
admissions
(Medicare acute care admissions ÷ Total acute care 
admissions) × 100%
TR 41.77
(14.21)
Medicare inpatient 
days
(Medicare acute care inpatient days ÷ Total acute care 
inpatient days) × 100%
TR 50.42
(14.91)
Medicare gross 
patient revenue
(Medicare gross patient service revenue ÷ Gross patient 
service revenue) × 100%
MRS 40.13
(11.93)
Medicaid 
admissions
(Medicaid acute care admissions ÷ Total acute care 
admissions) × 100%
TR 15.29
(11.46)
Medicaid inpatient 
days
(Medicaid acute care inpatient days ÷ Total acute care 
inpatient days) × 100%
TR 12.64
(9.88)
Medicaid gross 
patient revenue
(Medicaid gross patient service revenue ÷ Gross patient 
service revenue) × 100%
MRS 11.85
(9.45)
Managed care gross 
patient revenue
(Gross patient service revenue from managed care 
payers ÷ Gross patient service revenue) × 100%
MRS 27.85
(16.48)
Control variables
Case mix index Average diagnosis-related group case weight for all of a 
hospital’s Medicare patients 
TR 1.32
(0.28)
MRS 1.33
(0.27)
Average age 
of plant
Accumulated depreciation ÷ Depreciation expense MRS 10.02
(2.71)
Notes: Means were measured as the mean of hospital values averaged over the periods 2002 to 2007 for 
Thomson Reuters hospitals and 2000 to 2006 for Merritt hospitals. 
* TR = Thompson Reuters; MRS = Merritt Research Services.
Figure 1. Variable Defi nitions, Data Sources, and Descriptive Analysis 
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allows for comparisons across institutions. 
We used net patient revenue per total assets 
as an alternative measure in those parts of 
the analysis where large numbers of miss-
ing data did not allow the calculation of net 
patient revenue per adjusted discharge with-
out compromising sample size. Unlike net 
patient revenue per adjusted discharge, net 
patient revenue per total assets only adjusts 
for differences in hospitals’ case mix indices 
but does not take differences in wage indices 
and the shares of hospitals’ outpatient busi-
ness into account. 
 The independent variables of interest in 
this study are indicators of hospitals’ gov-
ernment payer mix, in particular their shares 
of Medicare and Medicaid patients ( see  
Figure 1). The reference group to which Medi-
care and Medicaid were compared consisted 
of all privately insured and self-pay patients. 
In general, payer mix can be defi ned either 
in terms of volumes of services provided to 
patients covered by each payer or revenues 
received from each payer. We employed three 
different measures of payer mix in our analy-
ses: Medicare and Medicaid payer mix were 
measured fi rst in terms of volume using acute 
care admissions and acute care inpatient days 
and second in terms of revenues using gross 
patient services revenue. Besides Medicare 
and Medicaid payer mix, we included the 
percentage of gross patient revenue derived 
from managed care payers as an additional 
indicator of payer mix in parts of the analysis 
whereby our measure of managed care payer 
mix included Medicare patients enrolled in 
Medicare Advantage plans and Medicaid 
patients enrolled in HMOs. 
 Besides payer mix, a number of factors, 
both internal and external to the hospital, have 
been found to affect revenue cycle manage-
ment performance. 16 Due to the use of fi xed 
effects regression models, however, we were 
unable to estimate coeffi cients on time-invar-
iant covariates, which limited the number of 
control variables that could be included in 
the analyses ( see  Figure 1). In our analysis of 
days in net accounts receivable, we included 
case mix index,  i.e ., the average diagnosis-
related group case weight for all of a hospi-
tal’s Medicare volume, as a control variable. 
More complex cases often prompt additional 
reviews by third-party payers in the process-
ing of claims, which may result in payment 
delays for hospitals. 17 Moreover, in our anal-
ysis of net patient revenue per total assets, we 
included the average age of plant, defi ned as 
accumulated depreciation divided by depre-
ciation expense, as a control variable. Hos-
pitals may not only record higher net patient 
revenues per total assets because of more 
effective revenue cycle management but also 
because of changes in their asset base, which 
frequently is the result of aging capital assets. 
Finally, all analyses included year and state 
dummy variables to capture inter-temporal 
changes in revenue cycle management per-
formance common to all hospitals and differ-
ences in revenue cycle management between 
hospitals across states, respectively. 
 Data and Samples 
 The data used in the analyses were from 
two sources: First, we analyzed fi nancial 
data from Medicare cost reports collected 
and provided by Thomson Reuters. 18 Since 
almost all US hospitals have a contract with 
Medicare to treat Medicare benefi ciaries this 
dataset represents close to the total popula-
tion of US hospitals. Second, we analyzed 
audited fi nancial statement information for 
all bond-issuing, not-for-profi t US hospitals 
collected and provided by Merritt Research 
Services. 19 Even though the Merritt Research 
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Services dataset contains only a subset of US 
hospitals, its use allowed us to compare and 
reinforce our results by using several differ-
ent measures of both payer mix and revenue 
cycle management performance and thus to 
determine the robustness of our results with 
respect to different specifi cations of our 
dependent and independent variables. 
 The data provided by Thomson Reuters 
contained fi nancial information from Medi-
care cost reports for all hospitals that treated 
Medicare patients between 2002 and 2007. 
Of the 7,072 hospitals and 32,347 hospital-
year observations included in the database, 
we obtained information on 4,264 hospitals 
and 20,655 hospital-year observations with 
complete data on the variables of interest. 
The fi nal sample represented 60.3 percent of 
hospitals and 63.9 percent of hospital years 
in the database. 
 The Merritt Research Services database 
contained audited fi nancial statement infor-
mation beginning in 1988 for all not-for-profi t 
hospitals that have issued tax-exempt debt. 
We limited the period of analysis to 2000 
to 2006. Of the 1,486 hospitals and 8,707 
 hospital-year observations for which fi nan-
cial reports were available, we obtained fi nan-
cial information on 753 hospitals and 2,761 
 hospital-year observations with complete data 
on the variables of interest. The fi nal panel 
represented 50.7 percent of hospitals and 31.7 
percent of hospital years in the database. 
 While both data sets employed in this 
study had substantial missing data problems, 
the nature of the missing data problems var-
ied by data source. Thomson Reuters data 
are based on information from hospitals’ 
Medicare cost reports and thus unaudited 
fi nancial statements, which are known to 
contain many inconsistencies and errors. 20 
The Merritt Research Services database, 
on the other hand, contains fi nancial infor-
mation from audited fi nancial statements. 
As a result, there were very few missing or 
implausible values for most fi nancial state-
ment items. However, there was a substantial 
amount of missing information on hospitals’ 
payer mix since hospitals are not required to 
provide information regarding payer mix in 
the notes to their fi nancial statements. 
 The missing data problems encountered 
raised the question of the extent to which the 
fi nal samples were representative of all US 
hospitals and all bond-issuing, not-for-profi t 
US hospitals, respectively. For this purpose, 
a set of organizational and fi nancial char-
acteristics of hospitals in the fi nal samples 
was compared to those of all hospitals ( see  
Figure 2). The fi nal sample of Thomson Reu-
ters hospitals differed substantially from all 
US hospitals. They were generally larger, 
better performing, and not-for-profi t hospi-
tals. These fi ndings are consistent with the 
observation by Burkhardt 21 that hospitals with 
missing or inconsistent Medicare cost report 
data are generally smaller, poorer perform-
ing, and investor-owned hospitals. Likewise, 
the fi nal sample of Merritt Research Services 
hospitals differed from all bond- issuing, not-
for-profi t US hospitals. While they were very 
similar in terms of size, they had higher occu-
pancy rates and also performed better fi nan-
cially. Despite higher revenue deductions, 
both their operating and total profi t margins 
were higher than those of all bond-issuing, 
not-for-profi t US hospitals. As a result, since 
both fi nal samples contain disproportionately 
many larger, better performing, and not-for-
profi t hospitals, the fi ndings of this study may 
not apply to smaller, poorer performing, and 
investor-owned hospitals and caution should 
be exercised when interpreting and general-
izing the fi ndings. 
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 Results 
 Over the study period, hospitals con-
tinuously improved their performance at 
managing the revenue cycle. On average, 
hospitals reported between 57 and 60 days 
in net accounts receivable ( see  Figure 1). 
For Thomson Reuters hospitals, average 
collection periods decreased by around 
seven days, from 61.5 days in 2002 to 54.4 
days in 2007. For Merritt hospitals, the 
 improvement was even more impressive. 
Between 2000 and 2006, days in net accounts 
receivable decreased by over 15 days, 
from 68.7 days in 2000 to 53.6 days in 
2006. Moreover, the amounts of net patient 
revenue hospitals collect increased sub-
stantially over the study period. For Thom-
son Reuters hospitals, net patient revenue 
per adjusted discharge increased steadily 
over time, from $5,462 in 2002 to $6,321 
in 2007, averaging $5,806 over the six-year 
study period. Likewise, for Merritt hos-
pitals, net patient revenue per total assets 
increased from 61 cents per  dollar invested 
in total assets in 2000 to 66 cents in 2006, 
averaging 65 cents per dollar over the 
seven-year study period. 
Figure 2. Representativeness of the Final Samples
Thomson Reuters Hospitals
Merritt Research 
Services Hospitals
Final sample All hospitals Final sample All hospitals
Size
Number of hospital beds 175.8** 135.4 449 441
Net patient revenues (in 000) 133,000** 95,900 304,222* 342,446
Hospital ownership and type
Not-for-profi t hospitals 61%** 54% N/A N/A
Investor-owned hospitals 20%** 24% N/A N/A
Government-owned hospitals 19%** 23% N/A N/A
Operating performance
Occupancy rate 52%** 50% 63%** 62%
Average length of stay 4.1** 8.7 4.8 4.9
Financial performance
Revenue deductions as a 
percentage of gross patient 
revenue
54%** 50% 50%** 48%
Operating profi t margin 3.3 3.4 0.6* 0.4
Total profi t margin 3.4 3.5 3.7** 3.4
Notes: Sample means/proportions are presented for all variables. 
* denotes difference in means between the fi nal sample and all hospitals was statistically signifi cant 
at the fi ve percent confi dence level. 
** denotes difference in means between the fi nal sample and all hospitals was statistically signifi cant 
at the one percent confi dence level.
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 Hospitals’ government payer mix, the 
main independent variable, remained rela-
tively stable over the study period, averag-
ing around 55 percent of all care provided by 
hospitals. The percentages of gross patient 
revenues and acute care admissions attribut-
able to Medicare patients averaged 40.1 and 
41.8 percent ( see  Figure 1). When measured 
in terms of acute care inpatient days, how-
ever, Medicare payer mix averaged over 50 
percent, a fi nding that can be explained by 
the fact that once  admitted, Medicare patients 
on average stay in the hospital longer than 
non-Medicare patients, mainly due to greater 
severity of illness and higher co-morbid-
ity. The percentages of hospitals’ acute care 
admissions, acute care inpatient days, and 
gross patient revenues attributable to Medic-
aid patients equaled 15.3, 12.6, and 11.9 per-
cent, respectively.  
 Hospital-level fi xed effects regression 
analysis of days in net accounts receivable 
showed that higher Medicare payer mix was 
associated with more rapid patient  revenue 
collection ( see  Figure 3). An increase in 
Medicare payer mix of one percentage point 
Figure 3. Regression Analysis of Days in Net Accounts 
Receivable with Hospital-Level Fixed Effects
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 54.91**
(9.49)
55.55**
(9.47)
87.01**
(7.23)
Payer mix variables
Medicare –.076*
(.031)
–.142**
(.040)
–.121
(.089)
Medicaid –.018
(.031)
–.021
(.045)
–.26
(.16)
Managed care payers — — –.126*
(.053)
Control variables
Case mix index –4.89
(2.61)
–4.67
(2.61)
–7.43
(3.90)
Year dummies 5 included 5 included 6 included
State trends 50 included 50 included 48 included
Hospital fi xed effects 4,264 included 4,264 included 752 included
Adjusted R2 .016 .014 .056
Notes: Model 1 uses Thomson Reuters data and defi nes payer mix in 
terms of acute acre admissions. Model 2 uses Thomson Reuters data 
and defi nes payer mix in terms of acute care inpatient days. Model 3 uses 
Merritt Research Services data and defi nes payer mix in terms of gross 
patient services revenue. Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
* denotes statistically signifi cant at the 5 percent confi dence level. 
** denotes statistically signifi cant at the one percent confi dence level.
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was associated with a decrease in hospitals’ 
average collection period of 0.08 to 0.14 
days, which translated into decreases of 
around 0.14 to 0.24 percent. Medicaid payer 
mix, on the other hand, was not associated 
with hospitals’ average collection periods.  
 When analyzing hospitals’ net patient rev-
enues we found that both higher Medicare 
and higher Medicaid payer mix somewhat 
increased hospitals’ average net patient reve-
nues ( see  Figure 4). An increase in Medicare 
payer mix of one percentage point increased 
net patient revenue per adjusted discharge 
by between $21 and $80 per adjusted dis-
charge, or by between 0.3 and 1.4 percent. 
Likewise, controlling for Medicare payer 
mix, an increase in a hospital’s Medicaid 
payer mix of one percentage point was asso-
ciated with increases in net patient revenue 
per adjusted discharge of $7, or 0.1 percent, 
and net patient revenue per total assets of 
0.3 percentage points, or 0.5 percent. 
Figure 4. Regression Analysis of Net Patient Revenue per Adjusted 
Discharge (Models 4 and 5) and Net Patient Revenue per 
Total Assets (Model 6) with Hospital-Level Fixed Effects
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 6,948.67**
(269.73)
7,799.20**
(240.79)
.504**
(.051)
Payer mix variables
Medicare 79.77**
(4.96)
21.39*
(8.69)
–.0004
(.0010)
Medicaid 7.42**
(2.21)
–1.998
(4.013)
.0030*
(.0014)
Managed care payers — — –.00045
(.00043)
Control variables
Average age of plant — — .0100**
(.0023)
Year dummies 5 included 5 included 5 included
State trends 50 included 50 included 48 included
Hospital fi xed effects 4,264 included 4,264 included 753 included
Adjusted R2 .0015 .0004 .10
Notes: Model 4 uses Thomson Reuters data and defi nes payer mix in 
terms of acute acre admissions. Model 5 uses Thomson Reuters data and 
defi nes payer mix in terms of acute care inpatient days. Average age of 
plant is not included as a control variable in Models 4 and 5 because the 
dependent variable used does not depend on a hospital’s total assets. 
Model 6 uses Merritt Research Services data and defi nes payer mix in 
terms of gross patient services revenue. Heteroskedasticity robust White 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
* denotes statistically signifi cant at the fi ve percent confi dence level. 
** denotes statistically signifi cant at the one percent confi dence level.
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 Discussion 
 Despite the continuing efforts of govern-
ment payers to contain hospital costs, we 
found that serving Medicare and Medicaid 
patients did not undermine hospitals’ ability 
to manage the revenue cycle effectively. On 
the contrary, we found that hospitals with a 
higher Medicare and Medicaid payer mix 
collected slightly higher average amounts of 
patient revenue. Moreover, hospitals serv-
ing more Medicare patients collected their 
patient revenue faster while higher Medicaid 
payer mix was not associated with the speed 
of revenue collection. For hospital manag-
ers, these fi ndings may represent good news. 
They show that, despite a potentially unfa-
vorable payer mix, managers are frequently 
able to generate adequate amounts of patient 
revenue and collect it in a timely fashion. 
 Hospitals with larger shares of Medicare 
patients report shorter average collection 
periods than hospitals with more privately 
insured and uninsured patients. This result 
is consistent with prior empirical evidence 
by Prince and Ramanan, 22 who found that 
higher Medicare payer mix was associated 
with lower excess collection times. It is also 
consistent with anecdotal evidence that sug-
gests that, based on the speed of payment, 
Medicare is a good payer. By law, Medicare 
is required to pay hospitals within three to 
four weeks after a clean bill has been sub-
mitted electronically, and audits that could 
delay reimbursement are conducted rarely. 23 
Medicare thus pays hospitals comparatively 
faster than many private third-party payers 
and self-pay patients, 24 which may represent 
an important explanation for why hospitals 
with higher Medicare case loads are able 
to collect their patient revenues faster. The 
exception among private payers consists of 
managed care organizations, which tend to 
pay hospitals faster, a fi nding that is sup-
ported by our analysis. In general, the more 
managed care contracts a hospital enters 
into, the more sophisticated the hospital has 
to be when negotiating, billing, and collect-
ing patient revenues, all of which help reduce 
average collection times. 25 
 Medicaid case loads, on the other hand, 
are not associated with hospitals’ speed 
of collection. This result is not consistent 
with Prince and Ramanan who found thatat 
least during the late 1980shigher Medicaid 
payer mix was associated with lower aver-
age collection times. 26 One potential expla-
nation for the discrepancies in fi ndings is 
that Medicaid’s payment policies and prac-
tices differ widely across states. While some 
Medicaid programs pay hospitals as quickly 
as within 14 days others take up to three or 
four months to reimburse hospitals. 27 Given 
that the samples of hospitals analyzed in this 
study cover the years 2000 to 2007, the fi nd-
ings may refl ect relative changes in Medic-
aid’s average speed of reimbursement over 
the past 15 to 20 years or, alternatively, point 
to a non-representative selection of hospitals 
and, potentially, states. Future work should 
thus look more closely at state-level differ-
ences in Medicaid’s hospital reimbursement 
practices to determine whether increases in 
Medicaid payer mix add to hospitals’ aver-
age collection times in states known for their 
slow Medicaid reimbursement while contrib-
uting to shorter average collection periods in 
states known for faster payment. 
 With respect to the amount of patient reve-
nue, hospitals serving more publicly insured 
patients do not collect substantially more 
or less revenue than hospitals serving more 
privately insured and uninsured patients. An 
increase in a hospital’s government payer mix 
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was even found to be associated with small 
increases in the average amount of patient 
revenue the hospital records. This fi nding is 
consistent with prior empirical evidence by 
Buckley who also found small but positive 
associations between Medicare and Medicaid 
case loads and the average amount of patient 
revenue hospitals collected. Despite fre-
quently voiced concerns about government 
payers’ reimbursement rates, higher Medi-
care and Medicaid payer mix does no appear 
to undermine hospitals’ ability to generate 
adequate amounts of patient care revenue. 28 
Since their implementation in 1965, both 
Medicare and Medicaid have enormously 
strengthened the fi nancial position of hospi-
tals and as a result transformed the provision 
of hospital services from a charitable under-
taking into a profi table business. 29 Despite 
substantial changes in reimbursement rates 
and terms during the past 25 years, such as 
the introduction of Medicare’s prospective 
payment system in 1983 or the passage of the 
Balanced Budget Act in 1997, government 
payers continue to play an important role in 
supporting hospitals’ fi nancial viability.  
 Several other factors may explain why 
hospitals serving more publicly insured 
patients do not necessarily collect reduced 
average amounts of patient revenue. First, 
when negotiating payment rates and terms, 
private third-party payers have historically 
taken into account the proportion of a hos-
pital’s Medicare and Medicaid patients and 
the payment rates for these patients . Pri-
vate payers often considered the hospital a 
social enterprise in need of fi nancial support 
to assure access to adequate care for their 
insured. Particularly since the introduction 
of Medicare’s prospective payment system 
in 1983, which substantially reduced pay-
ment rates to hospitals, private third-party 
payers were concerned about hospitals’ 
fi nancial viability. In Michigan, for instance, 
Blue Cross Blue Shield has traditionally paid 
close attention to the total level of revenue 
deductions hospitals incurred—including 
contractual allowances granted to Medicare 
and Medicaid and bad debts from patients 
without health insurance. As a result, Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, like many 
other private payers across the country, often 
agreed to pay hospitals more than what was 
necessary to cover their costs. More recently, 
however, major purchasers of health care, 
such as the auto industry in Michigan, have 
raised concerns about the fi nancial burden 
they incur when compensating hospitals for 
public payers’ contractual allowances. While 
private payers’ concerns about the fi nancial 
viability of hospitals have for a long time 
been an important factor in the negotiation 
process, they likely constitute a less impor-
tant explanation for why government payers 
do not appear to undermine hospitals’ ability 
to generate adequate patient revenues in the 
current business environment. 
 In today’s world, hospitals have taken 
action to improve their revenue cycle by 
initiating a variety of organizational and 
managerial changes. First, more effective 
revenue cycle management has enabled 
many hospitals to increase their net patient 
revenues despite a potentially unfavorable 
payer mix. Improvement efforts frequently 
target the front end of the revenue cycle, 
including requiring patients to pay upfront 
for the deductibles and copayments they 
owe thus lowering bad debt 30 and collecting 
information regarding any  supplementary 
health insurance patients may have and that 
hospitals could bill for some of the care 
provided. Moreover, at the back end of the 
revenue cycle, improved billing processes 
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help increase the number of clean bills sent 
to government payers and their intermediar-
ies, which reduces the proportions of claims 
resubmissions and denials and speeds up 
revenue collection. 
 Second, cost shifting has allowed many 
hospitals to offset changes in payer mix. 
While increases in hospitals’ shares of pub-
licly insured patients may reduce patient 
revenue in the short term, hospitals often 
look to the privately insured to make up the 
difference and remain fi nancially viable in 
the long run. Prior empirical evidence sug-
gests that hospitals are able to shift costs 
to private payers in order to counterbalance 
lower reimbursement rates by government 
payers. A study conducted by RAND, for 
instance, found that growing Medicare and 
Medicaid payment shortfalls accounted for 
12 percent of the increase in rates paid to 
California hospitals by private insurers in 
the late 1990s. 31 Likewise, Wu found that 
hospitals were able to transfer up to 37 per-
cent of the cuts in Medicare reimbursement 
rates implemented by the Balanced Budget 
Act in 1997 to private payers. 32 In the early 
2000s, coinciding with the managed care 
backlash and hospitals’ gaining market 
power, hospitals’ payment-to-cost ratios for 
private payers continued to increase, from 
116 percent in 2000 to 132 percent in 2007, 
providing additional evidence that hospi-
tals are frequently able to maintain aver-
age amounts of patient revenue by charging 
the privately insured and the uninsured 
more. 33 
 Third, in order to offset revenue decreases 
associated with changes in payer mix, hos-
pitals may decide to change their service 
mix. 34 Hospitals may reduce the provision 
of services that do not generate enough 
revenue to cover the costs associated with 
them even though these services may be the 
ones that underserved populations, such as 
the elderly or the poor, need most. At the 
same time, hospitals may introduce new, 
more profi table services that do not nec-
essarily address the greatest needs in the 
community. A recent example that received 
national attention was the announcement of 
the University of Chicago Medical Center 
in March of 2009 to reduce the number 
of inpatient beds available to emergency 
patients and to expand efforts to redirect to 
other hospitals and clinics those ER patients 
who do not need emergency care. The hos-
pital, which serves a high percentage of 
Medicaid patients who often rely on care in 
the emergency room for non-emergent con-
ditions, openly admitted that the changes 
were proposed to meet the hospital’s fi nan-
cial challenges. 35 
 Finally, any increases in a hospital’s 
Medicaid payer mix in particular are at least 
partially offset by decreases in the number 
of uninsured patients served. Despite the 
recent debate surrounding the amounts 
hospitals charge uninsured patients for 
their care, 36 in practice, many hospitals col-
lect only a small percentage of the charges 
billed to the uninsured. As a result, even at 
current levels of Medicaid reimbursement, 
serving Medicaid rather than uninsured 
patients may allow hospital managers to 
generate more patient care revenue. In light 
of the recently passed health care reform 
bill, this fi nding is of particular interest to 
managers. The new Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act will eventually extend 
health insurance coverage to an additional 
32 million Americans, around half of whom 
will be covered under expanded Medicaid 
programs. This will substantially reduce the 
fi nancial burden of hospitals that treat many 
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of the currently uninsured and thus improve 
their revenue cycle management perform-
ance. 37 The prospect of an improved pay-
ment environment has already sparked 
the interest of for-profi t hospital chains 
to acquire cash-strapped urban hospitals, 
which often serve as inner-city safety nets 
for the poor and uninsured, as exemplifi ed 
by the recent announcement by Vanguard 
Health Systems to take over Detroit Medi-
cal Center. 38 In the future, as in the past, 
government payers will thus continue to 
play an important role in supporting hospi-
tals’ fi nancial viability. 
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